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ABSTRACT 
 
Radical Catholic Resistance to the Mexican Revolution: 
The Cristero Rebellion and the Sinarquista Movement. (August 2006) 
Martin Tomas Velazquez, B.S., Brown University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Henry C. Schmidt 
 
 
 
The Cristero Rebellion and the Sinarquista Movement were reactionary forces 
that opposed the progression of the Mexican Revolution in the first half of the twentieth 
century. This thesis compares the two movements, with particular emphasis on their 
ideologies. Both groups embodied Catholic resistance against an anticlerical and 
socialist Mexican government. The struggle between the church and state, which can be 
traced to colonial times, reached a zenith with the highly anticlerical Mexican 
Revolution of 1910. As revolutionary ideology was vigorously implemented by the 
Mexican state, Catholics rallied behind the church and sought recourse in violence. This 
culminated in the Cristero Rebellion of 1926-29, with disastrous results. In the 1930s, 
when the new threat of socialism emerged, Catholics abandoned the path of bloodshed 
and supported the Sinarquista Movement. These movements represented the ultimate 
expression in religious protest, yet little is written that compares the Sinarquistas with 
the Cristeros. Moreover, some historians contended that the two groups had little in 
common. In essence, present historiography views the movements as two separate 
events. This thesis argues that while a few differences exist, the Sinarquistas shared 
 iv 
many of the goals, ideologies, and demographics of the Cristeros. Moreover, it 
concludes that the Sinarquista Movement was essentially a continuation of the Cristero 
struggle. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Cristero Rebellion and the Sinarquista Movement were Catholic challenges 
to the rule of the Mexican government in the first half of the twentieth century. These 
episodes were emblematic of the contentious relationship that existed between the 
church and state since colonial times. Throughout Mexican history, conservative forces 
rallied to the church’s defense as this institution faced encroachment of its powers by 
liberal, anticlerical governments. The Mexican Revolution of the early twentieth century 
ushered in an unprecedented era of state-sponsored church persecution. Consequently, 
this drew a forceful response from the Catholic laity, which occurred in two phases. The 
first stage was a violent upheaval in the late 1920s known as the Cristero Rebellion. The 
second phase of Catholic resistance occurred in the 1930s, when the viciousness of the 
rebellion was transformed into a powerful sociopolitical force known as the Sinarquista 
Movement. This thesis compares and contrasts both groups and argues that Sinarquismo 
was a continuum of the Cristero struggle. 
 
Cristero and Sinarquista Historiography 
 
 The Cristeros and Sinarquistas are subjects that received light treatment in 
 
_______________ 
This thesis follows the style of the Hispanic American Historical Review. 
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Mexican historiography, especially when compared to the Mexican Revolution. It is due 
to the conservative nature of these movements that such a discrepancy exists. Earlier 
historiography lauded the Mexican revolutionaries, while ignoring or attacking their 
enemies. While many works were written about revolutionary leaders such as Pancho 
Villa and Emiliano Zapata, little notice was given to the Cristero leader Enrique 
Gorostieta or the Sinarquista chief Salvador Abascal. The few early works written about 
the Cristeros and Sinarquistas were biased. 
The Cristero Rebellion, also known as La Cristiada, exploded in 1926 to prevent 
attempts by the Mexican government to subdue the Catholic Church. This peasant 
uprising lasted for three years and claimed the lives of over 100,000 Mexican citizens.1 
Prior to the 1960s, Mexican historians distorted the popular nature of the Cristero 
Rebellion, mainly for political reasons. The rebellion was looked down upon because it 
was a reactionary movement that ran counter to the principles of the Mexican 
Revolution. This is not surprising, given that Mexico was dominated by the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) for many years. Many of these historians accepted the party’s 
view that the revolution was “progressive, triumphant and good,” while its enemies were 
“reactionary, Catholic and bad.”2 Furthermore, Mexican historiography was dominated 
by secularists and Marxists, who caricatured the rebellion as “fanatical, obscurantist, and 
priest-ridden.”3  The rebels were often dismissed as misguided, religious peasants who 
were manipulated by the church and landowners in their efforts to attack the revolution. 
Few early efforts were made by historians to understand the root causes and popular 
nature of the movement. 
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 Beginning in the late 1960s, a number of researchers began examining the 
Cristero Rebellion in an objective manner. Writers such as Robert Quirk, Alicia Olivera 
de Bonfil, and David Bailey studied the origins of the conflict.4 Their works provided an 
excellent investigation into the church-state struggle. These authors critically examined 
the roles played by President Elías Calles and other state officials in the suppression of 
Catholicism in Mexico. Moreover, they studied the response of the Catholic Church, in 
particular the actions taken by Mexican bishops and top Vatican officials. They also 
covered the Mexican middle-class laity, whose leadership played a critical role in the 
uprisings. These historians greatly enhanced our understanding of the power struggle 
that ensued between the upper echelons of the two factions. However, they largely 
ignored the peasant soldiers on the battlefield, the Cristeros, whom they considered to be 
inconsequential. 
It was historian Jean Meyer that first focused on the rebels and transformed them 
into a legitimate object for study.5 Meyer revolutionized the scholarship of the Cristero 
Rebellion by viewing the uprising as a grassroots movement, as opposed to an 
insurgence led from the top.6 Meyer’s immense research included the innovative use of 
questionnaires and interviews directed at the survivors of the rebellion. Although 
Meyer’s approach had some shortcomings, no other author came close to examining the 
peasant rebels in such exacting detail. Published in the 1970s, La Cristiada remains the 
standard in Cristero historiography. As one critic stated, “We still await a worthy sequel 
to the thesis advanced by Jean Meyer.”7 
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In the decade following the collapse of the Cristero Rebellion, the Sinarquista 
Movement emerged as a direct response to the socialist policies of President Lázaro 
Cárdenas. The National Synarchist Union (UNS), established in 1937, attained an 
impressive following of over half a million members, making it a potent threat to the 
official party.8 Since Sinarquismo was also a direct challenge to the Mexican 
Revolution, its historiography suffered the same fate as that of the Cristeros. 
Contemporary accounts, along with works immediately following the collapse of the 
movement, were subjective. 
The analysis of Sinarquismo fell into two categories: unequivocal praise and 
unabashed condemnation. The Nazi-looking Sinarquistas became an easy target of the 
Left and the Mexican government, which derided them as nothing more than a fascist 
group. Leftist writers, such as Vicente Lombardo Toledano and Carlos Velasco Gil, 
argued that Sinarquismo was not a grassroots movement, accusing it instead of being an 
“exotic plant” in the service of foreigners.9 Newspaper accounts, including those of the 
United States, also lacked objectivity and lumped Sinarquismo together with European 
fascism. Furthermore, the Sinarquistas’ views were rarely published, since the Mexican 
press was controlled by the government.10 
At the other end of the spectrum were the works of the Sinarquistas. Salvador 
Abascal wrote numerous articles and published a memoir regarding his involvement in 
the organization. Another Sinarquista writer was Juan Ignacio Padilla, who published 
Sinarquismo: Contrarrevolución. Anyone researching Sinarquista writings and 
periodicals in order to obtain a clear picture of the movement should be mindful of 
 5 
historian Kenneth Prager’s admonition that their purpose was to “indoctrinate the fold 
against the abuses and hopelessness of the Mexican Revolution and to reinforce the 
impression that the UNS was Mexico’s only means to attain salvation.”11 
In similar fashion to Cristero historiography, objective and professional research 
on the Sinarquistas did not occur until the 1970s. Historians such as Hugh Campbell 
wrote about the Sinarquista movement, as well as other organizations of the Mexican 
Right. Extensive research of the Sinarquistas was undertaken by Héctor Hernández and 
Jean Meyer, who looked past the simplistic, extremist, and derogatory labels given by 
leftist historians and instead painted the UNS as a complex, yet undeniably Mexican 
organization. 
 
The Need for Comparison 
 
 The improved studies on the Cristeros and the Sinarquistas have furthered our 
knowledge regarding these two groups. While these contributions are commendable, 
there is no work that compares these two movements. The existing research tends to 
analyze both subjects as completely separate entities. This thesis attempts to fill the void 
and argues that despite the lack of a “direct link,” a great resemblance existed between 
the Sinarquista Movement and the Cristero Rebellion. Moreover, the evidence indicates 
that there was continuity between the two elements, where the Sinarquistas adopted and 
modified the Cristeros’ brutal struggle into a nonviolent, but potent political entity. 
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 At a glance, it appears that the Cristeros had little in common with the 
Sinarquistas. The Cristeros used vicious guerilla tactics, while the Sinarquistas employed 
passive resistance. The Cristeros waged their battles in the countryside, whereas the 
Sinarquistas marched in the cities. The peasant garb of the Cristeros contrasted sharply 
with the green uniforms and red armbands of the Sinarquistas. Furthermore, the majority 
of ex-Cristeros chose not to join the UNS. 12 These facts attack the notion of a strong 
connection between the two groups. 
 Yet, a methodical examination shows that a striking resemblance did exist. The 
movements shared the same goals: the defeat of the revolutionary government and the 
establishment of a Christian Social Order on Mexican soil. The ideology of the 
Sinarquistas and the Cristeros was compatible in many areas. They had common views 
on religion, land reform, morality, and (surprisingly) martyrdom. Moreover, both 
movements shared a troubled relationship with the Catholic Church and faced identical 
enemies as they strove to achieve their objectives. Also, the demographic make-up of 
both movements was remarkably alike: a peasant base with a middle-class leadership. 
Most importantly, both the Cristero Rebellion and the UNS represented popular, 
grassroots movements that threatened to destabilize the status quo of Mexican politics. 
 This thesis demonstrates that Catholic resistance against Mexico’s anticlerical 
government was a changing process. This struggle, which emerged as early as the 
Bourbon reforms of the eighteenth century, depended principally upon the degree of 
persecution experienced by the church. This Catholic opposition was a continuous thread 
throughout Mexican history that became more active when the church suffered greater 
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oppression. When church-state relations improved, this resistance faded, yet remained 
just below the surface waiting for the next crisis to appear. Thus, when the Cristero 
Rebellion came to an abrupt end in 1929, it did not signify that the Catholic struggle 
ceased as well. Instead, it evolved and adapted into a different type of resistance, called 
Sinarquismo, which was possibly more effective in dealing with an intransigent Mexican 
government. 
This thesis begins with an overview of the church-state struggle in Mexico; a 
history that contains the roots of both Sinarquismo and the Cristero Rebellion. A 
sequential timeline of both movements is rendered, which cites important developments 
and milestones of Catholic resistance between the 1920s and 1940s. This is followed by 
an in-depth comparison of both movements, which addresses key ideological concepts, 
demographics, relations with the church, and other elements. Hopefully this thesis will 
advance the knowledge of this obscure, but essential, facet of Mexican history.   
 8 
CHAPTER II 
THE CHURCH-STATE STRUGGLE 
 
The Cristero Rebellion and the Sinarquista Movement owed their existence to the 
conflict that arose between the Catholic Church and the Mexican government. The bitter 
struggle between church and state divided Mexicans more than any other issue 
throughout Mexico’s history, leading to decades of war and ramifications in modern 
Mexican society. The once-powerful colonial church lost power and influence through 
increasingly liberal governments seeking to implement the principles of the 
Enlightenment. Conservative forces tried to reverse these setbacks and restore the 
prestige and authority the church once enjoyed. The Cristeros and Sinarquistas were but 
the latest of these groups that belonged to the Mexican Right. An examination of the 
church-state conflict shows that the Cristeros and Sinarquistas were true reactionary 
movements in the twentieth century, whose principles dated back five hundred years.  
 
The Colonial Church 
 
 In colonial times, the Catholic Church enjoyed a special relationship with the 
Spanish monarchs that gave it immense power and influence throughout New Spain. The 
agreement, known as the patronato real, or the right of royal patronage, was a series of 
papal grants made in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries to the Spanish crown. 
This agreement gave the Spanish monarch the responsibility to Christianize the natives 
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and to build needed churches and monasteries throughout the newly discovered lands. In 
exchange, the crown was made the head of the Catholic Church in Spain and her 
colonies. This allowed it to name church officials, collect tithes, allocate church 
revenues, assign missionary orders, and determine boundaries of holy sees. The Spanish 
kings also had the right to approve papal bulls and decrees before they could be 
disseminated throughout the colonies.13 These rights over the church were also exercised 
by ranking colonial officials and the Council of the Indies. The special arrangement of 
the patronato real became the root cause of the church-state conflict for centuries to 
come. 
 Under the patronato real, the Catholic Church and the Spanish crown became 
partners in the colonization of the Americas. Although the crown remained the ultimate 
authority, it needed the church to establish the legitimacy of divine rule. The church 
supported the notion that the king was responsible to God alone, making defiance of his 
pronouncements sacrilegious. Moreover, Spanish monarchs since the time of Ferdinand 
and Isabella were ardent Catholics and supported the spread and primacy of their faith. 
Consequently, Catholicism became the sole religion throughout the colonies and the 
church was given a royal blessing to obtain immense power and influence.14 This close 
cooperation between church and state on the basis of theocratic centralism can be traced 
back to Roman Emperor Constantine’s First Council of Nicaea in 325 A.D.15 
As time passed, the Habsburg rulers of Spain considered the church a dominant 
branch of the government, interlocked with the colonial bureaucracy at every level. This 
time period was labeled by Mexican conservatives as the “Golden Epoch,” where 
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“humanity [had] reached its maximum creative capacity as a consequence of its ultimate 
union with divinity.”16 Emblematic of the closeness of church-state cooperation was the 
Holy Office of the Inquisition, established by the Spanish monarchs Ferdinand and 
Isabella in 1478, whose purpose was to eradicate heresy and unify the Spanish Empire.17 
Church influence throughout New Spain was pervasive. The church was 
responsible for maintaining social services, such as health care and orphanages. It was in 
charge of the educational system, from primary school to the university level. The 
records of births, deaths, and marriages were the domain of the clergy. The church was a 
wealthy institution, thanks to the contributions from pious donors and the collection of 
an ecclesiastical tax known as the tithe. This prosperity allowed the church to become 
the primary lender for capitalist undertakings. The biggest component of the church’s 
wealth was its holdings in real estate. It is estimated that in 1700, the church owned half 
of Mexico’s arable land.18  
The clergy in colonial times had a prominent place in Mexican society. They 
were given corporate status and granted special privileges known as fueros, which made 
them answerable only to their own specialized courts for any offenses committed. 
Church authorities found that their advice heavily influenced the way in which 
authorities administered the colonial government. This sway extended to the lower 
clergy, who became sources of information for peasants and professionals. The church 
used this authority to promulgate its ideology to the flock. This philosophy, in turn, 
reinforced to the masses the concept of unquestioning allegiance to king and church.  
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Mexican colonial society was effectively divided into two major classes: the elite 
and the masses. The masses were primarily composed of the Indians and mestizos, who 
were generally weak in political and economic terms. The small but powerful class of 
the elite consisted of wealthy, literate, and fairly urbanized Spanish and creole 
landowners, royal officials, merchants, high-ranking military officers, and members of 
the church hierarchy. In order to justify this rigid top-down structure to the masses, 
church dogma preached that Mexican society was a well-regulated organism.  
By this concept, a person lived not as an individual but existed as “cell in a 
human body without any identity of his own.”19 Essentially, everyone possessed a 
unique and fixed place in the social order with no opportunity for upward mobility. On 
the other hand, the notion of a fluid society was labeled anarchic by the church and as 
interfering with the harmony established by “divine arrangement.”20 The church, with 
the support of the elite, adopted a paternalistic stance towards the lower classes in order 
to reinforce their sense of helplessness and condition them towards a strong obligation of 
servility.21 
The church used its dogma of redemption as another tool to control the masses. 
This belief saw life as a temporal phase in which man would restlessly await his demise 
in order to be reborn into a “promised” perfect society awaiting him on the other side of 
death.22 The Indian and peasant were indoctrinated to resign themselves and perform the 
required sacrifices in order to obtain salvation. No more powerful symbol of sacrifice 
existed than that of Christ, whom Mexicans worshipped because they saw in Him a 
transfigured image of their own identity.23 This spirit of martyrdom figured prominently 
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in both the Cristero Rebellion and the Sinarquista Movement. Acting as an intermediate 
between man and the hereafter, the church determined what God required and which acts 
had to be observed in order for one to be saved. This served as a potent element of 
control necessary to maintain complete and unwavering devotion.24 The church’s efforts 
kept the masses in check. However, erosion of its power came not from below, but from 
its supposed ally, the monarchy. 
 
The Bourbon Reforms 
 
 The arrival of the Bourbon dynasty at the beginning of the eighteenth century 
spelled the end of the “Golden Epoch.” After ruling Spain for centuries, the Habsburgs 
ended their reign with Charles II, who died without an heir. Following the War of the 
Spanish Succession, Philip d’Anjou, a member of the Bourbon monarchy in France, 
became the new king of Spain.25 As ruler, Philip V implemented the same policies that 
were successfully used by his family. France had become a powerful nation under 
Bourbon rule and he hoped that the same formula would reinvigorate a decadent and 
impoverished Spain.26 These new policies significantly altered the relationship between 
church and state. 
 The Bourbons were intent on modernizing Spain and bringing it out of its 
sixteenth-century mentality. Inspired by the principles of the Enlightenment, the 
Bourbons discarded Spanish practices which did not meet the eighteenth-century 
standards of utility, reason, and immediate economic advantage.27 Spain and her 
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colonies were transformed through what is known as the “Bourbon Renaissance.”28 
Throughout their rule, the Habsburgs had delegated much of their power to councils and 
semi-private organizations, each with its own fuero. The Bourbon mentality, being quite 
the opposite, was based on a clearly organized and centralized system where the direct 
lines of command were unmistakable.29 Effectively, the power of the Bourbon state was 
absolute. 
 The Bourbons, unlike the Habsburgs, did not trust the church nor see it as an 
equal partner. The Bourbons believed in the supremacy of civil over spiritual power and 
insisted that the church function as a minion under their rule. The Bourbons were not 
concerned with regulating the spirituality of the church. Instead, they wanted to end the 
church’s monopoly on land and property.30 Consequently, the Bourbon state extended 
civil jurisdiction over the clergy by abolishing many fueros and by taxing income-
producing property.31 The crown also imposed restrictions on the frequency of public 
celebrations and church spending, thereby reducing the social and political influence 
enjoyed by the clergy.32 This secular trend continued with subsequent governments. 
The most controversial Bourbon act was the expulsion of the Jesuits from the 
Spanish colonies in 1767. This powerful and wealthy order was seen as a “state within a 
state,” whose loyalties seemed more in line with the pope than the king.33 The expulsion 
of the order raised the ire of many colonists. The Jesuits were highly regarded for their 
intellect and hard work, having established over a hundred missions and countless 
schools, including 23 colleges.34 The result was an unprecedented series of riots 
instigated by Jesuit supporters in half-a-dozen cities.  
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 The revolts in support of the Jesuits came from the grassroots level. The account 
of José de Gálvez, visitor-general of New Spain, attested to this fact. Knowing full well 
the unpopular nature of his orders, Gálvez took good care that the general public did not 
know about the expulsions until they were implemented.35 Still, riots occurred in the 
northern villages and mining regions, where commissioners had been driven out and 
were thus unable to perform the evictions. The elite were not involved in the rebellion. 
These uprisings were brutally suppressed by the crown, which executed 90 leaders, 
sentenced seven hundred rebels to life imprisonment, and exiled over one hundred 
others.36  
The uprising was perhaps the first popular response by the laity against 
anticlerical policies in the New World. The key element of this rebellion was not 
ideological, but rather a personal connection that the rebels felt towards the Jesuits. 
Centuries later, this personal relationship also existed between the Cristeros and the 
oppressed clergy. Grassroots reaction also characterized the Sinarquista Movement. 
Whether intentional or not, the Bourbons had begun a challenge-and-response cycle 
between the secular state and the laity. Jean Meyer affirmed that the religious conflicts 
of the twentieth century stemmed from Bourbon policies and the opposition to them.37  
 
Conservatism vs. Liberalism 
 
 Sinarquismo and the Cristero Rebellion were also a legacy of the liberal-
conservative struggle. Beginning with the Bourbon reforms of the eighteenth century, 
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the war between liberals and conservatives was a determining factor of church-state 
affairs as well as the course of Mexican history. The Sinarquista Movement and the 
Cristero Rebellion were emblematic of the conservative response to Mexican liberalism 
and post-revolutionary anticlericalism. It is therefore necessary to define the terms 
“liberalism” and “conservatism” vis-à-vis the framework of Mexican history. 
 Liberalism emerged from the Age of Enlightenment, a period that transformed 
Europe in the eighteenth century. The Enlightenment advocated rationality as a means to 
establish an authoritative system of ethics, aesthetics, and knowledge.38 This movement 
supported the idea of universal human progress and the use of empirical methods in 
science. Writers such as Voltaire, Rousseau, and Locke focused their criticism on the 
remnants of the Middle Ages. They disparaged religious intolerance, inflexible and 
disparate class systems, limits on economic activities, and absolute monarchies.39 
Liberalism carried forward the principles of the Enlightenment long after that period had 
ended.  
Liberals advocated a pluralistic democratic system of government, a free 
exchange of ideas, and economic competition. They fought for equal rights under the 
law and the right to life, liberty, and property. Liberals challenged the status quo and 
were responsible for the two most important upheavals in the eighteenth century: the 
American Revolution of 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789. With regards to the 
Catholic Church, liberals opposed established religion and church dogma, while 
clamoring for religious freedom.40 
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Conservatism was a direct response to liberalism. This philosophy sought to 
preserve the status quo, with the prospect of regressing society to former times. To a 
conservative, any existing value or institution had to be respected because it had 
undergone the correcting influence of past experience.41 A conservative did not oppose 
change, but insisted that it be natural rather than radical.  
There were several key characteristics of conservatives. They treasured order 
because it guaranteed that existing values would survive. Conservatives valued tradition 
over innovation, and unity over conflict. Class loyalty to conservatives was vital, since 
they tended to be of the privileged class. Class was considered strictly hereditary. The 
plight of the lower classes was deemed inconsequential. Conservatives saw society as a 
tree with deep roots in the past. To do away with tradition meant cutting the roots and 
killing the great tree of civilization.42 Conservatism cherished the natural order and saw 
it wiser than any human mind. Furthermore, morality was emphasized over relativism by 
conservatives, who wished to enforce what they saw as “right living.” Consequently, 
religion became the guiding standard of the conservative movement. 
Conservatism and liberalism are also defined in terms of the “Right” versus the 
“Left.” This political jargon emerged from the French Revolution. In the National 
Assembly of 1789, the liberals, or Jacobins, sat to the left of the speaker’s podium, while 
the conservatives, who defended the king, sat on the opposite side of the chamber.43 
These definitions serve only as general guidelines. In Mexico, as was the case 
throughout Latin America, the principles of “liberals” and “conservatives” varied 
depending on their goals and the situation at hand. For example, most Mexican liberals 
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in the nineteenth century did not believe in social revolution. Nevertheless, the Catholic 
Church found that its interests lay with conservatives, thus becoming a bastion of 
support for the Right and a loathsome enemy of the Left. 
 
Mexican Independence 
 
 The Bourbon reforms brought with them the first exposure of liberal ideas to 
New Spain. This brought resistance from the privileged elites of colonial Mexico, who 
along with the church hierarchy, tried to preserve the authoritarianism, paternalism, and 
Catholicism of the earlier period.44 Their commitment to these conservative goals proved 
to be greater than their loyalty towards the motherland.  
The ouster of the Bourbon king by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1808 ushered in a 
state of confusion for New Spain and the other Spanish colonies. Although a caretaker 
government was established in New Spain to run affairs in the name of Ferdinand VII, 
several factions fought to control the course that the state would take. Liberals and 
conservatives carried their cause to the battlefield, with the church solidly behind the 
latter faction.  
 The early independence efforts were led by Miguel Hidalgo and José María 
Morelos, men that espoused the values of the Enlightenment. Conservative criollos 
refused to go along with the rebels and doomed them to defeat. The church denounced 
Hidalgo and Morelos, tried the priests under the auspices of the Inquisition, defrocked 
them, and turned them over to the government for execution. The church’s role in the 
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demise of two of Mexico’s most revered heroes was seen as traitorous and 
collaborationist by future Mexican governments. 
 Conservative loyalty to the Spanish crown faded after 1820. Although Ferdinand 
VII was reinstated as king, he was forced by his subjects to accept the liberal Spanish 
Constitution of 1812.45 Accordingly, the Mexican Church, along with conservatives, 
threw its support behind Agustín de Iturbide to declare Mexican Independence in 1821. 
Some historians saw this ecclesiastical action as an attempt to maintain the Catholic faith 
intact from a European liberal “infection.”46  
 Mexican Independence was a compromise between liberals and conservatives. 
Iturbide, a criollo general of the Royalist Army, switched sides and signed an agreement 
with the rebels known as the Plan de Iguala. This document contained the “Three 
Guarantees,” which proclaimed an independent constitutional monarchy, asserted 
Roman Catholicism as the state religion, and assured racial equality.47 Although the 
church was pleased by this conservative triumph, an important question remained 
unresolved: should the Mexican government exert the same control over the church as 
had the Spanish crown?48 This issue proved to be the root cause of the church-state 
conflict for decades to come. 
 The Spanish royalty spurned the idea of accepting a Mexican crown and thus 
allowed an ambitious Iturbide to manipulate the fledgling Congress to declare him 
constitutional emperor of Mexico in 1822.49 The First Empire lasted only ten months. 
Iturbide’s unscrupulousness and inability to run the country instigated another rebellion, 
consisting of conservatives and liberals. Following the successful overthrow of the 
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emperor, the insurgents enacted the Plan de Casa Mata, which called for a new 
government in the style of a republic.50 Despite initial optimism, this alliance broke 
down and plunged the country into decades of chaos, in which conservatives battled 
liberals for control of the government. The church remained the focal point of this 
struggle.  
 
The Early Republic 
 
 The decades following the overthrow of Iturbide were marked by financial 
disorder, political insecurity, and humiliation in dealing with foreign powers. 
Throughout this period, the liberals and conservatives refused to compromise on matters 
of substance, drawing battle lines instead. The ideological mêlée focused on whether the 
new Republic would become a federalist or centralist state.51 Throughout this period, 
conservatives and liberals became entrenched with their views of the church. 
 Mexican liberals supported federalism, which in Latin America meant states’ 
rights, not central control. Liberals, also known as federalists, clamored for freedom of 
the press, religious toleration, curtailment of fueros, secular education, and an egalitarian 
society. In foreign affairs and models for nation-building, liberals looked to the United 
States as their model. These liberals came from a variety of backgrounds: middle-class 
intellectuals, journalists, teachers, lawyers, and small businessmen. The liberal camp was 
divided into two factions: moderados (moderates) and puros (ultraliberals).52 The latter 
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group advocated a radical restructuring of society, prompting a response from alarmed 
conservatives. 
 The liberal firebrands, who were inspired by the U.S. Constitution and the 
Spanish document of 1812, saw the Catholic Church as an obstacle to progress. Their 
rhetoric contributed to the rise of anticlericalism in Mexico. Liberals accused the church 
of being the collaborationist “shadow of Spain,” and of “[corrupting] man through 
mindless acceptance of dogma.”53 Ironically, the church had been accused by the 
(liberal) Spanish government of manipulating the uneducated masses for its own 
benefit.54 The church’s enemies wanted to seize its powerful influence over the masses. 
 The conservative faction favored a centralized state, even if it meant rule by 
dictatorship. Centralists advocated censorship, a class system of rule by the elite, 
preservation of fueros and titles of nobility, monopoly of religion by the Roman Catholic 
Church, and clerical control of the country’s school system. Conservatives looked for 
inspiration in Europe rather than the United States. They extolled the nation’s colonial 
heritage and its tradition of strong central government (ironically, conservatives adopted 
this aspect of the Bourbon Renaissance). Wealthy merchants, mine owners, army 
officers, and church officials were centralists. Indians generally supported the 
conservatives, since their communities also enjoyed fueros.55 
 Delegates from liberal and conservative factions convened to adopt the 
Constitution of 1824, a compromise document that still guaranteed Catholicism as the 
sole religion in Mexico.56 This cooperation, however, was short-lived and the federalist 
state that emerged was soon in jeopardy. The ideological divide was manifested in the 
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branches of Freemasonry to which many leaders belonged. Most conservatives joined 
the Scottish Rite (escoceses), while many liberals flocked to the York Rite (yorkinos).57 
Given the uncompromising nature of these two factions, it was an unwise policy that a 
president and vice-president were elected from opposite sides of the political spectrum. 
The result was that these men conspired and led rebellions against each other, plunging 
Mexico into disarray.  
 In 1833, liberals briefly held the reins of power and demonstrated their 
willingness to decimate the church’s influence. In that year, Vice President Valentín 
Gómez Farías, a puro, enacted a series of radical decrees targeting the church. The right 
of patronato was given to the state, allowing it to name bishops and other church 
officials. Moreover, members of the monastic orders were allowed to renounce their 
vows, payment of the church tithe was deemed no longer mandatory, the Franciscan 
missions were secularized, and the University of Mexico, where most of the faculty was 
clerical, was closed.58 Conservatives, rallying to the cry “Religión y Fueros,” rose in 
indignation and ousted the liberal government. 
 Ideological leaders like Gómez Farías, however, were the exception, not the rule. 
The typical authority of the period was the caudillo; a military chief with a personal 
following. The caudillo was far more pragmatic and opportunistic than philosophically 
driven, a prime example being Antonio López de Santa Anna.59 The mercurial Santa 
Anna switched sides between different factions whenever it suited his ambitions, as he 
did with Gómez Farías, whom he supported only to drive out later.60 The end result was 
that throughout the Early Republic, Mexico was plagued with leaders that failed to 
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adhere to any set of principles, preventing the country from heading in any meaningful 
direction. As long as the government remained ideologically rudderless it could not 
assert any meaningful authority over the Catholic Church.  
 Mexico paid a heavy price during this chaotic period. Following the ouster of 
Gómez Farías, Santa Anna suspended the Constitution of 1824, disbanded the Congress, 
and worked to concentrate power into the central government. Though welcomed by 
some conservatives, Santa Anna’s dictatorship sparked a number of rebellions, again 
leading Mexico into disorder. In the years 1833-55, the presidency changed 36 times, 19 
of these with Santa Anna at the helm.61 Following a disastrous war with the United 
States, Mexico lost over half its territory in 1848. Adding insult to injury, Santa Anna 
sold another piece of Mexican territory in the Gadsden Purchase of 1853.62 At this 
juncture, Santa Anna had firmly allied himself with the conservatives, bringing ultimate 
discredit to their cause. Outraged liberals enacted the Plan de Ayutla in the summer of 
1855 and rose in rebellion to rid the country of Santa Anna once and for all. This was a 
new kind of movement, where ideologies were more important than personalities.63 
 
La Reforma 
  
 The men who took control of the Mexican government in 1855 were of a 
different breed than the caudillos. They saw the war with the United States as a disgrace 
and wanted to redefine the conscience and goals of the Mexican nation. Anti-
militaristically and secularly oriented, these politicians deeply mistrusted the church and 
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looked down upon the ambitious armed forces.64 Many of them attributed the United 
States’ power to its Protestant religion and felt that their own Catholic Church needed 
reform.65 The Revolution of Ayutla had a wider base than previous antigovernment 
movements, giving its ideological leader, Benito Juárez, a mandate to impose major 
changes to the church-state relationship.66 This period in Mexican history was known as 
La Reforma (The Reform). 
 Under Juárez’s stewardship, the government enacted a series of laws designed to 
destroy the sustaining structures of the conservative state. The 1857 Ley Juárez 
abolished military and clerical fueros. It did not dismantle military and ecclesiastical 
courts, but limited their jurisdiction to cases involving military or canon law. 
Henceforth, priests and soldiers accused of violating civil or criminal law were to stand 
trial in state or federal courts.67 The 1856 Ley Lerdo was even more controversial. This 
law prohibited civil and ecclesiastical organizations from owning property not directly 
used in daily operations. The Roman Catholic Church could keep its monasteries, 
seminaries, and church buildings, but had to divest itself from other rural and urban 
properties.68 The church was obliged to sell its vast landholdings at public auction. The 
Ley Juárez and Ley Lerdo were only the beginning of a liberal backlash against the 
church. 
 The Constitution of 1857 was a more liberal document than its predecessor of 
1824. Conservatives, who opposed the Plan de Ayutla, were mostly excluded from the 
drafting of the document.69 The Constitution incorporated Ley Juárez and Ley Lerdo in 
addition to Ley Iglesias, which prohibited the church from charging high fees for the 
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sacraments.70 Furthermore, the Constitution did not declare Roman Catholicism as the 
state religion, allowing for the toleration of other creeds in Mexico. Predictably, 
conservative response was indignant. 
 Events in Mexico were not unnoticed by the Vatican. Pope Pius IX declared, 
“We arise our Pontifical voice in apostolic liberty…to condemn, to reprove, and declare 
null and void the said decrees and everything else that the civil authority has done in 
scorn of ecclesiastical authority and of this Holy See.”71 The actions of the state and 
church placed Mexicans in a dilemma. If they swore allegiance to the Constitution, they 
were seen as heretics by the church and if they refused, they were condemned as traitors 
by the government. Catholics who took advantage of Ley Lerdo to buy church property 
were excommunicated, while civil servants who refused to take an oath to the 
Constitution lost their jobs.72 Mexican society was hopelessly divided once again and the 
country sank into a disastrous three-year civil war. 
 The War of the Reform engulfed Mexico in the years 1858-61. It was the 
culmination of the church-state conflict that had been building since the Bourbon 
Reforms.73 Ideological conflicts often bring out the worst atrocities, this war being no 
exception. The first intense persecution of the clergy occurred during this time period. 
Churches were desecrated by liberals, and priests who refused them the sacraments were 
summarily executed.74 This unrestrained violence against the clergy was repeated 
seventy years later during the Cristero Rebellion. 
 Conservative forces held Mexico City, where they declared the anticlerical 
legislation null and void. They showed support for the church by taking communion in 
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public and swearing an allegiance to the Holy See.75 The church was delighted to 
support the conservative war effort with its own treasury. The Juárez government, 
operating out of Veracruz, responded by enacting the Reform Laws, which were more 
radical than the 1857 Constitution. The new decrees made births and marriages civil 
ceremonies, legalized divorce, truncated the number of religious holidays, limited public 
religious processions, secularized cemeteries, abolished male monastic orders, prohibited 
female orders from accepting new members, taxed the priesthood, and nationalized all 
church assets and property.76 The Vatican was not pleased. 
 An interesting phenomenon transpired during the War of the Reform. Indians and 
peasants joined the conservative cause in large numbers. The deciding factor for most 
was land. It was obvious to them that the liberals who enacted the Reform Laws were 
not interested in social reform. The land confiscated through Ley Lerdo was sold to 
wealthy landowners instead of being distributed to landless peons.77 Indian villages, 
treated as corporations under Ley Lerdo, were forced to sell their communal property. 
Ironically, the liberal laws were working to the detriment of the rural masses and to the 
benefit of the hacendados.78 The issue of land was also a driving force behind the 
Sinarquista Movement and the Cristero Rebellion. 
 
The Second Empire and the Restored Republic 
 
 Juárez’s liberal army captured Mexico City on New Year’s Day, 1861, after 
trouncing the conservatives on the battlefield.79 However, hopes for stability were 
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shattered when French armies invaded at the behest of conservatives. Emperor Napoleon 
III wanted a colony in the New World and the Mexican crisis presented him with an 
opportunity. An added benefit of rescuing the church in Mexico was to curry favor with 
the strong Catholic element in France.80 On the pretext of collecting unpaid debts, 
French troops disembarked in Veracruz and marched inland. Welcomed by 
conservatives and the clergy, the French forced Juárez to abandon Mexico City once 
more. Napoleon, after conferring with conservative exiles, concluded that Mexico 
needed rule by a European monarch.  
 The conservative leadership was less concerned with the loss of Mexican 
sovereignty than the opportunity which presented itself in the wake of the liberals’ 
defeat. With aspirations that Mexico would revert to rule by divine right and that the 
Catholic Church would be prominent once again, a delegation of conservatives offered 
the Mexican crown to Austrian Archduke Maximilian von Habsburg.81 Maximilian 
accepted the throne and in 1864 was received in Mexico by the church hierarchy and its 
conservative allies.82 The emperor, however, turned out to be a colossal disappointment. 
Fancying himself a liberal (he was a Freemason), Maximilian refused to suspend the 
Reform Laws and return seized church property.83 By trying to find middle ground, 
Maximilian alienated his conservative base, while winning no friends from the liberal 
cause. 
 Napoleon, facing pressure from the United States and military concerns in 
Europe, withdrew French forces from Mexican soil. Abandoned by Napoleon and the 
pope, Maximilian made his stand in Querétaro, where he was defeated, tried, and 
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executed in 1867.84  The liberals, having successfully ousted a foreign army, usurped the 
banner of nationalism. For the conservatives, however, association with the enemy 
tainted their cause as treasonous and led to their party’s dissolution.85 After this 
humiliating defeat, the church sought more modest goals.86 
Flushed with victory, but facing immense political and economic problems, 
President Juárez wisely chose a conciliatory approach. He issued an amnesty decree for 
conservatives and allowed for modest continuity of church activities.87 The church 
hierarchy responded in kind, which led to a reduction of tensions. Symbolic of this 
détente was the Mexican archbishop’s blessing at the government ceremony 
inaugurating the Veracruz-Mexico City railway in 1873.88 The Laws of the Reform, 
while remaining on the books, were not vigorously applied. For decades to come, 
enforcement of anticlerical decrees proved pivotal to the intensity of the church-state 
struggle. 
Benito Juárez died unexpectedly in 1872 and his successor, Sebastián Lerdo de 
Tejada, abandoned the path of appeasement.89 Lerdo de Tejada applied anticlerical laws 
with greater vigor, even to the extent of expelling the last remaining order of nuns, the 
Sisters of Charity.90 Moreover, the Reform Laws that had been enacted during wartime 
were fully incorporated into the Constitution in 1875.91 The brief tolerance under Juárez 
ended and the religious conflict arose once again. A new revolt emerged which presaged 
the Cristero Rebellion.  
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The Religionero Revolt 
  
 The Religionero Revolt was a peasant guerrilla movement that existed between 
1874 and 1875.92 Yelling, “¡Viva la religión! ¡Muera el mal gobierno!” (“Long live 
religion! Death to bad government!”) the Religioneros waged their war throughout the 
western part of Central Mexico, the same region where the Cristeros emerged the 
following century.93 Historian Jean Meyer argued that this uprising was the precursor to 
La Cristiada. He asserted that the Religioneros resembled Vendée and Spanish Carlism, 
both of which were conservative movements that sought to protect the Catholic faith in 
France and Spain, respectively.94 The Religioneros fought tenaciously a government that 
they believed had abandoned Catholicism and turned Protestant.  
 The Religionero Revolt, like La Cristiada, was a true mass movement. Meyer 
called the rebellion “a war of the people” and noted that the rebel groups formed and 
disbanded as necessary to tend to their crops.95 Meyer recited the story of a Religionero 
“general” by the name of Socorro Reyes, who was captured by government forces. 
When asked who led him to rebel, he replied, “My conscience commanded me.”96 Reyes 
faced the firing squad with such grace and honor that Meyer remarked, “Such, then, was 
the character of the popular religious movement that the excellent Federal army proved 
unable to defeat.”97 This attribute also applied to the Cristeros. 
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The Pax Porfiriana 
 
Lerdo de Tejada’s intransigence, along with other controversial actions, made 
him an unpopular president. His announcement for reelection prompted a prominent 
general, Porfirio Díaz, to issue the Plan de Tuxtepec and declare himself in revolt.98 
After forcing Lerdo de Tejada from office, Díaz took power in 1877.99 Díaz was an 
astute politician as well as a military genius, which allowed him to approach the church-
state controversy in a pragmatic and constructive way.  
 The priority for Díaz was to establish internal stability and stimulate economic 
growth. Though he had been a champion of the liberal cause for 20 years, he realized 
that he could not make an enemy of the church. Therefore, he ensured that constitutional 
restrictions on the church were not enforced and that anticlerical rhetoric of government 
officials was curtailed.100 Still, Díaz was a “constitutional dictator” and forced all 
factions in Mexico to stand solidly behind through his use of the “carrot and the stick” 
method. Thus, the Laws of the Reform menacingly remained in the Constitution. Though 
there were no legal restrictions on church political activities, it was expected that the 
clergy would stay politically silent. Hence, the church remained subservient to a benign 
state.  
 The Porfiriato proved to be the most glorious period of the church since 
Independence. Church property and personnel increased considerably. Monasteries and 
convents reopened as charitable institutions, orphanages, and schools. The number of 
Catholic schools increased six times.101 There was an expansion of clerical influence and 
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prestige, for once again Mexico welcomed Catholicism. The church, for its part, became 
an ardent supporter of the regime. The hierarchy, religious newspapers, and most priests 
spoke favorably of the dictator.  
 
The Legacy of the Church 
 
 Throughout the centuries, the Catholic Church established a firm record of siding 
with the conservative cause. Intent on preserving its colonial power at all costs, the 
church supported governments that placed order and authority above personal freedoms. 
By opposing “heroes,” such as Miguel Hidalgo and supporting “villains,” like 
Maximilian von Habsburg, the church placed upon itself a traitorous label in a country 
replete with nationalism.  Moreover, the church was seen as backward-looking; a relic. It 
appeared that the church did not care about the social welfare of the average Mexican. 
Nowhere was this more evident than during the Porfiriato, when the gap between the 
rich and poor widened into a chasm. Even when the church moderated its course in the 
late nineteenth century, it found that it was impossible to reach an accord with the Left. 
Its traditionalist heritage and its past allegiance towards the conservative cause became 
major liabilities when the Mexican Revolution began in 1910. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE CHURCH AND THE REVOLUTION 
 
 The Cristero Rebellion and the Sinarquista Movement would not have emerged 
were it not for the Mexican Revolution, for their raison d’être was to oppose it. The 
revolution was fundamentally anticlerical and presented a mortal threat to the Catholic 
Church. Unlike prior conflicts, there was no organized coalition of conservative elites 
that rallied to the defense of the clergy. The church’s only recourse was to mobilize its 
mass base, the faithful. This period also marked a transformation for the church, where it 
worked for the needs of the laity beyond a spiritual way. This change in mindset 
ironically placed the church on a collision course with revolutionary ideology. The 
church and the secular government became adversaries in their quest to win the hearts 
and minds of the Mexican people.  
 
The Revolution’s View of the Church 
 
 The Mexican Revolution brought with it an unprecedented persecution of the 
Catholic Church.  Under Porfirio Díaz, the church had enjoyed an accommodating 
policy with the government. Therefore, in the eyes of the revolutionaries, the clergy 
were seen as willing accomplices to the excesses of the regime. Previously, the church 
faced adversaries intent on implementing liberal principles without disturbing the 
framework of society. However, with the advent of the revolution, the church faced a 
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new breed of enemy, one that was willing to change the whole social order. The goal of 
the revolution was to create a “new man,” free of superstition, fanaticism, prejudice, and 
idolatry.102    
 The church was the target of revolutionary goals. Revolutionaries felt that the 
church needed to be marginalized in order for Mexico to become a modern nation.103 
They accused the church of opposing every progressive movement in Mexican history, 
thereby retarding the development of the country.104 Many radicals felt that the church 
obstructed nationalism, since it instructed its flock to remain faithful to the Vatican.105 
The church frustrated the revolutionary government’s goal of controlling the nation. 
With the absence of a major opposition party, the Catholic Church was perceived as the 
main political adversary in Mexico.106 Moreover, a new social Catholic ideology had 
evolved, which made the church a competitor to the revolutionary program. 
 
The Transformation of the Church 
 
 Contrary to revolutionary rhetoric, the church was not as intransigent as it once 
had been. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the Vatican realized that it had to 
address the social ills affecting the laity, otherwise it would lose its following to secular 
socialist movements. In 1891, Pope Leo XIII issued Rerum Novarum, an encyclical that 
promulgated a type of socialism which was compatible with Christian principles.107 
According to Rerum Novarum, social Catholicism was a form of Christian democracy 
that would unite the church with the people.108 Catholics were called upon to solve the 
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problems of the working class, such as labor reform and the workers’ right to organize, 
while rejecting secular socialism and class struggle.109 
 The Mexican clerical response to Rerum Novarum was mild, but palpable. A 
handful of progressive clerics sponsored a series of Social Action Congresses during the 
first decade of the twentieth century. These congresses debated social issues, criticized 
the hacendados, and deplored the condition of the working class.110 Reforms were 
proposed that gave land to the peasants and rights to laborers. The focus on labor was 
particularly intense, exemplified by the formation of the Mexican Catholic 
Confederation in 1913, the first attempt at labor unionization in the country.111 In 
addition, Catholic Worker’s Circles were established to catechize the proletariat and 
fight social vices, such as gambling and alcohol.112 Catholic action also infiltrated the 
political arena. On May 5, 1911, the archbishop of Mexico called upon the leaders of 
two nascent political organizations, Operatarios Guadalupanos (Workers of Guadalupe) 
and the National Catholic Circle, to form the National Catholic Party.113 The party’s 
platform was the furtherance of Catholic social aims publicized by the earlier 
congresses.  
 Rerum Novarum was not uniformly implemented. This was especially the case 
during the Díaz regime, when the Mexican hierarchy kept a firm grip on the reins of the 
program. Historian Kenneth Prager observed that until 1910, the Social Action programs 
were shallow and uneventful.114 These groups were never allowed to go beyond the 
discussion stage, lest they disturb the delicate balance that had been established with the 
state. Still, a precedent was set in motion which became useful once hostilities resumed. 
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The church began to organize its base as a check against the revolutionary government. 
These lay organizations ultimately provided the middle-class leadership for the Cristero 
Rebellion and the Sinarquista Movement.  
 The irony of the conflict between the church and state was that the former was no 
longer a “willing handmaiden of reaction.”115 However, the church had to fight an image 
that it had developed throughout the centuries. Moreover, it did not matter to 
revolutionaries that the church had changed. They were resolute on implementing 
reforms on their own terms and were unwilling to let another entity carry out a parallel 
program. The church was seen as a challenger to be dealt with, and crushed if need be. 
 
The Onset of the Revolution 
 
 On November 20, 1910, the Mexican Revolution began as Francisco Madero led 
his forces against the Díaz government. The first stage of the revolution saw the ouster 
of the old regime, followed by civil war. The coalition dissolved and the revolutionary 
leaders fought against each other, bringing the country to near anarchy. Throughout this 
period, the church faced renewed persecution for its support of the dictatorship. In its 
quest for survival, the church tried to make pacts with the more moderate factions.116  
 Progressive Catholics were joyful with Madero’s triumph in 1911. As president, 
Madero welcomed the National Catholic Party as a tangible manifestation of Mexico’s 
new liberty.117 Catholic traditionalists, however, viewed Madero as weak and 
ineffective. They, along with other conservatives, greeted the coup of Victoriano Huerta 
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in 1913.118 However, Huerta had achieved the presidency through treachery, murdering 
Madero in the process. His actions precipitated another, bloodier phase in the revolution, 
as several governors proclaimed themselves in rebellion. The church had associated 
itself once again with an unsavory leader and consequently paid a hefty price.  
 Convinced that the clergy had colluded in Madero’s overthrow, the rebels 
exacted their vengeance. Churches were seized and burned while priests were jailed, 
harassed, and murdered. 119 In many regions, worship ceased to exist.120 The revolution 
took a decidedly anti-Catholic tone. When the rebels triumphed against Huerta, a 
convention was held in Querétaro which gave an institutional basis to the revolution. A 
new constitution was drawn up which threatened the very existence of the Mexican 
Catholic Church. 
 
The Constitution of 1917 
 
No other document had greater impact on Mexican church-state relations than the 
Constitution of 1917. True to their convictions, the victorious revolutionaries 
incorporated sweeping anticlerical legislation into the charter. The Constitution adopted 
the Laws of the Reform and implemented other measures that further stymied church 
influence. Article 3 established secular education.121 Article 5 prohibited monastic 
orders.122 Article 24 banned public worship outside the confines of a church building.123 
Article 27 nationalized all church real estate and gave the government the authority to 
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regulate church buildings.124 The most anticlerical section of the Constitution was 
Article 130, which proved to be the crux of the church-state conflict in the 1920s. 
Through Article 130, the Constitution denied the church legal existence. As a 
nonentity, the Mexican Church was left without any official channels to address 
grievances. Legally, the church was defenseless. Furthermore, Article 130 treated the 
clergy as members belonging to a professional organization and gave the state 
governments the power to register and regulate them.125 Article 130 allowed only native-
born clergy on Mexican soil. Moreover, priests and nuns were not allowed to speak out 
against the government nor vote in elections.126 
Anticlerical laws prior to the Constitution of 1917 were meant to increase the 
government’s power at the expense of the church and to separate the two entities. The 
intent of the Constitution, however, was radically different. It sought to incorporate and 
subordinate the church into the government, in essence a revival of the patronato real.127 
The church found itself in the precarious situation of state control with none of the 
privileges it had enjoyed during colonial times and no recourse to the Vatican. The 
church had no one to turn to except its flock. 
 
The Practical Revolutionaries 
 
 The Mexican Revolution, like any other sociopolitical movement, had its 
moderates and radicals. The anticlerical provisions of the Constitution, striking as they 
were, could be rendered innocuous if not enforced. Therein lay the key to the church-
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state conflict. A few leaders, such as Juárez and Díaz, understood that peaceful 
coexistence with the church was possible through non-enforcement of provocative laws. 
Practicality took precedence over ideology so that harmony could exist. Some 
revolutionary leaders heeded the precedent. 
 The first president under the Constitution of 1917 was Venustiano Carranza, 
leader of the armies that had ousted the unpopular Huerta. Although he convened the 
constitutional assembly, Carranza was no radical. The delegates drafted a document too 
drastic for his taste, especially those sections that dealt with land reform. Carranza 
wanted to build popular support for his policies without alienating the church. He 
therefore allowed public processions, such as one honoring the Virgin Mary in 1919.128 
He also talked of modifying Article 130. The church responded to Carranza’s olive 
branch with goodwill. 
 Like so many administrations of the early revolutionary period, Carranza’s rule 
was ephemeral. In 1920, he was driven out of office by rival Alvaro Obregón, a famous 
military general of the revolutionary campaigns. While Obregón adopted Carranza’s 
conciliatory attitude towards the church, his approach was quite different. Obregón, who 
came from the northern state of Sonora, had a well-earned reputation as a fierce 
anticlerical. As a military man, he slandered the priesthood, closed Catholic schools, 
imprisoned clergy, seized convents, and even helped draft the 1917 Constitution.129 
Despite his anticlerical convictions, Obregón, as president, chose to avoid a direct 
conflict with the church. Obregón’s priority was to consolidate his power, which he 
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achieved through persuasion and intimidation. An astute politician, he was able to 
manipulate various factions, including the clergy, to fulfill his goals.130 
 To achieve his objectives, Obregón preferred cooperation over conflict. While he 
could be lenient, anything that seemed to challenge his authority was dealt with directly 
and brutally. With regards to the church, Obregón chose a prudent path by scaling back 
his caustic rhetoric and ignoring anticlerical laws.131 His patience was tested, however, 
when in 1923 a large open-air ceremony took place in Central Mexico to commemorate 
an enormous statue of Christ. Obregón viewed this as a deliberate church violation of the 
ban on public worship.132  He promptly expelled the Vatican’s apostolic delegate, who 
had presided over the ceremony.133 Obregón’s response was just as decisive with the 
National Eucharist Congress of 1924. He shut down the convention, deported foreign 
clergy, and fired government employees who had participated in the assembly.134 
 Obregón was a moderate, notwithstanding his actions. He was able to placate the 
anticlerical demands from the Mexican Left while maintaining an open dialogue with the 
Vatican.135 Obregón’s tactics were tame compared to the wave of anticlericalism that 
was sweeping across the country, for extremists had begun a campaign of terror by 
bombing churches.136  The situation became more unbearable under Obregón’s 
successor, Plutarco Elías Calles. This was a president who knew no patience and gave no 
quarter. Calles’s callous policies unleashed the wrath of the Cristeros.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CRISTERO REBELLION 
 
 The Cristero Rebellion of 1926-29 was a genuinely popular counterrevolutionary 
movement. Like the Religioneros of the 1870s, the Cristeros launched a vicious attack 
on a government they considered godless. The uprising was a measure of last resort to 
defend a church threatened with extinction. The Cristeros forced the government to curb 
its anticlerical policy. This grassroots phenomenon also transpired in the Sinarquista 
Movement of the 1930s. The composition of the rebellion was complex, consisting of 
elements from the middle and lower classes. These two factions attempted to work in 
conjunction with one another against the government. Adding to the fray was the 
Catholic Church, which endeavored to control and channel the laity into a potent weapon 
against the state.  
  
The Intransigence of Calles 
 
A new anticlerical phase of the Mexican Revolution began on December 1, 1924, 
when Plutarco Elías Calles assumed the presidency.137 The church found an implacable 
foe in Calles, for this president lacked Obregón’s reflective temperament. President 
Calles was an individual of stubbornness and principle; a man completely devoted to the 
ideals of the revolution.138 Prior to Calles, there was hope that the revolution could be 
reconciled with the church. His actions erased all prospects for conciliation. 
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Calles was an absolutist. He imposed order on the chaos left by the revolution 
through centralized control. He consolidated the army and subjugated the revolutionary 
generals. He continued Porfirio Díaz’s modernization efforts and imposed federal power 
over caciques, state governments, the press, and labor unions. Calles intended to 
institutionalize the revolution and manage it by identifying it with the absolute state.139 
To this end, Calles created a monolithic political entity, the National Revolutionary 
Party (PNR).140 Meyer stated, “If a dictator is one who tolerates nothing outside his own 
will, then Calles was dictatorship personified.”141 Calles intended to be the master of his 
house and found the church to be a stubborn guest. 
Calles had other reasons for attacking the church. He was elected to the 
presidency with unwavering support from socialists, whose core component was the 
Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers (CROM). Calles wanted to use this support 
to solidify his grip on power and implement his programs. Therefore, he acceded to the 
demands of the Mexican Left, in particular the implementation of Article 27, the 
regulation of church buildings.142 The CROM, representing the most radical hue of the 
revolutionaries, had a privileged place within the Calles government.  Its outspoken 
leader, Luis Morones, was appointed Minister of Labor. The CROM also controlled the 
Ministries of Commerce and Industry.143  
Calles was also driven by his personal views on the church. He, like Obregón, 
came from the northern state of Sonora, where Protestantism was making inroads.144 
Though not opposed to Catholic spiritualism, Calles had disdain for the clergy who 
misused it for their own benefit. He concluded that the church could only function 
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through government control.145 However, when faced with church resistance to his 
policies, Calles’s position radicalized. Convinced that the clergy were in open rebellion 
against him and in collusion with American oil companies, he wanted nothing more than 
to “extirpate the Catholic faith from the soil of Mexico.”146 The détente that had taken 
place between Obregón and the church disintegrated under Calles. 
 
The Calles Law 
 
 President Calles needed only a pretext to unleash his anger on the Catholic 
Church. In February 1926, the primate of Mexico made a declaration that the church did 
not recognize the Constitution.147 This ecclesiastical challenge to civil authority goaded 
Calles into decreeing full implementation of all constitutional provisions regarding 
religion. In July 1926, he signed the Law for Reforming the Penal Code, also known as 
the Calles Law.148 This was an enabling act for the Constitution of 1917, which 
previously had been selectively enforced. 
 The Calles Law consisted of 33 articles which specified application of 
constitutional provisions relating to religion.149 Religious orders were outlawed, church 
buildings nationalized, and public religious acts prohibited. Priests were required to 
register with the government, forbidden to wear their religious garments in public, and 
barred from criticizing the state. The laws had teeth; noncompliance meant fine, 
imprisonment, or both.150 The greatest concern for the church hierarchy was Article 19, 
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the compulsory registration of clergy.151 This was seen as a prelude to the establishment 
of a Mexican national church. 
 On February 21, 1925, one hundred armed men from the CROM broke into La 
Soledad church in Mexico City, ousted the parish priest, and installed one of their 
own.152 This priest proclaimed himself to be the “patriarch of the Mexican Church.”153 
An angry mob of parishioners ejected the intruders and street battles ensued. The 
government eventually stepped in to restore order. Calles then made a curious 
proclamation in which he denounced the attempts by one creed to take over a church 
building belonging to the nation. He was, however, disposed to recognize the existence 
of a “Mexican Church.”154 This confirmed suspicions that Calles had orchestrated the 
entire event in order to create his own church on Mexican soil. 
 The schismatic church eventually failed, but it was only part of the state’s 
secularizing agenda. The aim of the separatist church was to divide the clergy and 
establish a state-controlled religious entity.155 Only a few parishes followed this sect, 
whose priests were promptly excommunicated by the church.156 Still, the bold move by 
the government ushered in another wave of oppression. As if to prove his resolve, Calles 
ordered La Soledad closed and turned into a public library.157  
 State governments followed the precedent set by Calles. Some states, such as 
Tabasco, were particularly anticlerical. Laws were enacted in that state which the church 
could not reasonably follow, such as limiting the number of clergy to 1 per 30,000 
inhabitants, or requiring priests to be married and over the age of 40.158 With Calles as 
president, it was quite acceptable for a municipality to turn a churchyard into a 
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basketball court.159 The Mexican Revolution’s socialist undertones also brought a new 
level of intensity to the war against the church.160 Propaganda campaigns against the 
clergy were launched by the Left, which also waged a program of religious vandalism 
and terrorism. The CROM took part in church bombings, defaced sacred images, and 
planted its red flag on church grounds.161 Threatened with annihilation, the Catholic 
Church took action.  
 
Attempts at Compromise 
 
 The church had been chastened by its previous battles with the government. It 
knew that it was useless to wage an all-out war; to do so would only make matters 
worse. Its experience with the Díaz regime and other administrations taught it that 
compromise was the best course of action. The church hierarchy could maintain an 
accommodating stance with the Calles government so long as the anticlerical provisions 
remained “theoretically” dangerous to the church’s freedom.162 
 Calles’s encouragement of the schismatic church prompted the hierarchy to 
organize. In 1925, the Episcopal Committee was established to deal with the 
belligerency of the government.163 Headed by Mexico’s primate, Archbishop Luis Mora 
y del Río, the committee took guidance from Rome. Although some of the committee 
members wanted a confrontation with the government, the Vatican was resolute in 
seeking a diplomatic option. An apostolic delegate was sent to meet with the Minister of 
the Interior, to see if an arrangement could be made regarding the Calles Law. The 
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government’s response was a prompt expulsion of the diplomat.164 The Vatican’s policy 
was reduced to impotence by the Calles administration. A different approach by the 
church was needed. 
 The Mexican Constitution, while not recognizing the church as a legal entity, did 
not prohibit individuals from seeking legal action.165 An attempt was made by the 
hierarchy to petition Congress for constitutional amendments and to solicit injunctions 
against anticlerical decrees. However, the division of powers in Mexico was fictitious, 
for Calles controlled the system.166 Rebuffed by the legislature and the courts, the church 
abandoned this tactic, convinced that it would never receive a fair hearing from the 
regime. Protests issued by the Episcopal Committee were also fruitless. 
 The inflexibility of the Calles government encouraged the Episcopal Committee 
to adopt a more combative posture. Rome at first discouraged this attitude, but found 
that its low-key approach had failed to provide results. Therefore, the Vatican agreed 
with the committee’s advocacy of passive resistance. The pope issued an evangelical 
letter to the episcopate, condemning the anticlerical laws and recommending a course of 
“Catholic action.”167 Embarking on a new path, the Episcopal Committee counted on the 
fidelity of its flock. It was not disappointed.   
 
Social Action 
 
 Social, not political, action was what the church needed to confront the 
government. Politics were placed outside the realm of the church by the Constitution. As 
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a consequence, the National Catholic Party disappeared in 1917.168 The church wanted 
to avoid the appearance of meddling in affairs that were prohibited; therefore it directed 
Catholics to avoid political parties.169 However, the hierarchy was aware that Catholic 
discontent with the government needed guidance. Consequently, it encouraged the 
formation of advocacy groups dedicated to protecting the church through social means. 
The social action advocated by the papal encyclical Rerum Novarum became 
more relevant with the advent of the revolution.  However, the Catholic resistance that 
emerged was of a grassroots nature and not a plan orchestrated by the church. Still, the 
hierarchy tried to guide the discontent of its Catholic legions. Control of Catholic 
mobilization became a learning process for the church. 
 
The Laity Mobilizes 
 
Several lay organizations emerged that strove to channel Catholic discontent into 
civic action. One of these was Popular Union, or Unión Popular (UP). The UP was 
founded in 1925 in response to an anti-Catholic offensive launched by the governor of 
Jalisco.170 The founder of the movement, Anacleto González Flores, was inspired by the 
Volksverein, a German Catholic resistance group.171 González Flores based the UP on 
the ideas of two nineteenth-century German Catholics, Bishop Wilhelm von Ketteler and 
Ludwig Windthorst, leader of the Center Party. Ketteler wrote a book, The Labor 
Question and Christianity, in which he advocated a Christian and humanitarian approach 
to labor-management relations which rejected both laissez-faire capitalism and socialist 
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collectivism.172 González Flores, nicknamed El Maestro (the Teacher), strove to achieve 
his goals through nonviolence, believing that despotic systems should be overthrown 
through passive resistance.173 
The UP was very successful at recruitment and achieved a membership of over 
80,000.174 It organized an effective network throughout the towns and cities of western 
Central Mexico. Its territory was structured into street blocks, zones, and parishes, each 
headed by a leader in close touch with his subordinates and immediate supervisor.175 The 
UP operated clandestinely, where bureaucratic functions were kept to a bare minimum 
and messages were transmitted, whenever possible, by word of mouth.176 This urban 
system served as an effective urban base of support for the Cristeros.177 Ironically, the 
UP’s mission of peaceful resistance was ultimately transformed to support a bloody 
struggle. 
Another important lay organization existed in the region about which very little 
is known. Called the “U,” this ultra-secretive Catholic society from Morelia, Michoacán, 
was ostensibly founded in 1918 by a future archbishop of Mexico, Luis Martínez.178 
Apparently, the “U” was ultimately controlled by González Flores. The “U” was used to 
recruit Catholic leaders and to “pull the strings” behind the scenes of other lay 
organizations.179 According to Jennie Purnell, it was the “U” that organized the 
information, espionage, and mobilization networks that made the UP successful.180  
The other important lay associations were based in Mexico City. The Catholic 
Association of Mexican Youth (ACJM) was founded in 1913 by a Jesuit priest, Father 
Bernard Bergöend. 181 Bergöend, who worked with young people, became convinced 
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that Mexico needed a youth-oriented Catholic action group to combat revolutionary and 
secular influences.182 With the approval of Archbishop Mora y del Río, the ACJM was 
modeled after the Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Française of Bergöend’s native 
France.183 
The ACJM’s purpose was to prepare young Catholics for the task of infusing 
Christian principles of charity and justice into all functions of secular society. The 
ACJM also advocated abstinence from political involvement and declared that it was an 
“imperative duty” to defend political and religious freedom.184 It was organized into 
chapters consisting of about 15 students, with an ecclesiastical advisor appointed by the 
local bishop.185  These circles, named after famous Catholics, held weekly sessions 
where the three key principles were “piety, study, and action.”186 The gains made by the 
ACJM were at first modest, reaching a membership of seven thousand in 1923.187 
The ACJM, despite its small numbers, became a vocal organization against the 
Calles government. The original intent of the ACJM was not violence, but it ultimately 
radicalized and became the most combative of all lay organizations. The ACJM 
indoctrinated its membership to defend “directly and physically” Catholic interests.188 A 
good portion of the weekly meetings emphasized militancy and self-sacrifice, casting the 
young members in the role of “Christian warriors.”189  
The ACJM was headed by René Capistrán Garza, a fiery and gifted orator.190 He 
declared that the Calles government intended to establish a country without religion or 
ethics.191 Under Capistrán Garza’s leadership, the members of the ACJM became an 
armed and dedicated Catholic youth willing to combat the state. They were militants 
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who, when the time came, were prepared to die for the cause.192 These young Catholics 
waged violent street battles against police and state authorities.  
 
The League 
 
By 1925, the need for an umbrella organization was apparent. The incident of La 
Soledad alarmed many worshippers, who clamored for a new national Catholic entity. 
Existing associations, such as the UP, were of a regional nature and lacked cooperation 
with one another. On March 14, 1925, the National League for the Defense of Religious 
Liberty (LNDLR) was created by Miguel Palomar y Vizcarra, a militant member of the 
Social Action Congresses and the defunct National Catholic party.193 The LNDLR, 
known as the League, intended to teach Mexican Catholics their rights and obligations as 
citizens and to organize them for the defense of religious freedom.194 Reliance on the 
“volunteer spirit” for social action was emphasized.195 While opposed to the revolution, 
the League supported reform within a Christian social context.196 Still, the League 
declared that it would pursue its goals through constitutional means and “those required 
by the common good,” an ominous warning of things to come.197 
The fiery young men of the ACJM comprised the core membership of the 
League. The ACJM, unlike the UP and the “U,” was not confined to a particular region, 
giving the nascent League a national network to build upon. Consequently, it was the 
leader of the ACJM, Capistrán Garza, who headed the League’s Directing Committee.198 
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Although the League was not a creation of the Mexican Episcopate, it received the 
church’s blessing to invite various Catholic groups into the new coalition.199  
The League soon encompassed representatives from Catholic trade unions, the 
Knights of Columbus, the Catholic Ladies, the Congregation of Mary, and the Nocturnal 
Adoration.200 Anacleto González Flores, aware of the combative spirit of Capistrán 
Garza, was reluctant to place the UP under the leadership of the League, but acquiesced 
at the request of the bishops.201 It was through the UP that the League could influence 
Catholics in western Mexico.202 
The membership of the League grew exponentially. In June 1925, it only had 
36,000 members, but by September 1926, its numbers swelled to 800,000.203 Based in 
the capital, the League maintained a strong membership throughout Central Mexico.204 
The initial ideology of the League was nonviolence, which the church wholly 
supported.205 Although not a political party, the League advocated political action as an 
acceptable form of passive resistance.206 A petition drafted by the League for the reform 
of the Constitution was signed by over two million Mexicans.207 Demonstrating 
audacity, the League carried out an intensive campaign of agitation and mobilization by 
encouraging legal action, economic boycotts, and other nonviolent exploits.208 This 
approach brought further persecution from the Calles government and leftist groups.209 
Nevertheless, the Leaguers provided a bastion of support for the Catholic Church as it 
considered a drastic measure to confront the ensuing crisis. 
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The Suspension of Worship 
 
 The strongest measure enacted by the church was the suspension of public 
worship. It was clear to the hierarchy that the Calles presidency represented a new type 
of anticlerical persecution: inflexible and unrelenting, with no hope for compromise.  
Therefore, the Episcopal Committee voted on July 11, 1926, to enact the cessato a 
divinis (the suspension of mass), the most potent weapon of passive resistance at its 
disposal.210 The Vatican, seeing the futility of negotiations, authorized the action.211 The 
suspension was to take place on August 1, the day the Calles Law was to take effect.212 
The ending of the public cult was not an excommunicatory measure, but an attempt to 
put the sacraments and clergy beyond the reach of the civil law. This measure was 
deemed necessary, since conditions were incompatible for the free practice of the 
Catholic religion.213  
The end of worship was an unprecedented event in Mexican history. The 
announcement created panic and prompted a last-minute rush on churches by swarms of 
devotees.214 Despite the end of public mass, the churches remained open and full of 
parishioners.215 Still, Catholics yearned for the sacraments. Priests, striving to serve their 
flock, found themselves in a quandary: mass could not be celebrated in the church, 
where the episcopate forbade it, or outside, where it was declared illegal by the 
government. At the risk of persecution, priests celebrated mass in the private homes of 
the devout.216 By breaking the law, they faced government reprisal in the form of 
expulsion, jailing, or even death.217  
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The suspension of worship was accompanied by a nationwide economic boycott. 
The plan for the boycott was hatched by the League, with the hierarchy’s approval.218 
Catholics were directed to buy nothing except basic necessities.219 They were also asked 
to use public transportation as sparingly as possible, cut down on electricity, and give up 
entertainment.220 Catholic teachers stopped working in secular schools. The sanctions 
also targeted businesses that supported the government.221 The UP was successful in 
implementing the boycott in the areas which it controlled: Jalisco, western Michoacán, 
and western Guanajuato.222 It is estimated that economic activity fell by 75% in these 
areas.223 
 The boycott proved ineffective against the government, however. By October 
1926, the program collapsed, due mainly to opposition from wealthy Catholics affected 
by the sanctions.224 These upper-class Catholics were fearful that continued mass 
opposition would worsen government repression.225 Without the cooperation of the 
wealthy, the boycott was doomed to fail, since the poorer elements lacked the buying 
power to inflict significant economic damage.226  
 The end of worship did not affect the government’s impudence. The Minister of 
the Interior could barely contain his enthusiasm, stating, “The [church] has exceeded our 
wildest hopes in decreeing the suspension of religious services, nothing could be more 
pleasing to us…We have got the clergy by the throat and we will do everything to 
strangle it.”227 President Calles boasted that the tactic was counterproductive and would 
decrease the church’s membership by a weekly 2%, leading to its eventual extinction.228 
Many Catholics were outraged and felt that passive resistance was fruitless. Impatient 
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for a peaceful resolution, many of them began taking matters into their own hands. 
Although intended as a nonviolent measure, the suspension of worship became the 
catalyst for the Cristero rebellion. 
 
Spontaneous Mobilization 
  
 Catholics were more likely to respond violently to government anticlericalism if 
they felt it on a personal level. The suspension of services made the church-state conflict 
into an individual struggle for many worshippers, who saw their churches closed and 
their priests persecuted. Government harassment had a reinvigorating effect on popular 
piety, leading to a fierce reaction. Meyer described this phenomenon as “spontaneous 
mobilization.”229 A key example was the reaction to the schismatic church, which 
resulted in a massive street battle between Catholics and troops. “Spontaneous 
mobilization” also characterized the Jesuit and the Religionero revolts of earlier 
periods.230 
At first, most Catholics wanted nonviolent protests, while a small, but visible, 
minority desired an insurgence.231 The former group opted for wearing mourning clothes 
as a sign of dissent against the government.232 The latter group, known as the “white 
radicals,” was not afraid of an open fight with the state.233 As attacks on the church 
increased, the number of “white radicals” swelled. These Catholics stood guard around 
their churches to prevent acts of iconoclasm and waged street battles with 
revolutionaries. The cessato a divinis was for many Catholics, the last straw: “Rather 
 53 
than the unconvincing slowness of the civil struggle, the populace, its nerves shattered 
by the suspension of services, preferred open war, without realizing what that would 
mean in terms of horror.”234 
 Just a few days after the suspension of services, revolts began in Mexico’s 
western highland region. On August 3, 1926, four hundred armed Catholics entered the 
church of Our Lady of Guadalupe in Guadalajara, Jalisco.235 The ensuing battle with 
federal troops resulted in several dead and injured. The following day, in Sahuayo, 
Michoacán, 240 government soldiers stormed the parish church. The priest and his vicar 
were killed in the ensuing violence.236 On August 14, in the town of Chalchihuites, 
Zacatecas, federal soldiers executed several members of the ACJM, including a priest.237 
These government atrocities ignited more revolts from indignant Catholics. Between 
August and December 1926, there were 64 uprisings in the Mexican countryside.238 
These outbreaks were small, isolated, and uncoordinated.239 
 
The League Declares War 
 
 By the end of 1926, the calls for passive resistance rang hollow to the League: 
“Patience, penance, and prayer of the period from May to December had been to no 
avail, for the heart of Calles had been hardened.”240 The League was tired of the 
nonviolent approach and wanted hostilities to begin. The mission changed from defense 
of the church to an offensive program, with the intent of seizing power.241 The numerous 
spontaneous uprisings in late summer and autumn also precipitated this change in 
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strategy.242 Its massive popularity, along with prior support from the church, had clouded 
the judgment of the League’s leadership.  
The young leaders of the League became delusional, thinking they could direct 
an army of thousands and force the government to capitulate.243 They abandoned passive 
resistance in the hopes of leading a crusade.244 The UP membership concurred with the 
League’s decision, despite the objections of González Flores.245 The secretive “U” also 
had a role, which consisted of mobilizing and coordinating the leadership of lay 
organizations to support the rebellion.246 There is considerable debate as to whether the 
church approved of the uprising. Officially, the rebellion was neither condemned nor 
sanctioned by the episcopate.247 However, there are accounts which indicate that the 
rebels received the church’s blessing. Regardless, the League always maintained that it 
had received the blessing of the church.248  
 The League, relishing its role as an all-encompassing Catholic organization, 
wanted to coordinate the uprisings into one massive rebellion. The League called upon 
all insurgents to attack the government beginning on January 1, 1927.249 On that day, 
René Capistrán Garza issued his famous manifesto, “A la Nación” (“To the Nation”). He 
declared that “the hour of battle has sounded” and “the hour of victory belongs to 
God.”250 With that call, the state of Jalisco, which had until then remained relatively 
quiet, exploded.251 
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The Rebellion Begins 
 
The war erupted in the Los Altos (the Highlands) region of Jalisco, northeast of 
Guadalajara.252 Hundreds of bands, consisting of groups of 50 to 300 men, began seizing 
villages.253 These rebels, often armed with old rifles and machetes, called themselves the 
Cristeros, for they were soldiers fighting for Christ the King.254 These insurgents 
launched themselves at government forces uttering the famous battle cry “¡Viva Cristo 
Rey!” (“Long live Christ the King!”).255 The rebellion spread from Jalisco to the 
bordering states of Michoacán and Colima.256 By the middle of 1927, the Cristero ranks 
had increased to 35,000.257 
 The government’s initial response was weak. Federal troops were left to guard 
the major cities, while agraristas (rural militias recruited by the government) were left to 
contend with the Cristeros. The rebels did well against these militias, for they were 
expert horsemen and knew the terrain well.258 The Cristeros could not equal the 
firepower of the federal army and employed hit-and-run tactics whenever possible.259 
Yet, the rebels outmatched the federal cavalry and began scoring successes on the 
battlefield. The Cristeros also enjoyed the wide support of the local populace, which 
supplied them with food, shelter, and intelligence.260 The Cristeros suffered from the 
lack of a single leader, however.261 Instead, several chiefs commanded troops 
independently of one another. The most successful of these commanders were Jesús 
Degollado (a druggist), Victoriano Ramírez (a ranch hand), and two priests, Aristeo 
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Pedroza and José Reyes Vega.262 As the war raged, the League tried to organize the 
disparate rebel elements into a single unit that it could control. 
 
The Role of the League 
 
 An unusual feature of the Cristero Rebellion was that it emerged as two separate 
entities belonging to different social classes. The middle-class League found itself 
isolated in Mexico City, while the lower-class masses fought in the western highlands.263 
In January 1927, the League created an entity to oversee military matters.264 This 
commission, known as the Special War Committee, was to manage and coordinate lay 
organizations as well as the rebel bands.265 Members of the ACJM volunteered to join 
the Cristeros, eager to fight and die for the cause.266 
 The League also looked to the United States for help. Capistrán Garza embarked 
on a mission to obtain financial and political support from U.S. Catholics.267 Another 
goal of the League was to attain the neutrality of the American government, which at the 
time was experiencing strained relations with the Calles administration.268 Despite his 
efforts, Capistrán Garza failed in his undertaking. Not able to acquire funds for the 
rebellion, he resigned as the League’s director in July 1927.269 The League also failed in 
its endeavor to control the Cristeros.270 
 The UP enjoyed a better relationship with the Cristeros. Under the leadership of 
González Flores, the UP functioned in parallel with the rebel forces. It continued its 
campaign of passive resistance, but also provided direct support to the insurgents. Some 
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UP members even became Cristero chiefs.271 The UP offered an urban network of safe 
houses for the rebels operating in the countryside.272 Moreover, the UP collected money, 
furnished supplies, and distributed propaganda.273  Working in conjunction with the UP 
were the Women’s Brigades, secretive units of feminine Cristeros which obtained funds 
and smuggled munitions to the insurgents.274 These women were so adept at their task 
that their mission remained a secret until the final stages of the war. 
  
Setback and Resurgence 
 
 Humiliated by initial defeats, the government took aim at the Cristeros. The state 
engaged in a brutal re-concentration campaign, similar to that employed by General 
Valeriano Weyler during the Cuban insurgency of the 1890s.275 Whole villages were 
evacuated and had their grain and livestock looted by soldiers.276 Anyone found inside 
the perimeter was summarily interrogated, then hung or shot.277 This effectively 
curtailed the supplies that the rebels were receiving. Another loss to the Cristeros was 
the capture and execution of González Flores on April 1, 1927.278 The Cristeros also lost 
public support when they sacked and burned a passenger train on April 19, killing over 
150 people.279 
 The government took pains to target the clergy, since it surmised that they 
provided moral support to the cause. Priests found in the countryside were accused of 
treason and summarily executed.280  President Calles persecuted the bishops and exiled 
over half of the Mexican hierarchy by May 1927.281 The Episcopal Committee 
 58 
regrouped in San Antonio, Texas, where it continued issuing formal protests.282 The 
harassment was also extended to the membership of the League.283 
 Calles, however, made a serious miscalculation with the execution of Father 
Miguel Pro on November 13, 1927.284 The Jesuit priest, wrongly accused in a plot to 
assassinate former president Alvaro Obregón, was shot by firing squad without the 
benefit of a trial.285 Images of the execution were published in an effort to dissuade the 
rebels from continuing the fight. However, the pictures of Father Pro, with his arms 
outstretched in the form of a cross, inspired the Cristeros to follow him into 
martyrdom.286 
 Helping in the recovery of the movement were the addition of two important 
military leaders. One was Victoriano Ramírez, nicknamed “El Catorce” for having 
allegedly killed 14 men sent out to arrest him.287 This gifted guerilla leader brought the 
rebellion back to life, buying the League enough time to select an overall commander for 
the movement. The only substantive action taken by the League on behalf of the 
Cristeros was the appointment of General Enrique Gorostieta.288  A talented artilleryman 
in the days of the Porfiriato, Gorostieta organized the Cristeros in a way similar to the 
federal army.289 In 1928, under Gorostieta’s leadership, the rebels achieved impressive 
gains in the states of Jalisco, Nayarit, Aguascalientes, Zacatecas, Querétaro, and 
Guanajuato.290 Although appointed by the League, Gorostieta eventually distanced 
himself from the organization.291 
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Stalemate 
 
 The insurgency was in a standoff by early 1929, due to another government 
offensive.292  The Cristero Rebellion became a war of attrition, where neither group was 
able to defeat the other. The federal army had supplies, but lacked popular backing and 
the will to fight. The Cristeros had popular support and conviction, but had few 
munitions.293 An opportunity presented itself in March, when an army barracks revolt 
led by General Gonzálo Escobar diverted the government’s attention.294 The rebels 
immediately launched a successful counteroffensive in the Guadalajara region. 
 However, the military rebellion was quickly put down. Moreover, the Cristeros 
faced divisions within their own ranks. A rebel chief by the name of Mario Valdés, 
widely believed by historians to have been a federal spy, managed to stir up sentiment 
against El Catorce, leading to his execution before a rigged court-martial.295 A bigger 
setback occurred on June 2, when General Gorostieta was ambushed and killed by a 
federal patrol.296 Still, the Cristero army, numbering around 50,000, showed no signs of 
relinquishing the fight.297  
 
The Assassination of Obregón 
 
 The return of Alvaro Obregón to the presidency might have put a timely end to 
the rebellion. The popular leader did not abide by the no-reelection principle and 
managed, through Calles, to have Congress amend the Constitution to provide for 
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unlimited (but not consecutive) reelection.298 The intent was to rotate the presidency 
among the two powerful men in a perpetual diarchy. The pragmatic Obregón was able to 
give a public show of support for Calles’s anticlerical stance, while concealing his true 
intentions regarding the church.299 He secretly informed the Episcopal Committee that it 
could trust him to pursue a reasonable course in religious matters.300 Obregón looked 
forward to an “era of peace” during his administration.301 An assassin’s bullet put an end 
to those prospects. 
 On July 18, 1928, Obregón was assassinated at La Bombilla, a restaurant in the 
outskirts of the capital, by José León de Toral.302 Toral, a young arts teacher and staunch 
Catholic, killed Obregón because he felt that his death would put an end to religious 
persecution.303 Government officials executed Toral and imprisoned Madre Conchita, a 
nun whom they accused of aiding the assassin.304 Although the facts did not support a 
conspiracy by the clergy, Calles blamed the church for the assassination and unleashed 
further persecution.305 Obregón’s killing had other repercussions as well. 
 At first, some believed that a political adversary had ordered Obregón’s killing.  
Suspicion was cast on Luis Morones and the leftist bloc of Calles’s supporters, the 
traditional enemies of Obregón.306 Throughout the election campaign, Morones, leader 
of the Labor Party and one of Calles’s cronies, had attacked Obregón incessantly in 
blistering and intemperate speeches.307 Following the assassination, Morones and his 
allies went into hiding for fear of reprisal from indignant Obregonistas.308 Even though 
they were not responsible for Obregón’s killing, Morones and the leftists fell from 
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power.309 Without this pressure from the Left, Calles was able to choose his own policy 
with the church. 
 
Consequences of the Rebellion 
 
According to Meyer, it was Mexico’s economy that forced Calles to negotiate.310 
Problems with credit and investment, suspension of servicing the foreign debt, a drop in 
agricultural exports, and the deferment of public works were exacerbated by the ongoing 
insurgency.311 A majority of Mexicans believed that the nation could not recover 
economically without first settling the rebellion.312 Only the financial, political, and 
military support of the United States kept the Mexican state from collapsing.313 This 
influence made the U.S. a logical peace broker between Mexico and the Vatican. 
U.S.-Mexican relations had just normalized following the Mexican Revolution. 
Although Obregón assumed the presidency in 1920, the U.S. withheld recognition of his 
government pending resolution of several contentious items. These included U.S. claims 
resulting from the revolution and the threat that Article 27 of the Constitution, which 
stipulated that all land belonged to the state, posed to U.S. oil companies. In the Bucareli 
Agreements of 1923, Obregón agreed to a mixed claims commission and assured that 
Article 27 would not be applied retroactively. In exchange, he received official U.S. 
recognition.314 Three years later, Mexico’s relationship with the United States would be 
strained once again, this time due to pressure from American Catholics.  
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The National Catholic Welfare Center (NCWC), established in 1919 to be the 
Catholic voice of America, became an outspoken critic of Mexico’s anticlerical 
policy.315 It filed several protests with the U.S. State Department regarding Calles’s 
treatment of the church.316 The NCWC, however, refused to condone the Cristero 
Rebellion.317 Despite pressure from the NCWC, the Coolidge administration did not 
condemn Calles because it saw the religious affair as an internal matter.318 However, the 
efforts by the NCWC eventually bore fruit, as noted by historian Douglas Slawson: “If 
the American Catholic community were not so active in agitating against Mexico’s 
religious policy, especially through the NCWC, it is unlikely that …the State 
Department would ever have attempted a solution of the church-state riddle.”319 
 The election of 1929 was another factor that forced Calles to consider peace with 
the church. With Obregón’s death, Calles consolidated his power as Jefe Máximo 
(Maximum Chief), where he ran the country through “puppet” presidents who lacked a 
political following of their own. At the end of his term, Calles stepped down as 
president, allowing for the interim appointment of Emilio Portes Gil in 1928.320 In the 
presidential election of 1929, Calles’s handpicked candidate, Pascual Ortíz Rubio, was 
challenged by the popular José Vasconcelos. Vasconcelos had achieved fame as 
Obregón’s Minister of Education by emulating Mexico’s mestizo heritage and bringing 
art, music, and literature to the masses.321 This philosopher-educator had an immense 
political following consisting of leftist students and intellectuals, who considered him 
their moral leader.322 Since Ortíz Rubio was a virtual unknown, Calles could only ensure 
his election through massive fraud.323 
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Meyer argued that Calles was threatened by the likelihood of an alliance between 
Vasconcelos and the Cristeros.324 A major flaw of the rebellion stemmed from the 
insurgents’ isolation and the absence of powerful urban allies.325 Potentially, 
Vasconcelos’s movement could provide it with the necessary support.326 It was 
imperative for the government to demobilize the Cristeros by the autumn of 1929 so that 
they would not threaten the election.327 Meyer maintained that the Cristeros supported 
the candidature of Vasconcelos, yet this assertion is debatable.328 Although Vasconcelos 
later turned out to be a fervent Catholic, throughout La Cristiada his tendency was 
towards the Left. More scholarship is needed to ascertain what the Cristeros hoped to 
achieve by the election of Vasconcelos. 
 
Negotiations 
 
It was the American ambassador, Dwight Morrow, who persuaded Calles that the 
time to negotiate had arrived. Morrow, a skilled diplomat, developed a rapport with the 
obstinate president through informal breakfasts, an approach dubbed “ham and eggs” 
diplomacy.329 Morrow convinced Calles that the church-state conflict was hampering 
domestic tranquility and good relations with the United States.330 Only the resumption of 
public worship could demobilize the Cristeros.331 The talks were further facilitated by 
the succession of Portes Gil, who did not share Calles’s dislike for the church.332 
The Vatican was also predisposed to negotiations. All that Rome wanted was 
lenient enforcement, not revocation, of the anticlerical laws in Mexico. In abandoning 
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the radicals, the pope was willing to sacrifice social and political Catholicism for 
spirituality.333 The Vatican had expertise in making arrangements with other anticlerical 
countries and saw the confrontation in a broader perspective than either the Mexican 
bishops or the laity.334 Rome’s minimum requirement was that the clergy were allowed 
to perform its spiritual duties under its chain of hierarchy.335  
Talks began between the Mexican government and the church, with Ambassador 
Morrow and a representative of the NCWC acting as intermediaries.336 The League, 
however, chose continued aggression and became a liability for the church. The League 
was convinced that it could still win the war and opposed negotiations at all costs.337 It 
sent delegates to Rome urging the pope not to compromise.338 The League even went so 
far as to denounce as a traitor any bishop that advocated peace.339 With the government 
at the negotiating table, it became necessary for the church to distance itself from the 
radicals. 
 The Vatican separated the church from the uprising, letting the rebels act as 
individuals.340 The pope instructed the clergy to refrain from giving moral or material 
assistance to the insurgents.341 Furthermore, the bishops exiled in the U.S. undermined 
the League’s attempts at fundraising.342 These actions worsened the League’s 
unpopularity with mainstream Catholics. Moderate lay groups, such as the Knights of 
Columbus, withdrew their support. Having fallen from grace, the League’s influence 
diminished.343 It became an alienated entity and stopped being the mouthpiece of the 
Catholic people.344  
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The plight of the Cristeros was also ignored. Ambassador Morrow recognized 
that the important protagonists were the Vatican and Calles, not the rebels.345 Therefore, 
the Cristeros were left completely out of the discussions and kept in the dark.346 The 
church insisted throughout the negotiations that it had the right to act on its own, without 
the Catholic lay leadership.347 The breakthrough came on June 21, 1929, when the 
church and the government jointly announced that an agreement had been reached.348 
The church bells rang for the first time in almost three years, signaling the end of a 
disastrous conflict. 
 
The Arreglos 
 
The Vatican’s goal had always been one of compromise and it had been 
achieved. The Arreglos (“Arrangements”) were agreed upon by moderates of both 
sides.349 The Arreglos were pragmatic in nature, the same as previous agreements 
between church and state. In exchange for the resumption of worship, the government 
granted three concessions to the church: only priests who were named by hierarchical 
superiors would be required to register; religious instruction in the churches (but not in 
the schools) would be permitted; and all citizens, including the clergy, would be allowed 
to petition the government.350 Since the anticlerical laws remained on the books, many 
Catholic radicals were unhappy with the Arreglos and felt that the church had gained 
nothing.351 
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The rebels also felt betrayed and refused to give up the fight. However, the 
church threatened them with excommunication and the rebellion was extinguished. By 
September 1929, the last of the insurgents laid down their arms.352 Although the casualty 
figures are not very reliable, it is estimated that over 100,000 Mexicans died in the 
conflict - 60,000 federal forces and 40,000 Cristeros.353 The relative calm that ensued 
was known as the modus vivendi (“way of living,” or “living with differences”).354 The 
fundamental issues not been resolved, yet a truce existed once again between church and 
state. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE SINARQUISTA MOVEMENT 
 
The Cristero Rebellion was a painful lesson to both flock and church.  Though 
anticlerical state policy was stymied, the cost in bloodshed was deplorable. Throughout 
the uprising, the church’s silence, along with its suspension of mass, gave the insurgents 
encouragement to combat the government. Following the Arreglos, the church decided 
to avoid further carnage by quickly and unequivocally condemning any violent action. 
Still, a viable response was needed lest a new threat emerge against the clergy.  
The new hazard posed by state-sanctioned socialism encouraged the church to 
focus discontent into a course of peaceful action, giving birth to a new form of Catholic 
resistance: Sinarquismo. This new phenomenon essentially emerged from the ashes of 
the Cristero Rebellion. Like the uprising, the Sinarquista Movement of 1937-44 was a 
popular Catholic counterrevolutionary event. Sinarquismo was a continuation of the 
Cristero struggle, but modified into a nonviolent form. Though unarmed, the 
Sinarquistas proved as effective as the Cristeros in forcing the government to moderate 
its threatening stance towards the church. Though it claimed to be an “apolitical entity,” 
the UNS (National Synarchist Union) had a tremendous impact in Mexican politics, 
compelling it to shift away from the Left. 
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Aftermath of the Cristero Rebellion 
 
 The Arreglos of 1929 were strongly opposed by Catholic extremists, who felt 
betrayed by the church.355 Nevertheless, the Vatican abided by the truce and insisted on 
a policy of moderation and reserve. In September 1929, the archbishop of Mexico 
declared that the modus vivendi was not up to debate; the pope had made his decision 
and the clergy were forbidden to openly criticize it.356 Despite the optimistic outlook of 
the hierarchy, the Cristeros had their misgivings.357 Indeed, the good faith of the 
government proved temporary. 
 The government’s war on the Cristeros never waned, despite the demobilization 
of the rebels. A systematic and premeditated murder of the insurgents, who were now 
integrated into civilian life, took place following the Arreglos.358 Between 1929 and 
1935, there were five thousand Cristero victims, five hundred of whom were officers.359 
Because more leaders died during the “peace” than throughout the rebellion, historian 
Andrés Azkue termed the period the “modus moriendi.”360 No interest emerged from 
either the church hierarchy or the government to investigate the killings.361 Feeling 
abandoned, many former rebels fled to the United States and to San Luis Potosí, where a 
sympathetic caudillo, General Saturnino Cedillo, gave them refuge.362 The government, 
taking advantage of the ceasefire, deployed troops in Cristero areas to prevent future 
revolts.363 
 The League, once a powerful bastion of Catholic opposition, also faced 
eradication. It had failed in its efforts to lead La Cristiada. It misappropriated funds 
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intended for the rebellion and “did not provide the Cristeros with a single bullet.”364 The 
League was also incapable of working with other lay organizations, resorting to 
attacking those which it could not control. It succeeded in getting the “U” and the 
Women’s Brigades condemned by the pope as secretive organizations in violation of a 
nineteenth-century encyclical.365 These actions brought discredit to the League in the 
eyes of the laity.366 As new troubles arose with the government, the League and the 
ACJM ceased being important avenues for Catholic opposition.367 As a final act of 
redemption, the League strove to defend the hapless Cristeros, claiming that the 
government had violated its amnesty agreement.368 It clamored for the pope to nullify 
the Arreglos, to no avail.369 By 1932, the League had dissolved.370 
 
Renewal of Church Persecution 
 
 The modus vivendi was seen as sham by Catholic radicals, who lamented that the 
uprising had failed to resolve the church’s grievances. They were proven right, since the 
gains achieved through the Arreglos lasted only two years.371 The accord was 
undermined through the efforts of anticlerical extremists, who opposed any deal with the 
church.372 Among these radicals was former president Calles, who never relinquished his 
disdain for the clergy. The conciliatory efforts by presidents Portes Gil and Ortíz Rubio 
were openly sabotaged by Calles, a man of considerable influence.373  
The death of Obregón in 1928 left Calles as the primary political power broker in 
Mexico. To retain control over the national government, Calles created the National 
 70 
Revolutionary Party (PNR) to institutionalize the hierarchical and personalist system that 
previously bound the ruling coalition of revolutionary chiefs together.374 During the 
period of 1929-34, known as the Maximato, Calles used potent allies to impose his will, 
which often conflicted with that of the president’s. In defiance of the federal 
government’s policy of peace, anticlerical states, with Calles’s encouragement, imposed 
stringent measures against the church.375 In 1932, Calles grew tired of Ortíz Rubio and 
forced him to resign, replacing him with the more acquiescent Abelardo Rodriguez.376 
With this change, the floodgates of anticlericalism were opened once again. 
Article 130 of the Constitution, regularization of the priesthood, was 
wholeheartedly enforced by certain states. Veracruz, for example, limited the number of 
priests to 1 per 100,000 (11 total).377 The federal government joined in, limiting the 
number of clergy in the capital and firing officials who took part in religious 
ceremonies.378 By 1935, 17 states succeeded in expelling all of the clergy, while Mexico 
as a whole contained only 305 registered priests.379 The situation had deteriorated so 
badly that the apostolic delegate postulated that the church had ceased to exist in 
Mexico.380 
A new anticlerical program, deemed “de-fanaticization,” was implemented 
throughout the country. The campaign was designed to eliminate Catholic names, 
symbols, and rites to make way for revolutionary creed and ritual.381 The political elite 
of the Mexican Revolution believed that “spiritual emancipation” was necessary for the 
masses.382  Crosses were outlawed from cemeteries, saintly images burned, and names 
with religious overtones replaced with those of revolutionary heroes.383 Religious 
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holidays were ignored and festivals forbidden. Ecclesiastical weddings were to be 
replaced by socialist nuptial ceremonies.384 The Ley de Cultos (“Law of Religions”) was 
passed, which forbade the conducting of religious acts without government sanction.385 
Under this law, citizens were arrested for conducting private worship in their homes.386  
 
The Advent of Lázaro Cárdenas 
 
 On December 31, 1934, Lázaro Cárdenas assumed the presidency.387 Cárdenas 
was a fervent anticlerical as governor of Michoacán and intended to implement the same 
principles during his presidency.388 He appointed well-known enemies of the church to 
his cabinet and continued harassment of the clergy through property seizures, arrests and 
deportations.389 During his first two years in office, 19 out of 32 Mexican bishops 
remained in exile, while 350 churches were confiscated by the state.390 Even the primate 
of Mexico, Archbishop Pascual Díaz, was not exempt from persecution. He was arrested 
in March 1935 and forced to sign a confession, as a condition of his release, that he had 
performed illegal religious activities.391  
 Under the stewardship of Cárdenas, the government enacted more anticlerical 
legislation. In February 1935, a decree was passed prohibiting the sending of religious 
material through the mail.392 In September, the Ley de Nacionalización de Bienes (“Law 
of Nationalization of Goods”) stipulated that supplies used for religious purposes were 
property of the government.393 Cárdenas also encouraged the use of anticlerical 
propaganda. El Nacional, the semi-official government paper, relentlessly condemned 
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the priesthood, denouncing it as a class enemy of the poor.394 On a more sinister tone, 
Catholic protesters (labeled “fanatics” by the government) were shot during 
demonstrations.395 
 The Cárdenas administration gave the Mexican Left carte blanche to attack the 
church. The governor of Tabasco, Tomás Garrido Canabal, was allowed to organize a 
leftist militant group, called the “Red Shirts.”396 This organization waged a terrorist 
operation against the church, in which priests were shot, churches sacked, and riots 
instigated.397 The Red Shirts were greatly admired by Cárdenas, who gave them 
important posts in the Ministry of Agriculture.398 He even sent a wreath to the funeral of 
a member, who had been lynched by Catholics in retaliation for prior violence.399 
  
The Temperance of the Church 
 
 The hierarchy remained steadfast in its commitment to avoid bloodshed. During 
the administrations of Portes Gil and Ortíz Rubio, the church remained silent, 
recognizing that a power struggle was taking place with Calles.400 It was not until the 
removal of President Ortíz Rubio that Pope Pius XI condemned the violation of the 
Arreglos in his encyclical Acerbi Animi.401 Still, the pope indicated that the clergy would 
have to yield, for it was better to have some churches open than none at all.402 Some 
bishops wanted to suspend worship, but they were overruled by the Vatican.403 The 
hierarchy was not completely silent, however. In September 1935, 14 bishops and 
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archbishops signed a petition asking for the abrogation of the Ley de Nacionalización de 
Bienes and the modification of the anticlerical articles of the Mexican Constitution.404 
 In certain respects, the church fared worse under Cárdenas than it did under 
Calles, a fact the laity could not ignore. Once again, spontaneous mobilization of 
Catholics raged throughout the country. In November 1934, over 7,500 men waged a 
Cristero-type rebellion, termed “La Segunda” (“The Second One”).405 Though smaller, 
La Segunda was in ways more violent than La Cristiada, employing terrorist guerilla 
warfare. The agitation, led by several ex-Cristeros, targeted the socialist education 
programs being implemented by the state, singling out teachers. Three hundred 
educators were assassinated, while another two hundred were mutilated by the 
insurgents.406 Curiously, the conflict did not take place in Jalisco. Instead, the rebellion 
was concentrated in the Gulf coast state of Veracruz.407  
 The rebellion failed miserably. The church hierarchy, which had remained 
ambivalent during the Cristero Rebellion, chose a different course of action with La 
Segunda. It swiftly condemned the new insurgency, with some bishops even 
excommunicating rebels.408 Moreover, the pope issued a new encyclical, forbidding 
armed resistance and urging Catholics to participate in social programs that the church 
was implementing.409 La Segunda eventually dissipated by 1938, though some guerilla 
units continued the fight.410 In 1941, the last Cristero general, Federico Vázquez, 
surrendered in the state of Durango, only to be later killed.411 The age of religious 
insurrection was over. 
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A Thaw in Anticlericalism 
 
 President Cárdenas, despite his anticlerical predisposition, decided to curtail his 
attacks on the Catholic Church. His primary goal was to gather popular support for his 
reformist agenda, which was hampered by the ongoing persecution of the clergy. Also, 
Cárdenas needed the unity of the proletariat, whose rural component was heavily 
influenced by the priesthood.412 Cárdenas could ill-afford to have the church as an 
enemy while he faced foreign oil companies in a widening dispute.413 Moreover, 
historian Adrian Bantjes argued that Cárdenas’s volte-face was prompted by popular 
Catholic opposition to the de-fanaticization campaigns.414 
  Cárdenas intended to find a solution to the religious situation in an expeditious 
manner. He changed his rhetoric, attacking fanaticism instead of religious conscience.415 
In his speeches, Cárdenas declared that the government was not antireligious and that 
anticlerical campaigns would only retard economic growth.416 He rescinded the 
prohibition of the mailing of religious materials and appointed a Catholic as Minister of 
Agriculture.417 Teachers were instructed to apply the socialist curriculum in a pragmatic 
manner, without raising the ire of the populace.418 Another obstacle was Calles. 
Cárdenas, unlike his predecessors, was no puppet and exiled the recalcitrant strongman 
in June 1935.419 
 The thaw was evident in 1936, when the government stopped seizing 
ecclesiastical property and the Red Shirts abandoned their campaign of terror.420 Many 
states joined the new course, allowing churches to be opened once again.421 In an 
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emblematic move, Cárdenas allowed the public funeral of Archbishop Francisco Orozco 
y Jiménez, who was known for his support of the Cristeros.422 Still, this new acceptance 
of the Catholic Church had one important condition attached to it: the clergy were to stay 
out of politics.423 Cárdenas held the social reforms of the Mexican Revolution sacred and 
did not allow any meddling by the hierarchy.424 A statement by the Interior Ministry 
reiterated this position, explaining that freedom of conscience would be respected, so 
long as it did not violate federal and state laws.425 
 This new approach by Cárdenas was greeted by many moderate Catholics, who 
drew comparisons with Porfirio Díaz.426 The hierarchy responded by stressing a message 
of peace and moderation.427 By 1937, many of the church’s high officials from the 
Cristero period had died, resigned, or remained in exile. This allowed for the 
appointment of more moderate bishops.428 The naming of Archbishop Luis Martínez as 
primate and acting representative of the Vatican allowed the pope to give a unified 
message of restraint to the Mexican hierarchy.429 Under this policy of flexibility, the 
church accepted revolutionary nationalism and fully supported the oil expropriation of 
1938.430 Even more telling was the hierarchy’s refusal to support the rebellion of pro-
Catholic General Saturnino Cedillo that same year.431 Still, improvement of relations 
was limited and socialism remained a point of contention between church and state. 
 
 
 
 
 76 
Cárdenas and Socialism 
 
 The election of Lázaro Cárdenas in 1934 signaled a major shift to the Left in 
Mexican politics. The Callista political machine increasingly lost its popular support as 
the Great Depression worsened and the revolution’s promises of reform were not 
fulfilled.432 Reformists within the PNR, who developed a radical program to mobilize 
the popular base, coalesced around Cárdenas.433 Calles, the Jefe Máximo, employed 
political expediency by supporting the candidature of Cárdenas as the best course to 
quell party dissidence and popular alienation.434 Calles was also confident that he could 
control Cárdenas as another “puppet” president. 
 Cárdenas had a practical, populist desire for the social betterment of the Mexican 
masses. As governor of Michoacán, he fostered labor and peasant organizations, 
developed education, and redistributed land.435 Cárdenas used the 1934 election to 
galvanize support for reforms and to create his own political base. As president, 
Cárdenas organized peasantry and labor through the creation of powerful syndicates 
such as the National Peasant Confederation (CNC) and the Confederation of Mexican 
Workers (CTM).436  
One of Cárdenas’s goals was the formation of a national party based upon 
worker, peasant, and middle-class support in opposition to the old landowning elites and 
foreign property holders.437 In 1938, he transformed the PNR into the Party of the 
Mexican Revolution (PRM), the precursor to today’s Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI).438 Another important element of Cárdenas’s program was to replace the country’s 
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exploitive system of foreign “industrial capitalism” with economic nationalism, a prime 
example being the oil expropriation of 1938.439 The pillar of Cárdenas’s socialist 
program was enforcement of agrarian reform, contained in Article 27 of the 
Constitution.440 He confiscated 35 million hectares of private land and distributed them 
in the form of ejidos - communal farms regulated by the state.441 In his six years in 
office, Cárdenas distributed more land to the peasantry than all of his predecessors 
combined.442 Cárdenas’s ambitious program of social engineering led him to adopt a 
moderate course towards the church. However, this restraint did not extend to his 
educational policy, which inflamed Catholic passions. 
 
The Threat of Socialist Education 
 
 One issue on which President Cárdenas remained inflexible was socialism in 
public education.443 Cárdenas aimed to modernize the country’s educational system in 
order to transform Mexico into a socially integrated nation.444 Education had been a 
sensitive issue between the church and state since the Bourbon Reforms. By the 
twentieth century, the church was effectively separated from the public education 
system, but its influence was felt nonetheless. The church vigorously fought the 
Education Ministry’s implementation of a sexual education program in 1933.445 In 1934, 
the hierarchy expressed alarm once again, when Article 3 of the Constitution was 
changed to read: “State education will be socialist in character.”446 
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 Socialist education was implemented in conjunction with the de-fanaticization 
campaigns intending to combat religious doctrine.447 In its ideology, fanaticism would be 
eliminated through education in order to save the Mexican proletariat and peasantry for 
the new revolutionary order.448 Influenced by positivism, the new curriculum taught 
civics, patriotic history, and anticlericalist ideology inspired by Voltaire.449 The schools 
emphasized the role of workers and peasants in the Mexican Revolution.450 
Under the administration of the Ministry of Public Education (SEP), schooling 
assumed a “religious” character, in which the church’s moral quality would be 
appropriated and integrated into the state.451 The rural school was to replace the village 
church as the town’s identity.452 Teachers were at the forefront of the revolutionary 
program and became key political performers in mobilizing and unionizing workers and 
peasants.453 The teacher would supplant the priest and preach the new values of unity, 
patriotism, and work.454 Cárdenas envisioned teachers as defenders of the revolution, 
stating, “The mission of the teacher ought not be limited to the confines of the 
classroom.”455 As a matter of course, Catholics were expunged from educational 
positions.456 
 Cárdenas’s socialist program accommodated a religion which confined itself to 
the home and stayed out of politics and education.457 Cárdenas would not bend on the 
question of socialist education, believing that the church-state problem could be resolved 
if the clergy abdicated its influence over teaching.458 By forging ahead, Cárdenas was 
intent on rooting out completely what he called the priesthood’s method of self-
preservation: evangelization.459 Cárdenas’s answer to clerical protests was rapid 
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implementation of his policies through the Education Law of 1940, an enabling act for 
Article 3.460 
 The church’s initial response to socialist education was to openly fight it. During 
the height of the de-fanaticization campaigns of the early 1930s, Archbishop Pascual 
Díaz declared, “No Catholic can be a socialist…parents are forbidden to put their 
children in any college or school which teaches socialism.”461 The church stressed that 
socialism was an irreconcilable enemy and urged school administrators not to enforce 
the curriculum.462 Teachers who worked for the federal government were 
excommunicated.463  
The laity vehemently opposed socialist education.464 They followed the 
hierarchy’s order and withdrew their children from the system. In one village in the state 
of Jalisco, only 9 out of 170 students attended class.465 Teachers who dared to blaspheme 
God in front of village schoolchildren would often meet with deadly reprisals.466 It 
would be wrong, however, to blame the church for these atrocities, which could be 
explained by the inherent xenophobia that existed in these remote locations.467  
The improvement of church-state relations in other areas prompted the hierarchy 
to moderate its policy. In 1934, the church was struggling for its existence, while in 1940 
it was only fighting for control of the educational system.468 The church ceased to openly 
battle the revolution and decided to behave calmly and decisively with regards to 
socialist education.469 Unlike the Cristero Rebellion, the laity was carefully mobilized 
and controlled to oppose government policy in a nonviolent manner. These efforts gave 
rise to the Sinarquista Movement. 
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Catholic Action 
 
 The church was resolute in preventing another rebellion like La Cristiada. It 
realized that if it did not organize the laity, then another radical organization such as the 
League would emerge. A double policy ensued, where it was necessary to end the 
activities of the most confrontational Catholic elements, while channeling that militancy 
to work in an acceptable manner.470 Article 130 prohibited the Catholic Church from 
generating a political party, therefore any organization representing clerical interests had 
to be limited to spiritual matters.471 Mexican Catholic Action was established in 1930 to 
fulfill such a purpose.472 
 Catholic Action was a generic name for lay organizations that were established 
throughout the world in response to Pope Pius XI’s call for Catholics to actively support 
the church and defend the faith against the dangers of Protestantism, liberalism, 
positivism, and communism.473 Catholic Action made inroads into Latin America by the 
1930s, where it received support from the hierarchy. It had branches for men, women, 
and children. There were specialized groups for workers, students, businessmen, 
secretaries, and peasants. Catholic Action had strong ties with the religious schools run 
by orders, especially those of the Jesuits.474 In Mexico, it was Bernard Bergöend, 
founder of the ACJM, who established Catholic Action.475  
As the church ceased to openly attack the Mexican Revolution, it relied on 
Catholic Action to push forth its agenda. Religious displeasure with the government was 
organized into positive civic action.476 In March 1937, Pope Pius XI emphasized the 
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advantage of Catholic Action over the use of violence in defending the rights of the 
Mexican Church.477 In the same spirit of Rerum Novarum, Catholic Action was 
promoted as an alternative to socialism in solving agrarian and labor difficulties.478 Also, 
Mexican priests were instructed by the hierarchy to evidence concern for the 
socioeconomic welfare of the laity.479 Though Catholic Action was officially forbidden 
to participate in politics, it served as a school of political leadership for a new generation 
of Catholics.480 Nevertheless, a void existed; a more vocal association was needed that 
could work for church interests without any apparent connection. The relationship 
between the laity and the hierarchy needed to remain secret.481 
 
The Legion 
 
The papal encyclical Acervi Animi of 1933 encouraged lay people to form an 
entity, based on Christian principles, that would give guarantees for the defense the 
church “without calling itself Catholic.”482 The hierarchy envisaged the formation of 
action groups that would exert demands on government officials at the local level. The 
pressure would take the form of protests, petitions, and legal resources. The task of the 
groups was to teach social action, propagate ideas, and educate the laity in the exercise 
of civil rights.483 It was believed that individual conversions would bring about the 
essential transformation of the country.484 These groups, known collectively as La 
Legión (the Legion), were created to channel the violent tendencies of the laity.485 
 82 
The Legion was founded in Guadalajara in 1934 by Manuel Romo de Alba, a 
schoolteacher and former member of the UP.486  His testimony has allowed historians to 
reconstruct the obscure origins of the Legion, as well as its transformation into the 
Sinarquista Movement.487 The Legion was controlled by a Supreme Council staffed by 
devout laymen, whose decisions were subject to the approval of the archbishop of 
Mexico and the apostolic delegate.488 This relationship was of a strictly secretive nature. 
The survival of the Legion depended on concealment; its structure was created to 
prevent the possibility of repression. The “cell” was the basic unit of the Legion. Each 
cell was secret to all others, so that if one were uncovered, the whole organization could 
remain intact.489 Only when it was certain that an individual could be relied upon would 
he be asked to take the secret oath.490 The first three years of the Legion’s existence were 
devoted to attracting as many people as possible; from universities, factories, offices, 
and villages.491 The initial reaction to the Legion was promising: in six months it 
expanded into several states and boasted a membership of 20,000.492 In 1935, the Legion 
extended into the Federal District, where it recruited a great number of professionals, 
especially lawyers and doctors.493 
“Legionarios” vowed a secret loyalty to the church and swore an oath to obey 
their leaders “with all that conformed to morality and justice.”494 They disrupted political 
gatherings by exploding stink bombs and tried to influence public opinion regarding 
Catholic doctrine.495 Legionarios boycotted government schools and businesses they 
deemed unfriendly to church interests.496 Another tactic was to scrawl on public 
buildings and peso bills the phrase “Down with socialist education!”497 Despite initial 
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enthusiasm, the Legion floundered, as Catholics demanded a more radical response to 
government policies and became disillusioned with “boring” activities. With the 
rebellion of La Segunda raging, the hierarchy acknowledged the shortcomings of the 
Legion in providing a viable outlet for militant Catholics.498 Hence, the church deemed 
that a transformation of the Legion was in order. 
 
The Base 
 
 In 1936, the Legion underwent restructuring by the hierarchy, who were intent on 
attracting a larger contingent of Catholics to the organization. The Legion served as the 
core of a new body called the Base, with greater control by the Supreme Council and a 
closer cooperation with the episcopacy.499 Each cell leader answered to a division (state) 
leader, who in turn obeyed the orders of the jefe nacional (national chief), who was also 
the head of the nine-member Supreme Council.500  
The Base followed some of the ideas contained in the papal encyclical 
Quadragesimo Anno, which advocated a corporative structure in order to penetrate all 
levels of society and called for the establishment of social justice, not only for the 
proletariat, but for all sectors of society.501 The Base wanted to build the social 
awareness of Mexicans, believing that a people conscious of their rights and duties 
produced a just government working for the common good.502 It rejected the socialist 
policies of Cárdenas, which tied the employee to the company, which in turn was tied to 
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the state. As an alternative, the Base advocated the creation of separate, parallel 
organizations for management and labor.503 
The Base’s cells were like those of the Legion, except they were set up along 
geographic as well as functional lines.504 The Base was divided into ten divisions, 
corresponding to regions in Mexico.505 These divisions were subdivided into municipal 
sections composed of cells.506 In addition, the Base was partitioned into 16 sections, 
some corresponding to practical purposes (such as finances, propaganda, 
communications, and politics) and others to socioeconomic sectors.507 The formation of 
these latter sections was intended to permit infiltration into all sectors of society, labor in 
particular.508 Sections, akin to unions, were assigned to represent laborers, peasants, 
management, and professionals.509  
 The Base experienced an upsurge in membership, driven by Catholics’ 
dissatisfaction with socialism.510 However, these new members were disappointed that 
the Base lacked the crusade-like mentality of the Cristero Rebellion, adding to their 
frustration.511 The essential problem was the Base’s use of non-militant passive 
resistance, which included activities considered foolish by the membership. Base actions 
included writing to teachers, attending mass, and dropping stones near a church as a 
“sign” of protest.512 A cadre of Base members petitioned the Supreme Council for the 
creation of a more militant institution to “organize all of the Catholics in Mexico as a 
unit under civilian leadership, but under a military discipline, to confront… all enemies 
of the faith and liberty of the Catholic people.”513 Rather than risk losing popular 
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support, the Supreme Council acquiesced and set aside the 11th sector of the Base, which 
it called the Unión Nacional Sinarquista (National Synarchist Union).514 
 
Birth of Sinarquismo 
 
 The Sinarquista Movement was founded on May 23, 1937 in León, 
Guanajuato.515 The founders were a small contingent of Catholic students from the state 
university who were outraged by the anticlerical policies of the Cárdenas regime.516 
Headed by José Antonio Urquiza, the group obtained the blessing of the Supreme 
Council to establish a Catholic activist organization through the creation of a “visible” 
section of the Base. While the UNS had the appearance of a separate entity, it was 
strictly dependent on the Supreme Council.517 Important decisions, made by the Base 
leadership, were simply executed by the Sinarquista chief.518 
 On June 21, the new movement issued its Manifesto del Partido Sinarquista, a 
document stating its ideology and raison d’être.519 Sinarquismo emerged in a climate of 
discontent over Cardenista policies and tailored its message accordingly.520 The 
movement challenged President Cárdenas’ policies regarding the church, socialist 
education, and land redistribution.521 The Mexican Revolution was cast as a chaotic 
event in which the natural order of society was threatened. Sinarquismo offered 
“salvation” and a restoration of civil rights that had been lost at the hands of the state.522 
The word “Sinarquismo” was defined as the opposite of anarchy, in other words the 
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“counterrevolution.”523 “The Sixteen Points,” written by José Trueba Olivares, outlined 
Sinarquista dogma to members and would-be recruits.524 
 In stark contrast to its militant ideology, Sinarquismo advocated a policy of 
peace. The violence that marked the Cristero Rebellion was abandoned by the new 
Catholic struggle. As a promoter of harmony, the UNS repudiated revolutionary 
movements, particularly the socialism of the Cárdenas administration.525 This principle 
of nonviolence was enforced at all Sinarquista events, especially the famous marches 
that became the hallmark of the movement. The UNS also rejected politics, defining 
itself as a “unifying” civic movement and denouncing the political process as a divisive 
force in Mexican society.526 Notwithstanding this self-imposed label, Sinarquismo 
became a “force” that changed the political sphere. 
 The UNS grew steadily under the leadership of its first two presidents, José 
Trueba Olivares and Manuel Zermeño.527 The new message of Sinarquismo appealed to 
the Base membership, 90% of which joined the new movement.528 At the end of 1937, 
the UNS had nearly five thousand members.529 Recruitment was accomplished through 
the establishment of Sinarquista committees. Organizers were sent out to make initial 
contact with a sympathizer, sometimes the local priest. After they had five or ten people 
interested in joining, these recruiters arranged to show films of Sinarquista activities, 
discuss doctrine, and distribute literature. With enough recruits, a local chief was 
appointed, charged with organizing the new converts into a committee. The primary 
objective of the committee was to attract more members and establish new 
committees.530  
 87 
The UNS suffered a series of setbacks during its early years. In November 1937, 
police raided Sinarquista headquarters in Guanajuato.531 Shortly thereafter, the state 
governor expelled the leadership on the excuse that their lives were “endangered” by the 
local chapter of the leftist CTM.532 Following the ouster, the UNS moved to its new base 
in Mexico City.533 Tragedy struck the Sinarquista Movement in April 1938, when 
Urquiza was murdered.534 Although it was a case of personal vengeance, Urquiza’s 
death was treated as an act of martyrdom, a theme that became a key element of 
Sinarquismo.535 Despite government oppression, the UNS attracted new recruits, mainly 
because of its effective propaganda.536 The message of land reform, carried in pamphlets 
and the weekly bulletin El Sinarquista, appealed to the peasantry, who chose to join the 
movement in large numbers.537 By the end of 1938, the UNS claimed a membership of 
30,000.538 
 
Sinarquismo under Abascal 
 
 The Sinarquista Movement might have remained an obscure organization were it 
not for Salvador Abascal. Abascal, the pivotal leader of the movement, transformed the 
UNS into an immense “political” force capable of threatening the PRM’s hold on power. 
Born in Morelia, Michoacán, Abascal came from an old family of miners and property 
owners.539 A great influence on the young Abascal was his father, a former member of 
the secretive “U” during the Cristero Rebellion.540 As a child, Abascal learned to hate 
the Mexican Revolution, believing that it had destroyed social order and family 
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tranquility.541 At a young age he joined a seminary but eventually left in order pursue a 
career in law.542 
 In 1935, Abascal was approached by “an anonymous person,” who invited him to 
join the Legion. Abascal gladly accepted, swearing an oath on a crucifix.543 He dedicated 
himself to the cause, establishing the organization in Michoacán. He traveled to San 
Antonio, Texas, in order to obtain a blessing for the movement from the exiled Mexican 
apostolic delegate.544 Abascal soon had a reputation as an excellent organizer and 
propagandist.545 The Supreme Council recognized the potential of the young firebrand 
and appointed him to head the southern sector of the Base.546 
 In May 1938, Abascal, by then a regional leader of the Sinarquista Movement, 
organized Catholics to recover religious freedom in Tabasco. 547 Tabasco was a 
stronghold of anticlericalism, where church desecrations were sanctioned by the state. 
Abascal was determined to take over the Church of the Immaculate Conception, which 
had been closed by the government.548 He mobilized large numbers of peasants from the 
surrounding ranches and villages using the sound of indigenous drums.549 Ten thousand 
protesters, some of them walking several miles, arrived at the church, located in the state 
capital of Villahermosa.550 State troops used violence against the crowd, killing four 
activists and injuring many others in the process.551 Although Abascal was arrested, the 
government’s heavy-handed tactics backfired as the killings provoked outrage among 
the Mexican populace. The Sinarquistas, on the other hand, were praised for their 
peaceful resolve. The state government felt compelled to back down and mass was 
celebrated at the church for the first time in ten years.552 
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Abascal’s victory in Tabasco heralded a new kind of Catholic militancy with a 
fervor equal to that of the church’s enemies.553 His innovative technique of passive 
massive resistance, known as the “Abascal method,” proved to be an effective pressure 
device against the government.554 President Cárdenas was obliged to rein in the state 
governor, Tomás Garrido Canabal, ordering him to disband his infamous Red Shirts and 
to cease enforcing anticlerical laws.555 Abascal’s militant spirit transformed the nature 
and perception of Sinarquismo.556  
Abascal’s audacity was rewarded by the Supreme Council, which appointed him 
Jefe Supremo (Supreme Chief) of the UNS in January 1939.557 He fused vitality and 
enthusiasm into Sinarquismo and took the movement to levels of fanatical militancy.558 
Abascal wanted to make the UNS into a “shock group” that would carry out a frontal 
attack on the Mexican Revolution, thereby “exposing its crimes, spiritual and 
economic.”559 He strengthened the military structure of the movement and promulgated 
a set of strict moral rules in The Ten Norms of Conduct for Sinarquistas.560 Force would 
be repelled with nonviolent “force” – militant passive resistance.561 Under his rule, 
Sinarquista activities were audacious, fiery, and intense.562  
As Jefe Supremo, Abascal began an era of immense Sinarquista marches, 
beginning in June 1939, with the “capture” of Guanajuato.563 Marches were the feature 
and nucleus of his leadership style.564 As in Tabasco, Sinarquista rallies were carried out 
without consent of the authorities, thereby inviting government persecution.565 The 
demonstrations were aggressive, yet nonviolent, staying true to the Sinarquista principle 
of passive resistance.566 Abascal recognized that it was essential to keep the marches 
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peaceful, for any display of hostility would instantly brand them as rebels, dooming their 
cause.567 Abascal understood early on that any violent response perpetrated by the 
government served to inflame the masses and win more followers.568 The composure of 
the Sinarquistas in the face of brutal government reprisals inevitably gave the movement 
the moral high ground, adding to its popularity.  
Abascal made the marches extremely attractive to Mexicans through the use of 
nationalism. The rallies were a display of order and discipline, flags and songs, uniforms 
and armbands.569 He hoped Sinarquismo would win over the public and militarize 
Mexico spiritually.570 Several marches took place in 1939 throughout the cities in the 
Bajío region of western Central Mexico.571 A watershed event occurred in July, when 
several Sinarquistas were killed by agrarian militias in the city of Celaya. Among the 
dead of the “Celaya massacre” was María Teresa Bustos, who became a Sinarquista 
symbol of sacrifice.572 Though the government condemned the killings, Sinarquismo’s 
popularity swelled now that it had martyrs of the Catholic faith.573  
After Celaya, the Sinarquista program spread, increasing in size and geographical 
dimension.574 Between August 1940 and July 1941, there were marches in over four 
hundred towns and cities.575 By August 1940, the movement claimed a membership of 
360,000, concentrated mostly in the Bajío states of Guanajuato, Querétaro, and 
Michoacán.576 Sinarquista councils were established in several Mexican migrant 
communities of the United States, to include Los Angeles, Chicago, and El Paso.577 
These immigrants, affected by discrimination, poverty, and insecurity, were attracted to 
the UNS because they felt abandoned by the Mexican government.578 
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The popularity of the UNS reached a zenith with the election of 1940, due to its 
outright rejection of the Mexican political system. Many conservatives, terrified at the 
prospect that Cárdenas would select another socialist to run for president, threw their 
support behind Juan Andreu Almazán.579 A wealthy Catholic landowner who attracted 
fascist support, Almazán won the endorsement of the National Action Party (PAN), a 
conservative entity that had a strong Catholic following.580 Conservatives implored the 
UNS to support Almazán, but the movement was steadfast in its resolution to remain 
uninvolved. Any participation in politics would have implied Sinarquismo’s 
endorsement of the electoral process, thereby aiding Cárdenas and his cronies.581  
The defeat of Almazán was inevitable, since the ruling PRM controlled the 
election through fraud.582 Following the election of 1940, the Mexican Radical Right 
experienced a considerable decline of support, but not Sinarquismo. Many Mexicans, 
frustrated with the corrupt electoral process, joined the UNS (the “honest party”) in 
droves.583 Moreover, the movement offered a lucrative alternative to a potentially violent 
response from the defeated Almazanistas.584 By the end of 1940, there were over half a 
million Sinarquistas, making the UNS the most potent “political” force after the PRM.585 
The Sinarquista Movement became the primary exponent of the Right and the only 
viable opposition to the government.586 This success proved temporary, however. A 
failed undertaking, internal schisms, and an abrupt change in the political climate 
colluded to render the UNS impotent by 1944.  
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María Auxiliadora 
 
 The UNS failed to capitalize on the momentum garnered by the election of 1940. 
Instead, it squandered its energy supporting a bizarre colonizing project. This mission, 
headed by none other than Abascal, involved the creation of a “Heavenly City.” 587 His 
goal was to establish a Sinarquista utopia on Mexican soil where the Christian Social 
Order would prevail. Magdalena Bay, in the peninsula of Baja California, was the 
appointed place. The isolated location allowed the UNS to operate its religious colony 
without any external influence. The Mormons’ achievement in Utah was an inspiration 
to the Sinarquistas.588 Religion was not the only incentive to colonize, however. The 
UNS awaited an opportunity to implement its competing version of land reform.589
 Abascal asked the new president of Mexico, Manuel Avila Camacho, to give the 
UNS permission to colonize Baja California.590 Despite opposition from the Mexican 
Congress, Avila Camacho granted the request, stating that the Sinarquistas had the right, 
as Mexican citizens, to establish a settlement in national territory.591 Elated with the 
opportunity to isolate a political threat, the president offered to support the UNS colony 
with free transport and employment opportunities.592 In December 1941, Abascal left for 
Baja California along with 85 Sinarquista families, leaving the UNS presidency in the 
hands of Manuel Torres Bueno.593 Named María Auxiliadora (“Mary the Helper”), the 
colony was envisioned by Abascal to succeed with Divine Providence, the spirituality of 
the settlers, and outside help.594 
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 The endeavor, despite the enthusiasm of Abascal, experienced serious problems 
from the beginning. Unsurprisingly, the government reneged on its promise to pay for 
the long passage, forcing the colonists to expend their scant resources.595 Employment 
from the construction of a federal railroad and financial aid from American Catholics 
never materialized.596 Another problem was the lack of water in the arid peninsula.597 
The majority of the settlers were not farmers and those who had farming experience 
were used to the rich and fertile lands of the central states.598 Possibly the biggest failure 
came from a lack of leadership. Proper preparations were not made for the colonists, 
who were left to suffer in the extreme conditions of the land. Instead, everything was left 
to prayer and enthusiasm. Abascal later admitted that he regarded the whole project in 
apostolic and providential terms, and that he was wholly unqualified for such a 
venture.599 
 The crops failed, forcing many of the dispirited colonists to leave. During 1942, 
nearly half of the settlers abandoned María Auxiliadora and returned to the mainland.600 
The evacuees not only complained of the physical hardships they endured, but 
condemned Abascal’s ineptitude and callousness.601 Abascal, in turn, denounced his 
critics as cowards and deserters, urging that they be ousted from the organization.602 The 
Sinarquista leadership disagreed, however, and welcomed the returned settlers as loyal 
members.603 Moreover, Torres Bueno refused to provide any more support for the 
enterprise, which he considered to be a financial burden on the UNS.604 Soon, a rift 
developed between Abascal, the avatar of Sinarquismo, and the leadership back in the 
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mainland. The colonization scheme pierced the movement’s psychological shield of 
destiny and uncovered it as human and fallible.605  
 
The Decline of Sinarquismo 
 
 The political climate experienced a change during the early 1940s that further 
weakened the Sinarquista Movement. The election of 1940, which gave the UNS an 
enormous following, ironically contained the seeds of its destruction. President Cárdenas 
surprised Mexicans, who were expecting a Leftist candidate, by choosing moderate 
Avila Camacho as his successor. Cárdenas realized that the Mexican Revolution needed 
a shift back to the middle, in order to avert further conflict with the Right.606 Once Avila 
Camacho took power, he transformed the revolution into evolution, rejecting Marxist 
ideology as part of the new order.607 This new path addressed many of the factors that 
had empowered Sinarquismo.608 Times were changing and the UNS could not adapt to a 
policy that chose compromise over confrontation.609 
 Avila Camacho did not abandon the principles of the Mexican Revolution as he 
played the part of consolidator.610 He made sure that national unity took precedence over 
social struggle and that industrialization was emphasized over agrarian reform.611 A 
skillful leader, Avila Camacho made overtures towards conservatives in order to stem 
the radical elements of the Right. When asked about his views on the church, he declared 
“I am a believer,” providing Catholics with the most comforting words they had heard in 
an entire generation.612 Avila Camacho pursued his path of reconciliation by 
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pronouncing that the revolution did not intend to destroy religion.613 He went further by 
allowing military officers in uniform to attend public religious manifestations, though 
they were in violation of the law.614 The church reciprocated, praising him for defending 
the spiritual needs of the Mexican people.615 In 1942, Avila Camacho unequivocally 
declared that there was no religious problem in Mexico.616 
Another important development was the president’s refutation of socialism. 
Avila Camacho asserted himself as a democrat, not a socialist, and stated that no 
communist would intervene in his administration.617 Mexican business was favored over 
labor and Vicente Lombardo Toledano, most hated by the Right, was replaced with Fidel 
Velázquez as leader of the CTM.618 In late 1941, Leftist elements were expunged from 
the Ministry of Education and a new law was passed that specified that state instruction 
could not be of an antireligious nature.619 These changes, in addition to eliminating 
federal inspectors from private schools, were sufficient to allow the resurgence of 
Catholic education.620 Still, references to socialism were not removed from Article 3 
until 1946.621 In the meantime, Avila Camacho placated Catholics and satisfied 
revolutionary rhetoric by stating that, “Article 3 is not Marxist Socialism but Mexican 
Socialism.”622 Thus, Avila Camacho effectively abandoned the socialist education 
project established by Cárdenas.623 
 The moderate measures taken by Avila Camacho served to undercut support for 
the Sinarquistas. The government’s reconciliation with the church eased the discontent 
of the devout, who consequently lost interest in the UNS.624 Catholic teachers, who no 
longer had to teach in secret, left the organization as well.625 Although the UNS 
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continued to press for the repeal of Article 3, it did not matter since the offensive piece 
of legislation had been effectively neutralized by the president.626 The Avila Camacho 
administration also reached out to peasants, the core of UNS support. The regime 
became aware that the problem lay in the shortcomings of the revolutionary program and 
in particular agrarian reform.627 The Ministry of the Interior sent out “cultural brigades,” 
whose mission was to visit villages and give cultural lectures about the beneficial work 
being carried out by the federal government.628 These brigades provided vaccinations, 
medical supplies, books, and clothes to the needy.629 The propaganda measures 
effectively arrested the growth of the Sinarquista Movement: the UNS’s numbers 
remained constant from 1941 till 1944.630 
 The government also took direct steps to quell Sinarquismo. Initially, the 
government did not take any measures to limit the Sinarquista marches. However, on 
May 18, 1941, President Avila Camacho’s visit to Morelia was soured by a surprise 
Sinarquista march of 20,000.631 This embarrassment forced the government to accept the 
Sinarquistas as a serious threat.632 The increasingly larger marches worried the 
revolutionary leaders, who were fearful of losing popular support.633  On June 3, the 
PRM issued a manifesto, asking its members to “frustrate the restoring prospects of the 
reaction.”634 The proclamation was endorsed by unions, peasants’ leagues, and political 
groups, who called for the UNS to be disbanded.635  
The strongest opponent of the UNS was the Mexican Left, particularly the CTM, 
a harbinger of communist ideologues.636 The militant-looking Sinarquistas were labeled 
fascists by their foes. Word was spread that the UNS was of Nazi inspiration; a 
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collaborationist tool of the Axis powers.637 The Sinarquistas were accused of taking 
advantage of the ignorance of the masses in order to serve foreign powers, hacendados, 
and industrial capitalists.638 The national media as well as the United States joined the 
anti-Sinarquista movement, claiming that the organization threatened Mexican 
stability.639 An anti-Sinarquista committee was established by the Mexican Congress, 
placing more pressure on Avila Camacho to restrain the “seditious” group.640 The 
administration took action, instructing state governments to apply the laws vigorously 
against the UNS.641 In June 1942, it banned public gatherings without prior consent of 
the authorities, placing a severe obstacle to the Sinarquistas.642 Before Sinarquismo 
could succumb to external forces, however, it suffered a swift, staggering blow from 
within. 
 
The Collapse of Sinarquismo 
 
 The Sinarquista movement imploded due to strife among its top leadership. 
During Abascal’s absence, the UNS began taking a moderate stance towards the 
government. Mexico’s entry into World War II changed the paradigm in which 
Sinarquismo existed.643 The Supreme Council of the Base felt that the UNS risked being 
labeled unpatriotic if it continued its feverish stance against the administration. Manuel 
Torres Bueno, the new head of the movement, wanted to restrain the fascist and violent 
aspects of Sinarquismo, fearing increased suppression by the government.644 Prior 
Mexican figures that had been reviled, such as Benito Juárez and Miguel Hidalgo were 
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now accepted by the Sinarquistas.645 The UNS, despite its opposition to Mexico’s 
involvement in the war, felt obliged to remain silent on the issue of compulsory military 
service.646 This decision was not shared by all members, many of whom left the 
movement.647 
 Abascal, outraged by the moderate stance, began denouncing the new policy 
from his colony in Baja California.648 The disagreement became an embarrassment for 
the movement and the Supreme Council decided to expel Abascal in February 1944.649 
Shortly after arriving in Mexico City, the irate Abascal published a public declaration, 
calling on members to abandon Sinarquismo because it had been corrupted by Torres 
Bueno.650 Many of the more militant Sinarquistas chose to leave the UNS, causing a 
large split. Surprisingly, Abascal refused to establish a competing version of 
Sinarquismo, in effect abandoning his followers.651  
A second division appeared within Sinarquistas, this time involving Torres 
Bueno and the Base leadership. The leader of the UNS wanted to transform the 
organization into a political party.652 The Supreme Council vehemently opposed a 
political form of Sinarquismo and asked Torres Bueno to leave the movement.653 He 
blatantly disobeyed the order and wrested the UNS from the Base, making it an 
independent organization.654 The Supreme Council tried to appoint a new leader, but this 
failed, exposing an inherent weakness in Sinarquismo. Since the Base and the Supreme 
Council were secretive organizations, they were mostly unknown to the Sinarquista 
masses, which only recognized the “visible” leadership of Torres Bueno.655 Although the 
Sinarquista Movement eventually split into three separate factions (Abascal, Torres 
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Bueno, and the Base) the only one that was officially recognized as the “UNS” was the 
group headed by Manuel Torres Bueno.656 
The final blow for the movement came in June 1944, when an article appeared in 
El Sinarquista, imploring the Mexican army to prevent a communist takeover of the 
government.657 This was an obvious call for a military coup. Although the article, 
written by a wayward radical, did not represent the new moderate ideology of the UNS, 
it did not matter: it was seen as treason by the government.658 El Sinarquista was 
suspended, a ban was imposed on UNS meetings, and an investigation was launched by 
the Mexican government.659  
Without a public outlet, the UNS could not defend its reputation against Abascal, 
whose attacks remained unabated.660 As members left the organization in droves, Torres 
Bueno made one last desperate gamble by having the UNS participate in the elections of 
1946. The venture proved disastrous, as most members left when they saw that their 
organization had kowtowed to the corrupt political system.661 The UNS, emaciated, 
never again played a decisive role in Mexican history. Yet, it refused to disappear. 
Today, the Unión Nacional Sinarquista exists as a minor entity; a former shadow of 
itself, devoid of the militant ideology that had once made it a potent force.  
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 CHAPTER VI 
A COMPARISON OF IDEOLOGY 
 
 A study of the ideologies behind the Cristero Rebellion and the Sinarquista 
Movement demonstrates that these two events shared important goals. Foremost, was the 
establishment of a Christian Social Order in Mexico, namely a society ruled by morals 
where the Catholic Church would regain the prominence it once had during colonial 
times. These two movements emulated martyrdom as the ultimate expression of self-
sacrifice and devotion to the cause. The Mexican Revolution was reviled by both 
Cristeros and Sinarquistas, who felt that that this pernicious event had corrupted the 
nation through chaos and immorality. Another fundamental commonality was the topic 
of land reform. The desire for private property was a factor as important as religious 
consciousness in driving peasants to join the movements in large numbers. These 
common factors demonstrate that Sinarquismo was essentially a continuation of La 
Cristiada. 
 Ideology can also explain why most Cristeros chose not to join the Sinarquista 
Movement. Sinarquismo exuded extreme nationalism, which bordered on fascism.  On 
the other hand, the Cristeros’ sense of nationhood was less developed and limited only to 
their region; the patria chica. More importantly, the two movements differed sharply in 
how the Christian Social Order would be achieved. Sinarquismo envisioned the new 
society under an authoritarian state, where hierarchy and control would prevail. The 
Cristeros, on the other hand, cherished their freedom and sense of individuality. The 
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Cristeros had strong democratic values that made them incompatible with the repressive 
Sinarquistas. Although the Cristeros and Sinarquistas shared similar objectives, they 
disagreed on the means to achieve them. 
 
The Christian Social Order 
 
 Needless to say, religion was a fundamental characteristic of the Cristero 
Rebellion and the Sinarquista Movement. Both movements were deeply Catholic and 
made the protection of the faith a priority. They wanted to establish a new society in 
which the church would regain the exalted position it previously enjoyed during the days 
of the patronato real. In their vision, the Christian Social Order would bring harmony to 
Mexican society through creed and morality. Both the Cristeros and Sinarquistas 
established small-scale governments with the intent of implementing the Christian 
structure. These experiments at self-rule gave an indication of what these organizations 
hoped to achieve for the whole of Mexican society. 
Jean Meyer observed that “The theme of the Reign of Christ is firmly entrenched 
in Cristero ideology.”662 The Cristeros, while battling government troops, felt they were 
participating in the creation of a new world.663 This moral and perfect society which they 
hoped to build used family and religion as twin pillars for its foundation.664 The rebels 
did not feel that they were taking part in a revolution. Instead, they believed they were 
participants in the reformation of the social lawlessness that threatened the traditional 
mores of behavior.665 The Cristero army was building “the Kingdom of Christ,” argued 
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Meyer, in order to restore the hope of a “brilliant future” for the peasants.666 This 
liberating Catholic movement was entirely moral and focused on eliminating all 
disorder.667 Héctor Hernández stated that this vision was shared by the church hierarchy, 
which may have precluded them from condemning the rebellion.668 The Cristeros were 
effectively the “last Crusaders of Christianity,” who tried to establish colonial values in 
twentieth-century Mexico.669 
The Cristeros used religious logic in fighting the Callista regime. They 
recognized that all legitimate authority emanated from God, and were willing to “submit 
to a Caesar, on the condition that he didn’t wage war on God.”670 President Plutarco 
Elías Calles violated that principle, making him an implacable enemy of heaven in the 
eyes of the rebels.671 The Cristeros saw the rebellion and the persecution of the church as 
fulfillments of the prophecies of the Apocalypse.672 The killing, pillaging, hunger, and 
desecrations heralded the arrival of a reign replete with destructive evil.673 By depriving 
the faithful of the sacraments, Calles exposed himself as the anti-Christ, leaving the 
Cristeros no option but to fight for God and the salvation of souls in a just war.674 It is no 
wonder then, that the rebels chose the name “Cristeros” to identify themselves as 
Christian soldiers attacking a satanic government.675 
Anacleto González Flores, founder of the UP, believed that the duty of a 
Christian soldier was to plan his life with Christ as the ultimate goal.676 This lifestyle 
was to extend to one’s family and community, with the aim of reaching a higher ideal. 
He described this as “the glorious heroism of identifying the honor of God with one’s 
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own and placing this ideal ahead of one’s own life.”677 The Cristeros routinely practiced 
this way of life even while waging war.  
The areas in which the rebellion took place had a strong tradition in the Eucharist 
and the sacraments.678 The majority of respondents to Meyer’s questionnaire stated that 
they had courses in catechism and attended Sunday services.679 In Cristero camps, mass 
was given frequently by the few priests who ministered to the rebels.680 In the absence of 
clergy, the insurgents continued practicing their religion.681 In the camps there were 
individuals who practiced perpetual adoration of the sacrament, which was exposed 
whenever possible.682 The Cristeros prayed the rosary every day and sang to Christ and 
the Virgin Mary.683 Passages of the Bible were read aloud by the rebels for the benefit of 
their illiterate comrades.684 According to Meyer, Cristero culture was based on Christian 
oral tradition and the Bible.685 Militant Catholic figures, such as Joan of Arc and 
Charlemagne, were emulated by the insurgents.686 
The Cristeros were able to create local governments in the territories they 
controlled.687 The rebels considered themselves a free and sovereign people and did not 
recognize the legitimacy of the Calles government.688 As soon as territory was taken, the 
Cristeros tried to organize it efficiently, using the Christian Social Order as a model.689 
25 Cristero municipalities were established in the Los Altos region of Jalisco and 9 in 
the southern part of Zacatecas.690 In May 1928, a congress was held in the town of 
Mezquitic, Jalisco, in which a governing document, known as the General Order, was 
drafted so as to provide a framework for the judicial and administrative functions of 
these settlements.691 Meyer recognized that this self-rule was a fundamental objective of 
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the rebellion: “With a precise ideology that preaches the Adventism of justice and a 
cortège of Christian virtues, the Cristero government was the emancipation of the 
insurrection.”692 The two foci of the Cristero state were religion and morality. 
 The General Order recognized only the Mexican Constitution of 1857, a 
document that excluded the hated Reform Laws of the Juárez period.693 Consequently, 
the Order established a unified, harmonious relationship between church and state. 
Catholicism was recognized as the “true” religion and the apostolic church was hailed as 
the “perfect” society.694 The inhabitants were instructed to attend mass on Sundays and 
religious holidays.695 Religious education was emphasized and municipal leaders were 
required to establish Catholic schools in areas where there were at least ten children.696 
The Order rejected civil unions and divorce, and stipulated that a certificate from a priest 
was necessary in order to marry.697 
 The emphasis on religion was also adhered to by the UP, which controlled many 
local governments. UP leaders promoted “pious acts of oration and penitence” and 
worked for the establishment of religious education.698 The Christian spirit was 
maintained alive by making sure that Catholics repeated religious proclamations.699 
Residents were reminded to sacrifice for God’s cause and to maintain the period of 
mourning.700 Military leaders, such as Gorostieta, also recognized the importance of 
faith in their soldiers.701 
Priests found a haven in these Cristero enclaves, where they could operate 
without any obstacles.702 In areas that could not be reached by the priesthood, the laity 
maintained “organized and fervent pious organizations, where they would teach 
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catechism to the children, promote the acts of the divine cult, [and] celebrate with 
solemnity the large liturgical festivals like Corpus Christi.”703 The UP and other lay 
groups organized sacramental life in secret masses and maintained religious schools in 
private homes, caves, and trenches.704 The Women’s Brigades taught catechism and 
directed religious feminine groups such as Adoraciones Nocturnas Femeninas 
(Nocturnal Feminine Adorations).705 
The moral aspect of the Christian Social Order cannot be overstated. The 
Cristeros witnessed a decline in social mores since the advent of the Mexican 
Revolution, where “wine, gambling and scandals involving women” were on the rise.706 
These vices created conflict, violence, and death, leading to the disappearance of peace 
and justice.707 The Cristeros wanted to reestablish the social values and neighborly 
relations which they felt existed during the Porfiriato.708 In the wake of social 
disintegration, the Cristeros established a movement seen by Meyer as “thoroughly 
moral.”709 The eradication of the afflictions of society meant “a step towards perfection, 
the preparation of the Kingdom.”710 
The moral spirit was imposed by military chiefs. Ethical standards for soldiers 
were enforced by leaders such as Gorostieta, who felt that vices distracted the troops 
from the real enemy.711 Many rebels were executed for rape, robbery, and vengeance.712 
Alcohol was outlawed and there were harsh penalties for thievery.713 Rules were 
imposed to weed out corruption and inefficiency.714 One chief demanded that his troops, 
as soldiers of Christ, relinquish personal grudges for the new order.715 Accordingly, the 
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Cristeros placed themselves on a higher ethical plane than the government troops, 
believing that morality in Mexico would be regenerated with “rifle in hand.”716 
Morality was also imposed by the General Order of Cristero governance. 
Municipal presidents were instructed to “persecute immorality in all its forms” and to 
choose only employees who were “good Catholic citizens” and exhibited “wholesome 
habits.”717 There was a campaign against parties, drinking, and gambling.718 Municipal 
leaders had the authority to confiscate alcohol and destroy gaming devices.719 In order to 
observe the period of mourning (the closing of the churches), public celebrations were 
outlawed.720 Marriage was considered sacrosanct and the government attacked anything 
that might denigrate it, such as prostitution, adultery, and concubinage.721 Single men 
were obligated to marry, under penalty of fine.722  
The Sinarquista Movement shared the same Catholic religious and moral values 
as the Cristero Rebellion. Kenneth Prager argued that Sinarquismo, despite its nationalist 
overtones, was primarily a Catholic movement, with an ideology that was basically the 
application of Thomas Aquinas’s natural law.723 The establishment of a Christian 
government was a major theme of the Sinarquista Movement: “Sinarquismo… is a civic 
movement which seeks the restoration in Mexico of the Christian Social Order.”724 
Sinarquistas believed that the new society would be under God, governed by a God-
fearing state.725 Hernández claimed that the church hierarchy established the UNS with 
this purpose in mind.726 
 Prager stated that the Sinarquistas drew inspiration from Argentina’s pro-
Catholic Peronista government of the 1940s.727 There were theoretical aspects to the 
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Peronista regime that intrigued the UNS.728 An Argentine priest, Julio Meinvielle, 
formulated the concept of the “New Christian Order,” which postulated that the 
restoration of the Catholic Church of the Middle Ages would save the modern world 
from chaos and destruction. 729 Meinvielle’s New Order was based on the theory of 
General Will advocated by Thomas Aquinas, namely the Christian regularization of 
society’s economic life.730 Everyone in the New Order belonged to a syndicate, content 
to perform their function in society.731 The significance of Meinvielle’s theory for 
Sinarquismo was that the Christian Social Order, instead of being a theological dream, 
had the potential of being implemented under the right circumstances.732 Such a world 
was envisioned by Juan Ignacio Padilla, a Sinarquista propagandist. In his pamphlet, The 
Formation of the New Conscience, Padilla envisioned Mexico under a Sinarquista 
regime.733 
Like the Cristeros, the Sinarquistas felt that society had lost its moral compass: 
“Mexico began to forget about God and lived in a period of ambition, of disorderly 
sensuality, and of chaotic values.”734 Sinarquistas believed that practical remedies for 
society’s evils could be found in Catholic philosophy and spirituality.735 Socialism was 
the new “evil,” which could only be confronted by Catholics through national unity. 
Once the scourge of socialism was eradicated, social justice and Christian principles 
would prevail.736 Mexico could survive the chaos by looking back at its historical 
traditions, which were based on the Roman Catholic faith.737 Sinarquismo, the antonym 
of anarchy, wanted to establish in Mexico a modern version of St. Augustine’s City of 
God.738 
 108 
 The UNS looked to the colonial church as the blueprint for the Christian Social 
Order.739 Sinarquismo hailed the close collaboration between church and state that 
existed in New Spain, the important patronato real.740 It argued that this relationship 
fostered a community of religion, ideals, language, and Christian human values that 
allowed the colony to be effectively governed.741 Other colonial legacies acclaimed by 
the UNS were the church’s organic view of society and redemption, which were used as 
mechanisms to maintain order. Sinarquistas wanted to recreate the system in which some 
governmental functions were placed under the control of the Catholic Church.742 
Eighteenth-century Mexico was seen as a utopia, where there “was a marvelous harmony 
of all the social classes, united under the paternal authority of the two powers, the 
temporal and the spiritual, indissolubly linked.”743  
 Religious schooling was a principle of the Sinarquista Christian Social Order. 
Education could not be secular, since man was inherently a spiritual being.744 Sinarquista 
thinking was based on the premise that man lived in three societies: family, state, and 
church.745 All three could intervene in education, but only the family and the church had 
a “natural and divine right” to be a fundamental aspect of it.746 Sinarquistas believed that 
the church had the supreme authority in teaching, not subject to the rule of any worldly 
power.747 The state’s role in education was to be supplementary, consisting of subsidies 
for private Catholic schools.748 Sinarquistas presented this model as an alternative to the 
Cardenista socialist educational system.749 
 Sinarquismo portrayed itself as the defender of the church, claiming that within 
the essence of Mexico was Catholicism.750 Sinarquistas believed that “Catholic 
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doctrine…is a principal [sic.] and a foundation of our concept of the Christian Social 
Order.”751  Sinarquistas were ardent practicing Catholics, sworn to protect the interests 
of the church against the “evils” of Protestantism, Freemasonry, and international 
Judaism.752 Many Sinarquista leaders were trained in the Congregations of the Holy 
Virgin.753 According to Hernández, the Sinarquista leaders were true mystics, men of 
“undeniable religious character,” who were not animated by ulterior political motives.754 
Religious peasants found in Sinarquismo a comforting force capable of defending the 
church from “anti-Christian” powers such as the United States and the Mexican 
Revolution.755 The UNS ingeniously capitalized on Catholic sentiment that had been 
riled by the socialist policies of Cárdenas.756 
 Morality was another precept that Sinarquistas shared with the Cristeros. The 
UNS believed that man could achieve spiritual perfection if he lived according to moral 
principles.757 Through individual conversions, a profound change in society would 
occur.758 A worthy government could arise only through the efforts of a strong, hard- 
working, moral people.759 The UNS demanded that all its members “be men of 
consistent honesty in all fields of their activities.”760 Though Sinarquistas were 
instructed to obey their leaders, it was with the condition that such orders were not 
contrary to morality and justice.761 Likewise, Sinarquismo believed that natural law and 
Christian values took precedence in relations between capital and labor.762 The nucleus 
of morality lay within family life, which the UNS considered the foundation of 
society.763 Therefore, the Christian Social Order would be dedicated to promoting and 
protecting the family unit.764 
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The Sinarquistas, like the Cristeros, were intent on establishing a governing body 
capable of implementing the Christian Social Order. They were eager to prove to the 
world that a model republic, a materialization of Sinarquista philosophy, could 
function.765 Under the leadership of Salvador Abascal, the Sinarquista colony “María 
Auxiliadora” was founded in the arid peninsula of Baja California. Abascal, who 
believed that “a totally Catholic regime” should rule Mexico, established the colony out 
of “spiritual necessity.”766 The enterprise was seen by the UNS as a renewal of the work 
of the Spanish missionaries.767  
At the colony, Abascal drafted a set of bylaws which pledged the settlers to 
Christian principles.768 The activities of the colonists were prescribed: “Each person was 
to make the sign of the cross and pray an ‘Our Father’ before and after each meal, each 
family had to say Rosary together at least once a day.”769 The stern rules contained in 
The Ten Norms of Conduct for Sinarquistas were enforced. Dancing was strictly 
prohibited and every settler had to be in bed by ten in the evening.770 Therefore, the ideal 
Sinarquista state embodied a puritanical interpretation of Christianity, as did the 
Cristeros.’ 
 
Martyrdom 
 
The Cristeros and Sinarquistas shared a genuine desire to die for the cause. The 
followers of both movements were eager to offer up their lives as the ultimate act of 
faith; a sacrifice for the advancement of the Christian Social Order. This similarity is 
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remarkable, given that the Cristeros were armed combatants and the Sinarquistas 
peaceful demonstrators. The concept of martyrdom in Mexican Catholicism can be 
traced back to the early missionaries. The Cristeros and Sinarquistas carried on with this 
legacy in order to underscore the religious aspect of their cause. For them, salvation was 
the key motive behind martyrdom. This act of sacrifice also became an important 
recruiting tool for both groups. 
Meyer noted that the concept of sacrifice was important to the Cristeros: “The 
desire for martyrdom, thought of as a grace and as the means to advance the salvation of 
Mexico and of the world, was quite evident.”771 The Cristeros, in their apocalyptic view 
of the world, believed that their actions aided the Second Coming of Christ.772 “Our men 
gave their lives so that Our Father would return again,” wrote one rebel.773 They viewed 
sacrifice as a fulfillment of history to unfold itself, in the same way that the death of 
Christ and other martyrs was necessary for the rise of the Catholic Church.774 Meyer 
believed that the Cristeros were engaged in a collective “imitation of Christ,” in which 
they prioritized their own sacrifice, rather than the demise of their enemies.775 
Martyrdom was seen as the key to salvation; an expedient way to the gates of 
heaven.776 Anacleto González Flores composed a prayer in which the Cristero asked 
Christ for death on the battlefield as a way of atoning for his sins.777 Rumors were spread 
of miracles involving martyred rebels, giving comfort to those facing the firing squad 
that heaven was awaiting.778 The Cristeros applied the same principle to their enemies, 
offering them an opportunity to confess before being executed, since their soul was as 
precious as any other man’s.779 Still, God preferred the blood of martyrs than that of the 
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enemy, since only the former could wash away the sins of the world and defeat Satan.780 
In this paradigm, it is not surprising that many Cristeros preferred death when offered 
the opportunity to join the Callista army.781 
González Flores, the founder of the UP, was fascinated by the notion of 
martyrdom. His resistance philosophy consisted of two elements: collective civil 
disobedience and individual sacrifice.782 When he founded the UP, he dreamed of 
martyrdom: “Holy Mother of Guadalupe! Concede that my last words on earth and my 
first declaration in heaven be the words ‘Viva Cristo Rey!’” Martyrdom was a constant 
theme in González Flores’s speeches and writings, which called upon his followers to 
sacrifice their blood.783 His only published work was titled The Plebiscite of the 
Martyrs.784 However, historian Jim Tuck stated that it would be wrong to label him as a 
death-obsessed fanatic.785 González Flores deplored violence, seeing it as a way to 
tyranny. He believed that only through individual sacrifice and a mass program of 
passive resistance could despotic systems could be overthrown.786 His concept of 
martyrdom and his ideas on democracy were more in league with the Sinarquista 
Movement than the Cristero Rebellion.  
Meyer was able to count at least 250 Cristeros that met the church’s definition of 
“martyr.”787 The victims met their end with such a calm, almost gleeful, mien, that they 
instilled fear into the government troops.788 “It was a great adventure, so great and so 
noble, we were so happy at that time,” remarked a Cristero.789 To the rebels, death was 
not to be feared, since it was “communion with God.”790 The “need” to die was so great 
that the survivor of a mass execution felt sad that he was not chosen by God.791 The wish 
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for martyrdom was not limited to the peasants on the battlefield; members of the ACJM 
and the Women’s Brigades also sought it.792 
Sinarquistas revered the act of martyrdom. They considered themselves monk-
like “soldiers;” fanatical crusaders willing to give up their lives for God and country.793 
Kenneth Prager linked Cristeros and Sinarquistas through martyrdom, saying that by 
dying for the Catholic faith, both groups attracted a rank and file composed primarily of 
obsessed lay elements.794 “By appealing to the religiosity of the mass, both movements 
had a momentum which was gained through the cult of martyrdom, which was an 
integral part of their crusading spirit,” observed Prager.795 Prager also noted that the 
UNS was inspired by the sacrifice and martyrdom proclaimed by a founder of the 
League, Miguel Palomar y Vizcarra.796 
The language of the UNS accentuated sacrifice, danger, blood, and death.797 
Almost every issue of El Sinarquista cited a sacrifice made by a member for the glory of 
the movement.798 “God,” the newspaper declared, “requires blood for the salvation of 
Mexico.”799 José Trueba Olivares, an early leader of the UNS, compared the sacrifice of 
the Sinarquistas to that of the early Christian martyrs of Rome.800 The UNS incorporated 
martyrdom into its policy of nonviolence. Sinarquistas took no weapons to rallies 
because “they were not going to take the life of anybody, but risk their own for 
religion.”801 Hernández observed that martyrdom energized the militant spirit of the 
UNS.802 According to Prager, what made martyrdom so appealing was its compatibility 
with the peasants’ religious convictions and “tragic sense of life.”803 
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Like the Cristeros, Sinarquistas used salvation to justify martyrdom. Prager 
stated that Sinarquismo used the peasants’ willingness to sacrifice themselves as “an act 
that was God’s way of allowing them to be redeemed and be saved.”804 Salvation applied 
to the country as well, keeping with the movement’s nationalist spirit. Each follower was 
asked to wage an unarmed struggle and sacrifice himself for the “freedom and greatness 
of Mexico.”805 According to Meyer, the Sinarquistas rationalized that everything that 
needed conquering exacted a price: “It is dumb to suppose that Mexico can save itself 
without a fight… in order to save Mexico we must risk family, life and tranquility.” 806 
This feeling was so strong that a mother brought her sick child to a march, stating: “If he 
dies, he is one martyr more.”807 
The act of sacrifice was used as an effective recruiting tool by the UNS. This 
tactic was engineered by Abascal, who saw the movement as a war in which lives and 
property were lost as a matter of course.808 To him, it was essential that massive numbers 
of unarmed Sinarquistas be killed in the streets. The violent death brought on by the 
marches invigorated the spirit of the movement and gave the UNS a tremendous boost in 
membership.809 Calling the Sinarquistas “soldiers of freedom,” Abascal said, “It would 
be regrettable and sad if they didn’t lose a life when the enemy was fought.”810  
The “Abascal method,” consisting of immense numbers of marchers, provoked 
the desired response from the authorities. Hernández documented at least 87 martyrs 
between the years 1939, when the tactic was introduced and 1941, the height of the 
Sinarquista Movement.811 Hence, there existed a direct corollary between death and 
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recruitment. A similarity existed in the Cristero Rebellion, in which Meyer argued that 
the clergy saw the sacrifice of the rebels as potent recruiting tool.812 
Two prominent examples of martyrdom existed in the Sinarquista Movement. 
The first was José Antonio Urquiza, a prominent member of the UNS who was 
assassinated in 1938.813 Although it was later determined to be untrue, most Sinarquistas 
assumed that Urquiza had been killed on the orders of Cárdenas.814 Urquiza, known to 
Sinarquistas as “El Ausente” (“the Absent One”), became a celebrity of the 
movement.815 Another martyr was María Teresa Bustos, killed in the infamous “Celaya 
massacre” of 1939.816 Bustos was carrying the national flag when shot by the agrarian 
reserves.817 The bloodstained ensign was procured by the UNS, which passed it down 
from one leader to the next as a symbol of sacrifice, a tradition that continues to this 
day.818  
 
 The Mexican Revolution  
 
 The Cristeros and Sinarquistas considered themselves counterrevolutionary. Both 
movements stridently opposed the Mexican Revolution, which they saw as an obstacle to 
the creation of the Christian Social Order. The revolution was seen as an atheistic entity, 
intent on eradicating church influence in Mexico. It had created anarchy, threatening to 
destroy peace and order, which was the legacy of the patronato real. The revolution 
fostered the evils of communism and socialist education, menaces to one’s family and 
country. Moreover, it was apparent that the revolution had failed in its promise of 
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improving the lot of average Mexicans. The Mexican Revolution was continually 
vilified by the ideologies of the Cristeros and Sinarquistas. The general discontent 
created by the revolution effectively generated the mass support for both movements. 
 “One might simply say that the Cristiada was a movement of reaction against the 
Mexican Revolution,” observed Meyer.819 He added that the rebellion was doubly 
counterrevolutionary, both in the context of Mexican politics and in the technical and 
sociological sense of the term: “squabble, quarrel, conflict, [and] riot.”820  Indeed, the 
Cristeros viewed their struggle as the opposite of the chaos engendered by the 
revolution.821 This sentiment was voiced by their greatest general, Enrique Gorostieta: 
“Our fight, despite the fact that it is a guerilla movement… I am proud to declare of it 
that it is far from the anarchy and the disorder, like our enemies of justice and honor.”822 
The antirevolutionary sentiment of the peasant rebels was shared by their middle-class 
counterparts, the members of the League.823 
Historian David Bailey saw the rebellion as an attempt by Catholic militants to 
destroy the regime created by a “godless” revolution.824 Andrés Azkue agreed, admiring 
the Cristeros for their resilience: “They are the clear reflection of a Christian people that 
resists death at the hands of a modern revolution.”825 Azkue felt that the war was not 
fought to open the churches, but to finish the revolution once and for all.826 Aurelio 
Acevedo, a Cristero leader, protested that the adjective “revolutionary” be applied to 
him, asserting that his cause was the exact “opposite of a revolution.”827 His statement 
echoed the hopes of many Cristeros, who wished for the reformation of society, not its 
destruction.828 The rebels used this philosophy when they established their self-rule. 
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They strove to prevent the military from having influence on civilian rule, a defect they 
saw in the revolutionary regime.829  
The Sinarquista Movement, with its battle cry of “No Revolution!” was a 
continuation of the reactionary sentiment expressed by the Cristero Rebellion.830 
“Synarquismo [sic.],” wrote Hernández, “represented the counter-revolutionary response 
of the next generation.”831 Sinarquistas took the Cristeros’ counterrevolutionary theme 
and developed it further, disparaging not only the anticlerical aspects of the Mexican 
Revolution, but also the Marxist features it acquired in the 1930s.832 The UNS believed 
that the country had been overtaken by a corrupt “revolutionary gang” that had failed to 
deliver on its guarantees of social reform and economic progress.833 As Meyer observed, 
“Sinarquismo utilized in a very effective and dangerous manner the promises that the 
Mexican Revolution was unable to fulfill.”834 Sinarquismo saw that the revolution had 
destroyed colonial civilization without creating a superior state.835 Sinarquismo, 
signifying “with order,” was established to oppose the anarchy created by the 
revolution.836 
The UNS considered the Mexican Revolution a great threat, making its defeat the 
primary goal. Prager described the relationship between the two: “While the revolution 
promises the better life of justice and equality, invokes the good and undertakes its 
achievement, counterrevolution builds on evils already achieved, arms the people in their 
own humiliation and their suffering.”837 Sinarquismo saw itself as the expression of the 
popular will that had not been reached by the revolution.838 The UNS denounced 
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revolutionary society as unjust, with its true purpose of enriching the politicians at the 
expense of the peasantry.839  
Prager argued that the founders of Sinarquismo were alienated from the world 
created by the revolution.840 The monopolistic control of the country’s political, 
economic, and social processes by the revolutionaries reinforced their belief that it was 
impossible to have honest elections in Mexico.841 The Sinarquistas felt that it was 
essential to create an alternate society, which would serve as the basis for “a new man, a 
new mode of community.”842 This concept was appealing to many Mexicans, who saw 
the hollowness of revolutionary promises as their wages were outpaced by the cost of 
living.843 Prager believed that by tapping into this discontent, the Sinarquista Movement 
was able to turn the Mexican Revolution against itself.844 
Sinarquista literature was devoted to attacking the revolution, calling it the root 
of Mexico’s ailment and disorder.845 The revolution, Sinarquistas claimed, had created 
division among Mexicans and left the people impoverished.846  The despotic 
revolutionary government allowed union bosses to oppress workers and failed to provide 
land to the peasants.847 The corrupt state had misused public funds, while the country 
lacked schools, roads, and public services.848 The revolution was led not by true patriots, 
but by self-serving lesser men.849 Instead of bringing progress, the revolution had left 
millions in “illiteracy, injustice, misery and terror.”850 The abomination of the Mexican 
Revolution could only be exorcised through the creation of a Christian Social Order.851 
Sinarquismo attacked the revolution by linking it to communism. Sinarquistas 
claimed that the Cárdenas regime was run by communists and influenced by the Soviet 
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Union.852 The rhetoric intensified the fears of the Mexican middle class, who had 
witnessed Cárdenas’s partiality for radical leftist organizations like the CTM and the 
CNC.853 This group was concerned that the government favored the interests of the 
working class above all others.854 These worries were exacerbated by Cárdenas’s support 
for Republican Spain and his welcoming of civil war refugees, many of whom were 
communists.855 The UNS tried to counteract the socialist programs of the Mexican 
Revolution by offering its own proposals for the working classes. 
Sinarquismo subscribed to the belief that the labor movement had become too 
radical for the nation’s good. The UNS wanted a cordial relationship to exist between 
capital and labor: “Neither employers nor employees should forget that they are above 
all, Mexicans, and that the unity of the country comes first.”856 Under the corporatist 
Sinarquista plan, labor unions would be dedicated to the moral, material, and intellectual 
development of its workers.857 The unions would refrain from engaging in “unlawful 
strikes” or promoting class struggle.858 Still, Sinarquismo advocated that laborers receive 
a decent wage and work in safe conditions.859 Under the Christian Social Order, the 
state’s function was to develop industry, while protecting the laborer and fostering the 
common good.860  
Sinarquismo singled out socialist education as the worst institution of the 
Mexican Revolution. Its criticisms of the educational system found favor with many 
religious Mexicans that opposed the anticlerical teachings of the state. Allying itself with 
parental groups, such as the National Union of Parents, the UNS attacked Article 3 as 
“unconstitutional, anti-Mexican, oppressive, obscurantist, and retrograde.”861 
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Sinarquismo demanded that educational decisions be made by the parents, not the 
state.862 Under the Christian Social Order, education was to be religious in nature, 
dedicated to eradicating illiteracy.863 
 
Agrarian Reform 
 
 Next to religion, agrarian reform was the most important ideological facet of both 
the Cristero Rebellion and the Sinarquista Movement. Some historians argued that it was 
the most important reason why peasants joined the movements in great numbers. Land 
reform was seen as the greatest disappointment of the Mexican Revolution. Many 
campesinos felt that the revolution had failed to deliver on its promise contained in 
Article 17 of the Constitution.864  
The land distribution that was taking place was deemed defective and 
insufficient. The Cristeros and Sinarquistas capitalized on this discontent, offering 
lucrative alternatives to the destitute. The Mexican government counterattacked by 
portraying the two groups as reactionary forces allied with the hacendados. However, 
there is ample evidence to establish that the Cristero Rebellion and Sinarquismo were 
true agrarian movements that were willing to go further than the government in 
redistributing the land. 
 The Mexican government used the socialist device of the ejido to redistribute 
land to the peasants. The ejido was not private property; instead it was land that was 
owned by the state and parceled out to communities for cultivation. In his study of the 
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Cristeros, Meyer was very critical of the ejido, explaining how the system failed the 
peasants.865 Instead of benefiting the campesino, the ejido was used by the government 
as a political control mechanism.866 Land distribution lay at the hands of the local ejidal 
committee, an entity with overreaching powers. The committees controlled the 
movement of land parcels (which included allotment, inheritance, and planting) and the 
management of communal forests and pastures.867 Ejidal boards were controlled by 
corrupt officials, who manipulated the system to enrich themselves at the expense of the 
peasants that they were supposed to serve.868 Ejidatarios, those lucky enough to receive 
parcels, were unable to use their lands effectively.869 They lacked the necessary loans to 
obtain seed, beasts of burden, and other necessities.870  
 Several authors suggested that the Mexican Revolution was not a true agrarian 
revolt.871 They argued that the masses were mobilized by a “national bourgeoisie” in 
order to overthrow an unwanted dictatorship.872 Once the dictator was deposed, this elite 
group of “revolutionaries” imposed their own rule and disregarded the interests of those 
who had supported them.873 The great exception was Emiliano Zapata, the most radical 
leader of the revolution. Zapata died fighting for the rights of peasants, something for 
which the Cristeros admired him greatly. 874 Zapata’s vision of land reform differed 
significantly from the state-led agrarian reform program of the 1920s, which was 
disdained by the Cristeros.875 Plutarco Elías Calles, however, represented what the 
Cristeros most despised in the revolution. Calles, like other “revolutionary” presidents, 
distributed land sparingly as a way to pay lip service to Article 17. In 1926, the vast 
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majority of peasants remained outside the ejido system.876 The Cristeros took up the 
cause of the disinherited classes, condemning Calles for betraying his own citizens.877  
 Two historians, José Díaz and Ramón Rodríguez, insisted that the rebellion was 
not a religious war.878 They argued that La Cristiada was caused by an “ecological 
crisis” in Los Altos, induced by a shortage of land, combined with a rising population.879 
While Meyer believed that the root cause of the rebellion was religion, he stated that the 
agrarian problem was particularly acute in Cristero areas.880 In Jalisco, the ejido system 
negatively affected small property owners, while leaving the haciendas, which were 
powerful and influential, unscathed.881 Many of those dispossessed landowners became 
rebels.882 Moreover, the land that was distributed tended to the worst in the region, 
where it was unfeasible to raise crops.883 In order to survive, the peasants that worked 
these lands were forced to work as laborers on the haciendas.884 The government’s 
favoritism towards the landed elite generated the resentment that fueled the rebellion. 885 
 Jean Meyer’s questionnaire and Jenny Purnell’s study revealed how important 
the agrarian problem was to the rebellion.886 The Cristeros’ main foes throughout the 
conflict were the agraristas, the agrarian militia of the government.887 The Cristeros and 
agraristas shared the same set of religious beliefs and practices.888 Hence, Meyer and 
Purnell concluded that the key dividing factor between the two mortal enemies was land 
reform, not religion.889  
The Cristeros rejected revolutionary agrarian reform, seeing it as a form of 
enslavement, in which the peasant was tied to the land without actually owning it.890 The 
government’s conscription of ejidatarios supported their accusations.891 The agrarian 
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reserves were forced to fight at the front, suffering the brunt of Cristero attacks.892 
Purnell stated that the Callista regime depended on thousands of agraristas to conduct its 
counterinsurgency campaign.893 
The Mexican government was aware that the lack of land distribution fueled the 
insurgency. The state tried to undercut support for the rebellion by distributing land in 
the troubled areas.894 It parceled out more land during the three years of the insurgency 
than during the ten years prior.895 After the war ended, the state continued issuing ejidos 
as a conciliatory and coercive measure.896 The effort paid off, since those towns that had 
firmly established agrarian committees did not rise up in rebellion.897 The Cristeros 
realized that the agraristas were forced to fight and never lost hope in trying to convert 
them to their cause.898 Still, the Cristeros were not against land reform per se, but the 
manner in which the state was implementing it.899 Private, not communal, property was 
what drove many Cristeros to rebel.900  
 The Cristeros incorporated their own version of land reform into the Christian 
Social Order. The Cristeros seized land and animals from haciendas they felt were not 
being productive.901 They took complete control of the economy wherever they could 
and imposed rules to eliminate inefficiency.902 Agriculture, lands, and cattle were 
administered and price control measures were placed on maize.903 Ironically, the 
Cristeros farmed the lands communally.904 However, this was done out of necessity and 
private ownership of land would have been established once the rebellion triumphed. 
The Cristeros promised ejidatarios that they would be given titles to their properties 
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under “just conditions.”905 Moreover, Article 51 of the General Order stipulated that 
private property would be respected.906 
 The government, as well as some writers, accused the Cristeros of being a 
reactionary movement against land reform. The agrarista leadership called the Cristeros 
the “White Guards,” who were in the pay of the Vatican and the landowners.907 
However, Meyer used his research to debunk these claims.908 According to him, the 
hacendados never considered the Cristeros as their allies against the government’s 
program of land reform.909 The landed elite saw the Cristeros as bandits, calling their 
movement “la ratería (“the robbery”).910 On the other hand, they openly welcomed the 
Mexican army, providing them with intelligence, supplies, and horses.911 Some of them 
even executed Cristeros.912 Thus, Meyer described the rebellion as a war between the 
rich and poor.913 
 Sinarquismo continued the Cristeros’ tradition of agrarian protest. Historian 
Rionda Ramírez argued that Cristerismo endured past the year 1929 because the issue of 
land reform had not been resolved.914 The appearance of Sinarquismo, she stated, 
revived this social force and channeled it into nonviolent action.915 Sinarquismo offered 
the same enticing promise of private land to campesinos.916 Sinarquismo, like the 
Cristero Rebellion, wanted a Christian Social Order based on agriculture. Both 
movements turned their backs on a modern, industrial Mexico, preferring the 
agricultural, colonial aspect of the past. It is ironic that the vigorous application of land 
reform under Lázaro Cárdenas made the message of Sinarquismo even more appealing. 
However, this was due to the peasants’ desire for private, not ejidal property.
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 Prager noted that the corruption and bureaucracy inherent in the ejido system 
only worsened the plight of the peasants.917 During the early period of the UNS, over 
three million ejidatarios had pending claims for land distribution.918 The biggest 
problem, according to Hernández, was not the lack of land, but the abundance of 
government red tape.919 Peasants, uncertain of the future, were desperate for a piece of 
land, a situation that Sinarquismo exploited.920 Another predicament was the lack of 
available credit, since peasants had to deal with powerful (and corrupt) bank officials.921 
The situation deteriorated in 1938, when credit from the ejidal bank was reduced.922  
Insecurity was an additional problem of the ejido. Peasants believed that the lack 
of a clear deed made them vulnerable to the greed of agrarian superintendents.923 The 
ejidos were also inefficient, partly because peasants were not motivated to work on land 
that that was not theirs.924 Other negative factors were an expansion of the population 
and a lack of improvement in the country’s irrigation system.925 These elements, along 
with a drought, led to a reduction in maize production, which in turn increased the price 
of that vital commodity.926 The economic stress forced many Mexicans to leave the 
country to work as braceros (migrant workers) in the United States.927 According to 
Prager, a large portion of the peasantry felt betrayed by the government.928 This 
pessimistic conception of agrarian reform formed the basis of Sinarquista ideology.929 
Sinarquismo tailored its program to address the agrarian issue. The UNS 
proclaimed that the revolution had failed to keep its promise of giving land to the 
peasants.930 The Sinarquistas vehemently rejected the ejido program, saying it was a 
system alien to the rural world.931 Sinarquismo claimed that the ejido bounded the 
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peasant to the state rather than the land.932 The UNS published compelling pamphlets, 
such as one from 1938 titled, “Peasant: the revolution has betrayed you.”933 Sinarquismo 
proposed that in order to rehabilitate national agriculture, large properties had to be 
subdivided into small private landholdings.934 Sinarquista propaganda affirmed that the 
right of private property “was conferred on man by Natural Law and taught by 
Christianity.”935 The enemy of private property was not the haciendas, but the 
“communist” state of Cárdenas, along with Protestant groups.936 “The UNS fights to 
make you the absolute owner of the land, to get you a definite deed,” Abascal told 
peasants.937 
Sinarquista propaganda targeted the agrarian reserves, the traditional enemies of 
the Cristeros. Federico Gil condemned the reserves, stating, “Neither order, nor the 
material or moral betterment of the peasant, nor the complete and stable development of 
our agriculture, can be attained unless the Government sees fit to remove the gravest 
obstacle to the attaining of these ends, which obstacles consist of these armed groups of 
land users designated by the name of ‘Agrarian Reserves.’”938 The Sinarquistas viewed 
the agraristas as a state instrument of “terror and tyranny” designed to intimidate and 
impoverish the peasant.939 The Sinarquistas suffered casualties at the hands of the 
agrarian reserves, just as the Cristeros did. In their marches clamoring for agrarian 
reform, several Sinarquistas were killed, the prime examples being the martyrs of the 
“Celaya massacre” of 1939.940 
The Sinarquista message worked, enticing thousands of disgruntled peasants to 
join the movement. Hernández noted the allure of the UNS, stating, “The strongest 
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appeal Sinarquismo makes, and the most dangerous, is to the unrealized ambitions of the 
Mexican revolution [sic.] itself… Sinarquistas hold out the prospect of private land 
ownership.”941 Sinarquismo also attracted small property owners, who saw themselves 
as the losers in the state’s land redistribution program.942 Hernández stated that even 
those who benefited from the ejido system were attracted by the lure of private 
property.943  Meyer agreed, noting that many agraristas, unhappy with certain aspects of 
the ejido, joined the Sinarquista Movement.944 Moreover, Sinarquismo shared a distinct 
characteristic with La Cristiada in that it enjoyed greater success in those areas where the 
government’s agrarian program experienced the most difficulty.945  
The Sinarquistas incorporated agrarian reform into their vision of the Christian 
Social Order. They felt that they could distribute land to the peasants using the 
unexploited lands in northern Mexico and near the Pacific coast.946 Land would also be 
obtained from the large estates, which would be compensated.947 The ejidos, the 
“imperfect form of property,” would be transformed into individual landholdings.948 
Small property owners would be exempt, since they had already achieved the desired 
goal.949 The state would support the independent peasants with guarantees, security, 
protection, and financing.950 Moreover, credit unions would be established in the form of 
“genuine” cooperatives, where farmers could obtain long-term loans at low cost.951 Still, 
the Christian Social Order demanded that private interests remain subordinate to the 
national well-being.952 
An interesting aspect of the Christian Social Order was the establishment of an 
agrarian, instead of industrial, society. In this manner, both Sinarquismo and La 
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Cristiada were anti-modernist. The Sinarquista ideal was to have each peasant 
individually cultivate his own piece of the “national soil.”953 Instead working for an 
employer, families would live self-sufficiently and sell their surplus on the open 
market.954 The goal was to form a “landed bourgeoisie that would share in the welfare of 
the community and economic security of the largest number of Mexicans.”955 
Sinarquistas rejected a country based on industrialization because it placed it under 
foreign tutelage and impeded the formation of a society composed of small independent 
landowners.956 Hernández argued that the Sinarquistas ignored monopolistic and state 
capitalism in favor of nineteenth-century economics, where industrial production was 
performed by craftsmen.957 National wealth would be derived from agriculture, argued 
the Sinarquistas.958 Consequently, the nation would focus its educational and other 
efforts towards its rural sector.959 
The Sinarquistas looked for opportunities to experiment with their ideology of 
land reform. The UNS called upon its members to get elected to the post of ejidal 
superintendent.960 Others were encouraged to accept whatever plots of land they 
received from the government.961 Once in place, the Sinarquista peasants and 
superintendents solicited the agrarian authorities for registration of the plots so that they 
could become privatized.962 The Sinarquistas also tried to take over ejidos directly, with 
the intent of subdividing these into private holdings.963 Lastly, agrarian reform was 
implemented in the colonization scheme of María Auxiliadora.964 The colony, however, 
was unable to achieve this goal because of the difficulties encountered. The colonists 
were instructed by Abascal to pool their resources in order to survive.965 The 
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Sinarquistas repeated the irony of the Cristeros, who had to be communistic until they 
could become self-sufficient.966  
Several historians viewed Sinarquismo as a true movement of land reform. 
Meyer, who doubted that the Cristeros championed land rights, saw the Sinarquistas 
differently, stating that their organization was “the great agrarian movement” of 
Mexico.967 Meyer believed that peasants were the first intended converts of the 
Sinarquista Movement, who were supposed to be followed by the workers, the middle 
class, and the intellectuals.968 Hernández agreed, stating that Sinarquismo continued to 
attract the peasantry because it challenged the entire concept and system of agrarian 
reform.969  
Prager stated that the UNS was related to Mexico’s two distinctive traditions of 
agrarian protest.970 One was the “folk tradition” advocated by the country’s illiterate 
peasants, who translated protest in terms of direct reprisals against “concrete 
personalities.”971 The other tradition was of those educated elements of society 
(journalists, lawyers, clerics, politicians, philosophers, and professors), who saw protest 
in terms of its legal, philosophical, and political aspects.972 In essence, the key to 
Sinarquismo’s popularity was in adopting the needs of the peasant: “complete ownership 
of the land; work and bread for all; the right to preserve his property, security and 
dignity.”973 
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Nationalism, Fascism, and Hispanismo 
 
 Important differences in the ideology of nationalism of the Cristero Rebellion 
and the Sinarquista Movement exist. The Sinarquistas’ ideology of nationhood was more 
developed than that of their Cristero brethren. The Cristeros, while undoubtedly 
patriotic, had a confined sense of nationalism that was directed towards the patria chica; 
the region in which they lived. On the other hand, Sinarquista ideology encompassed the 
whole of Mexico, which they called the “fatherland.” In essence, Sinarquismo was a 
national program, while Cristerismo was regional. Moreover, Sinarquismo was also part 
of a larger movement, known as the Mexican Radical Right, which also included secular 
groups. Furthermore, the UNS had similarities to extremist nationalist groups, known as 
las derechas, based in other parts of Latin America. Another factor that distinguished 
Sinarquismo from La Cristiada was its undeniably fascist aspect. Still, the Cristeros and 
Sinarquistas shared the xenophobic aspect of nationalism. Elements of hispanismo, the 
glorification of Spanish culture, can also be found in both movements. 
 Meyer described the Cristero Rebellion as a patriotic movement.974 Azkue 
agreed, saying that the Cristeros had three loves: God, patria, family.975 Although the 
insurgents were in rebellion against the government, they still cherished parts of 
Mexican national tradition. This nationalism was evident in the Cristeros’ adoration of 
the Mexican flag, to which they added an image of the Virgin of Guadalupe.976 To the 
Cristeros, the red and white on the ensign symbolized the martyrdom of Christ.977 The 
respect that the Cristeros had for the national pennant was so intense that they were upset 
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by the scarcity of flags among the federal troops.978 They were also disappointed that the 
federales abandoned the national colors in favor of other flags used for 
communication.979  
The Cristeros lacked a uniform; however they distinguished themselves from the 
agrarian reserves by wearing a black armband (symbolizing mourning), which was 
replaced by another with the Cristero colors of red and white.980 The Cristeros adopted a 
few Mexican heroes as their own, namely Hidalgo, Morelos (who were priests), and 
Iturbide (a defender of the church).981 However, no explanation is given as to why these 
figures were emulated. Furthermore, the Cristeros demonstrated their patriotic passion 
by marching around the town plaza during festivals, with weapons displayed, to the tune 
of the national anthem.982 
Jim Tuck, who conducted a regional analysis of the rebellion, stated that Los 
Altos was a patria chica in every way, except linguistically.983 Tuck described Alteños 
as “clannish, suspicious of outsiders, and conservative in an anarchistic, non-
Hamiltonian way.”984 While he did not elaborate on the “anarchistic” element of the 
Cristeros, Tuck explained that they detested the Hamiltonian view of a central 
government, whether on a “federal, state or local” level.985 Tuck argued that this made 
the rebels prone to a decentralized leadership style consisting of cabecillas, or 
ringleaders.986 This argument is conceivable, given that the Cristeros rejected the 
authority of the League and lacked a singular military figure until the arrival of General 
Gorostieta. The Cristero disdain for strong, centralized authority clashed with 
Sinarquista ideology, a topic that is subsequently discussed. 
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Jim Tuck’s research suggested that there were elements of hispanismo in Cristero 
society. According to Tuck, Los Altos, Mexico’s most fervently Catholic region, had a 
unique culture which set it apart from the rest of the country.987 Tuck described the area 
as a “European Catholic enclave,” unaffected by the pagan influences that were 
prevalent among the natives in Mexico.988 Tuck emphasized the isolation of Cristero 
culture by stating, “With their French, Spanish-Basque, and Germanic antecedents, the 
Alteños are ethnically as well as ideologically related to the narrow country clericalism 
that prevails in the Vendée, Navarre, and highland Austria.”989 The Cristeros clung to 
their European ancestry and resisted influence from Mexican indigenous society. This 
Catholic European element of Cristero society is compatible with Sinarquista ideology, 
which emphasized an admiration of Spanish culture while rejecting Indian heritage. 
Known as hispanismo, this ideological element was an integral part of the Sinarquista 
Movement. On the other hand, the evidence does not suggest that the Cristeros glorified 
their Spanish legacy. In Cristero ideology, hispanismo was limited to the tradition of the 
Roman Catholic Church. 
Tuck stated that Los Altos unflaggingly supported the church throughout 
Mexico’s various conflicts.990 The Alteños opposed Hidalgo’s Independence movement 
(which contradicts the notion that they would have later considered him a “hero”), 
supported the conservative Independence movement against liberal Spain, and of course 
defended the church during the War of the Reform.991 Moreover, this is the same region 
where the Religionero revolt of the late nineteenth century took place.992 Tuck argued 
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that the strong faith of the Alteños kept the church from being attacked in their region 
during the early years of the Mexican Revolution.993  
The governments of Carranza and Obregón pragmatically enforced the 
anticlerical aspects of the 1917 Constitution, limiting them to the traditionally secular 
areas of Tabasco and Veracruz.994 According to Tuck, they avoided attacking the church 
in Jalisco because they feared a conflict with the Alteños.995 Calles disregarded 
prudence, hence he found himself mired in the Cristero Rebellion. Luis González, in his 
history of San José de Gracia, a small village in the state of Michoacán, described the 
manner in which the patria chica affected the perception of Calles.996 The villagers in 
San José were not aware of the nationwide “constructive acts carried out by Don 
Plutarco.”997 Instead, they knew only of the “destructive ones,” namely the closing of the 
churches and persecution of the clergy in their village.998 This indicates that the 
Cristeros’ concern was for the local, not national welfare of the church. National 
concerns were the domain of the League; the middle-class element of the rebellion that 
remained isolated in Mexico City.  
The Cristeros’ notion of patria chica was reinforced by their xenophobia. Their 
intense faith made them intolerant of outside influence. This xenophobia was related by 
a priest who lived there for many years: “You can’t imagine how it is in those little 
villages, how set in their ways these people are. Even today they will tell you to your 
face, ‘If you’re not Catholic, get out of town.’”999 Tuck described their religion as a 
“back-country” variety, removed from modernism and ecumenism.1000  
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The Mexican Revolution was seen by the Cristeros and their League allies as a 
movement influenced by outsiders.1001 Indeed, the Cristeros blamed foreign entities such 
as the Masons, Protestant groups, and the United States for instigating the rebellion.1002 
Calles was referred to as “The Turk” (a reference to his alleged Arabic heritage), who 
was the “hireling of international Freemasonry” and represented the “Yankee and 
Protestant foreigner.”1003 Moreover, the League believed that the Cristeros were fighting 
bolshevism.1004 In contrast, the church was seen as part of the Cristero community and 
the priests as originating from the peasantry.1005 This strong xenophobic element of 
nationalism was also present in the Sinarquista Movement. Nevertheless, Tuck stated 
that for all their “narrow conservatism,” it would be wrong to label the Cristeros as 
fascists or racists.1006 Meyer agreed with Tuck’s assessment, stating that some authors 
wrongly portrayed the Cristeros as a “proto-fascist” movement.1007 
 Hernández stated that Sinarquismo was the “fiercest nationalist attack” faced by 
Mexico’s revolutionary regime.1008 The Sinarquista Movement, unlike the Cristero 
Rebellion, had a better defined ideology of nationalism. This ideological component was 
as important to the UNS as agrarian reform and the Christian Social Order. Sinarquismo 
had an unmistakably fascist aspect to it, which inevitably caused concerns that it was 
part of a “Nazi” conspiracy to take over Mexico. Whereas the Cristero Rebellion was 
perceived by scholars as an isolated, singular event, the Sinarquista Movement was seen 
as part of a nationalist phenomenon that spread throughout Latin America.  
Sinarquismo belonged to the Mexican Radical Right, a term given to a group of 
Mexican nationalist organizations that emerged in the years leading up to World War II. 
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These extremists shared a similar xenophobic and anticommunist component in their 
ideologies. Sinarquismo also had a likeness to South American nationalist groups known 
as las derechas. Another important feature of Sinarquista nationalism was hispanismo, 
which made Sinarquista ideology similar in many ways to that of Franquista Spain. 
Despite appearances, Sinarquismo cannot be simply classified as a fascist organization. 
Nationalism was but one component of a complex ideology that made Sinarquismo a 
unique Mexican experience. 
 Nationalism was a recurrent theme in Sinarquista propaganda.1009 Salvador 
Abascal described the movement as a “nationalist, nonviolent, mystical struggle.”1010 
Sinarquismo wanted to bring an end to the anarchy of the Mexican Revolution by 
encouraging all Mexicans to work together. This concept of national unity consisted of 
strength, peace, and prosperity.1011 Sinarquismo defined itself as a union that was above 
all classes and parties, professing to represent the “comprehensive and inclusive 
character of the nation.”1012 Sinarquismo’s preoccupation was with the salvation of “the 
Fatherland,” a term it recurrently applied to the Mexican Republic.1013 Hernández wrote 
that the UNS skillfully developed a “brilliant nationalism, which captivated the spirit of 
post-revolutionary Mexico.”1014 
 Sinarquistas made every conceivable effort to make themselves appear patriotic 
to the Mexican public. Sinarquista rallies, which were full of uniforms, flags, fiery 
speeches, and military-style marches, were the hallmark of the organization. Green was 
the official color of the Sinarquista Movement.1015 The uniform consisted of green 
trousers and shirts and an armband with a green map of Mexico imposed on a white 
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circle.1016 The Sinarquista flag was red, housing a green map of Mexico encircled in 
white with the letters “U.N.S.” stamped in the middle.1017 According to Prager, the green 
color represented patrimony, white stood for justice, and red symbolized liberty.1018 The 
Sinarquista salute consisted of moving the right arm across the chest along with the 
shout “Viva Mexico!”1019 Sinarquista songs and slogans were replete with patriotism, 
sacrifice, and victory. 1020  
 Abascal said that “Sinarquismo had to acquire the mobility, the precision, and the 
flexibility of an army on the verge of battle.”1021 This goal was accomplished through the 
use of massive, nonviolent marches, which were the most potent weapon at the 
Sinarquistas’ disposal. The UNS took pride in being able to organize the “takeover” of 
cities using efficiency and coordination.1022 The Sinarquistas were able to elude 
detection from the authorities by arriving in small groups at predetermined locations 
throughout a city.1023 These were arranged along a route, so that the groups could easily 
join the march once it began.1024 The marchers were eerily silent; no talking was 
allowed, except for commands in a low voice given by the chiefs.1025 Smoking and 
eating were out of the question.1026 The element of surprise was the essential component 
to any Sinarquista march. While impressive, the military-style rallies of the Sinarquistas 
were suspicious and alien to many Mexicans, who inevitably compared them to the 
fascist assalto and the Nazi Sturm.1027 Moreover, the Sinarquista uniform was alarmingly 
similar to that of Hitler’s Brown Shirts. 
 Sinarquismo promoted an isolationist policy for Mexico, which placed it at odds 
with the Pan-Americanism of the United States.1028 This, along with an emulation of 
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Hispanidad, gave the UNS a distinctive anti-American character.1029 The Sinarquistas 
denounced the “Yankee imperialism” of United States foreign policy, as well as the 
racial discrimination faced by Mexican migrant workers in that country.1030 The UNS 
employed a hostile campaign against the Anglo-Saxon countries of the U.S. and Great 
Britain, claiming that their goal in World War II was to expand their empires, not defend 
democracy.1031  
Sinarquismo reminded Mexicans of previous American interventions, 
particularly the loss of Mexican territory in the nineteenth century.1032 The UNS also 
claimed that Mexican Catholicism was in peril due to the “Protestantizing” efforts of the 
Americans.1033 Sinarquista nationalism demanded that Mexico never submit itself as a 
satellite to the “Colossus of the North.”1034 Accordingly, the UNS insisted that Mexico 
refrain from joining the Allied cause and to end its bracero program with the United 
States.1035 The Sinarquistas continued advocating a non-interventionist policy until 1942, 
when Mexico’s entry into World War II made their position untenable.1036 
 The Sinarquistas’ disdain for Americans was exceeded only by their hatred for 
communists. The UNS was an uncompromising foe of the Mexican Left, reserving a 
special contempt for Mexican labor – a group they associated with the soviets.1037 The 
Sinarquistas claimed that the objective of communism was to destroy the family and “the 
good habits essential for the material and moral prosperity of the country.”1038 
Sinarquismo, the champion of the Catholic faith, saw itself as the “absolute denial of 
atheism and communist irreligiousness.”1039  
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The UNS denounced communism as a producer of anarchy through its advocacy 
of class war.1040 The communist tenet of a classless society was threatening to the 
Sinarquista vision of the Christian Social Order, where a stratified civilization 
guaranteed peace and stability. Moreover, the UNS rejected historical materialism, since 
this Marxist concept negated the role of God’s will in the course of history.1041 The 
Sinarquistas’ abhorrence of communism was so intense that they advocated the 
destruction of the Soviet Union.1042 Sinarquismo’s undertaking of constructive 
nationalism could only be achieved once it saved Mexico from “communist 
totalitarianism.”1043  
The conspicuous feature of the Sinarquista Movement was that it esteemed 
European fascism. According to Prager, Sinarquismo admired Hitler’s Germany, 
Mussolini’s Italy, and Franco’s Spain.1044 The material progress and military power of 
these countries was appealing to the Sinarquistas.1045 The UNS emulated the fascist 
“cult” of a strong leader, confident that its Jefe Supremo, Salvador Abascal, would be the 
man capable of bringing greatness to Mexico.1046 The Sinarquista Movement copied 
another trait inherent in fascism by appealing to the feelings, not intellect, of its 
audience.1047 Leftist writer Carlos Velasco Gil characterized the UNS as an unoriginal 
entity that mimicked the proven methods, banners, and uniforms of the fascists.1048 In 
the advent of World War II, Western intelligence services, along with some 
contemporary observers, worried that there was more than a casual connection between 
Sinarquistas and the European fascists.1049 
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The Mexican Left equated Sinarquismo with Nazism. It accused the Sinarquistas 
of being a subversive tool of the Nazis, an allegation many Mexicans accepted.1050 The 
UNS was labeled as a “fifth column,” preparing Mexico for an Axis invasion.1051 The 
Mexican press joined the fray, with El Nacional stating, “Sinarquismo represented a 
regressive movement with very clear affinities with the foreign interest of the 
expansionist countries under totalitarian regimes.”1052 The Mexican Left, spearheaded by 
the aggressive CTM, charged that the Sinarquistas were being financed and militarily 
trained by Germany.1053  
The members of the UNS were derided as “Nazinarquistas,” while Abascal was 
called the “Führer of Mexico” and the “Hitler with huaraches [sandals].”1054 The Left 
also charged that the Sinarquista colony in Baja California was a scheme to acquire a 
Pacific port for the Japanese.1055 When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, 
Mexican leftists intensified their efforts and demanded that the UNS, being a “creole 
assault force” of the Nazis, be dissolved by the Mexican government.1056 
 As Sinarquismo was gaining popularity, the Mexican Left concocted a foreign 
conspiracy theory, designed to attack the Mexican core of the movement.1057 The Left 
charged that the UNS was not endemic; that it was a creation of Nazism and the Spanish 
Falange.1058 It alleged that the acronym “UNS” was the German word for “us,” taken 
from the phrase “Gott milt uns” (“God is with us”), the rallying cry of a Kaiser military 
unit during World War I.1059 Even more damaging was the assertion that a Nazi agent by 
the name of Oskar Helmut Schreiter founded Sinarquismo.1060 According to the Left, 
Schreiter, a professor of linguistics at the University of Guanajuato, headed an 
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anticommunist center that included José Antonio Urquiza (the traditional founder of the 
UNS) among its members.1061 Allegedly, Schreiter gathered his “disciples” (Urquiza and 
others) to combine elements of Nazism and Falangismo in order to create the Sinarquista 
Movement.1062 
 The allegations that Nazis controlled the UNS are false. The importance of 
Schreiter to Sinarquismo was exaggerated by the Left. According to German records, 
Schreiter was a petty criminal, not a Nazi spy.1063 Hernández stated that the only link 
between Schreiter and Sinarquismo was a casual contact with UNS leader Manuel 
Torres Bueno.1064 Hernández maintained that the two men did not share philosophies and 
that Schreiter had nothing to do with the early stages of Sinarquismo.1065 Meyer also 
defended the independence of the Sinarquista Movement. Meyer backed his claim that 
the UNS never received outside funds by recounting the Sinarquistas’ extreme poverty. 
Many members could not afford the requisite uniform or the publication El 
Sinarquista.1066 Meyer stated that Sinarquistas raised their meager capital through the 
collection of dues, which typically amounted to five centavos per member.1067 
Hernández concurred with Meyer’s assessment, stating that the Sinarquistas didn’t need 
outside funding to rally 50,000 men (as was claimed by the Left), since most traveled by 
foot or second-class bus.1068  
The evaluation of the Sinarquistas by the U.S. intelligence services also deserves 
scrutiny. Historian Friedrich Schuler stated that the U.S. and Britain used fear of fascism 
as a propaganda tool to mobilize citizens against the Axis powers in Latin America. 1069 
Counterintelligence by these countries created a large trail of rumors, half-truths, and 
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misinformation, such as an assessment by the Office of Strategic Services which stated 
that the goal of the Sinarquistas was to overthrow the Mexican government and plunge 
the country into civil war.1070 However, the final analysis concluded that despite its anti-
American sentiment, the UNS did not have contacts with either the Germans or the 
Japanese.1071 Moreover, it was not in Germany’s interest to foment unrest in Mexico. 
The Germans’ priority in 1937 was to develop a Mexican oil trade relationship.1072 Any 
unrest would have welcomed interference from the U.S.; therefore the Germans could 
only support the toppling of the government “with great hesitation.”1073 In any case, the 
Nazis looked for converts in Mexico’s German community, not the Sinarquistas.1074 
There were elements of Sinarquista ideology that were incompatible with 
fascism. Sinarquismo stressed nonviolence, a practice not followed by fascists. The 
Sinarquistas abhorred the racist ideology of the Nazis, calling it “a deification of a race 
by the government.”1075 The Sinarquistas recognized that Nazi ideology had no place in 
a racially mixed Mexican society; “Mexico is a mestizo nation which makes it clearly a 
protest against these pretensions of racial superiority.”1076 Hence, Abascal emphasized 
that “Nazism cannot be our model.” 1077 Sinarquismo might have admired the strong 
leadership qualities, the nationalism, and the anticommunist tendencies of fascist groups, 
but not their intolerance, which was contrary to its goal of creating an all-encompassing 
union of Mexican society. Moreover, Nazism was anti-Catholic: “Hitler is an enemy of 
God,” said Abascal, who added, “His theory is barbarous, anti-Christian, and 
fundamentally false.”1078 God would punish Hitler and Mussolini, predicted the 
Sinarquista leader.1079 
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The fascist movement that Sinarquismo most resembled was the Spanish 
Falange. Franco’s victory in 1939 encouraged the Falange, a fascist pro-Spanish 
organization, to infiltrate Spain’s former colonies. The closeness between Sinarquismo 
and Falangismo was derived from their shared colonial heritage, language, and basic 
values.1080 They shared an equal devotion to the principles of Catholicism and had a 
similar concept of hispanismo.1081 Sinarquismo was a bastion of hispanismo, which it 
incorporated into its vision of the Christian Social Order. The Sinarquistas 
commemorated October 12, 1492, as the “Day of the Spanish Race,” the date when 
Hispanic culture graced the American continent.1082 Sinarquismo recognized Hernán 
Cortés as the “father of Mexico,” because it was he who brought Catholicism to the 
country.1083 Both Falangismo and Sinarquismo agreed that sixteenth-century Spain was 
the model for Mexico’s future.1084  
Sinarquismo rejected the indianismo of the Cárdenas administration and 
consequently ignored Mexico’s pre-Hispanic origins and accomplishments.1085 
Sinarquismo disregarded native skin color, saying, “Indians, mestizos, and the 
descendants of pure Spaniards, all form a single race in the spirit forged by Spain.”1086 
Mexico’s independence from Spain was seen as a tragic event, where every subsequent 
government was a “sorry imitation” of the colonial legacy.1087 Mexico’s history from 
independence onward was as a tale “of treason that must be eradicated from the minds of 
patriotic Mexicans.”1088  
 The Sinarquistas looked to Spain’s leadership under Francisco Franco to restore 
the cultural glory of the Hispanic people.1089 Prager, a proponent of the Sinarquismo-
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Falangismo connection, stated that “General Franco and the Nationalists were, for the 
Sinarquistas, heroic crusaders who aimed to rid twentieth-century Spain of the satanic 
and destructive forces of Bolshevism, Republicanism, Masonry, and liberalism.”1090 
Abascal, who often criticized Hitler and Mussolini, had nothing but praise for Franco.1091 
Prager noted that several similarities existed between the two movements. Sinarquismo 
and Falangismo adopted a spirit of sacrifice and service, requiring their members to be 
“half-monk and half-soldier.”1092 They also agreed on the principle of caudillismo, 
where all authority rested on a strongman, or jefe.1093 Both movements were also 
devoted to the patria and displayed a high degree of xenophobia.1094 
 The UNS was accused by the Mexican government of being nothing more than 
the “Spanish Falange transplanted to Mexico.”1095 Moreover, the Left claimed that 
Sinarquistas received funds and training from the Falange.1096 Nevertheless, Prager 
stated that Sinarquismo was not a creature of the Falangistas.1097 Unlike Falangismo, 
which exalted war and violence, Sinarquismo emphasized civil disobedience as the 
preferred method to bring about change in government.1098 Despite the UNS’s praise for 
Spanish culture, it emphasized Mexican nationalism and independence.1099 
 An important difference between the Cristero Rebellion and the Sinarquista 
Movement was that the latter is considered part of a much larger movement which 
occurred throughout Mexico and Latin America, while the former was a regional 
phenomenon. Sinarquismo was part of the Mexican Radical Right, a movement that 
Hernández defined as “ultra-nationalist, anti-parliamentarian, and anti-Marxist.”1100 
Extremist nationalist groups, such as Frente Constitucionalista Democrático Mexicano 
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(Mexican Democratic Constitutionalist Front), Partido Social Demócrata (Democratic 
Socialist Party), Vanguardia Nacionalista Mexicana (National Mexican Vanguard), and 
Acción Revolucionaria Mexicanista (Mexican Revolutionary Action), belonged to the 
Mexican Radical Right.1101 These groups, along with the UNS, held an equal contempt 
for Cárdenas, the United States, and the Mexican Left.1102 Nevertheless, the Right failed 
to unite as a common front. 
 A main characteristic of the Mexican Radical Right was its fragmentary nature; 
its inability to achieve cohesion.1103 The main reason for this was a conflict in ideology. 
The smaller groups that composed the Mexican Radical Right (Sinarquismo was the 
only one that attracted a large following) were secular in nature.1104 Another important 
difference between these groups and the UNS was their racism, a trait that was 
exemplified by Acción Revolucionaria Mexicanista (ARM), better known as Las 
Camisas Doradas (the Gold Shirts). Founded in 1934, the Gold Shirts was a product of 
rising Mexican anti-Semitism and middle-class frustration.1105 With its slogan of 
“Mexico for the Mexicans,” the ARM gained notoriety by viciously attacking Jewish 
businesses and labor unions.1106 The Gold Shirts’s message of violence and hate 
naturally conflicted with the Sinarquista philosophy of pacifism. Moreover, Sinarquistas 
never made anti-Semitism an important part of their platform. 
 The Radical Right existed in other parts of Latin America. Sandra McGee 
Deustch wrote a study of these movements, known as las derechas, which existed in 
South America.1107 Groups such as Liga Patriótica (Patriotic League - Argentina), Ligas 
Patrióticas (Chile), and Ação Social Nacionalista (National Socialist Action - Brazil) 
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shared an ideology of extreme nationalism and had an ambiguous relationship with the 
church.1108 Like Sinarquismo, these groups emphasized the creation of a strong 
corporatist state ruled by moral individuals rather than a specific economic program.1109 
Meyer concluded that Sinarquismo was hardly alone, noting that other fascist-like 
organizations emerged in Latin America at the same time as the Sinarquistas.1110 
 
Democracy and Individualism 
  
 An apparent conundrum arises in this comparative thesis: most Cristeros did not 
become Sinarquistas. Meyer stated that only one percent of the rebels joined the 
Sinarquista Movement.1111 Meyer expressed surprise at his finding, and understandably 
so. It has been shown that the Cristeros and Sinarquistas shared strong similarities in the 
topics of the Christian Social Order, martyrdom, the Mexican Revolution, and agrarian 
reform. It is therefore logical to assume that when the Sinarquista Movement appeared in 
1937, only eight years after the rebellion ended, many Cristeros would have joined. 
However, this was not the case. True, Sinarquista ideology was more developed in the 
realms of nationalism and hispanismo. Yet this difference cannot justify why most 
Cristeros felt a “great aversion” towards the Sinarquista Movement.1112 
A compelling explanation is found in a facet of Cristerismo that was completely 
irreconcilable with Sinarquista ideology: a strong sense of individualism and democracy. 
The Cristeros had a fierce attachment to their individual freedom. They rebelled, after 
all, to gain their religious liberty from a government they considered totalitarian.1113 The 
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Cristeros rose up spontaneously and were able to wage war while lacking leaders and 
outside help.1114 This was an “individual war,” where all of the troops were 
volunteers.1115 This “extreme individualism” made discipline a challenge, a problem that 
even General Gorostieta had to contend with.1116  
An impressive feature of the Cristeros was their admiration for democratic 
values, which was a byproduct from their strong sense of individuality. Cristeros had 
strong-minded personalities; during meetings, they freely expressed their opinions and 
readily criticized their chiefs.1117 The Cristeros elected their leaders.1118 They chose men 
with qualities such as bravery, honesty, and military experience.1119 Chieftains needed to 
earn the respect of their soldiers in order to be followed.1120 If the rebels did not agree 
with their leader, they would simply not follow him.1121 According to Meyer, a 
commander with whom the troops were discontented could not remain in his capacity for 
long and had to either return to the ranks or leave.1122 “In the final reckoning,” stated 
Meyer, “it was the troops who recognized their officers.”1123 
Democracy was an important element in Cristero government. Meyer stated, 
“The insurgents made clear their desire to give themselves a just government…It was an 
aspiration of self-government, of village democracy.”1124 Townships controlled by the 
rebels democratically elected their own authorities.1125 Another key democratic feature 
was the lack of military intrusion in civilian affairs. Article 7 of the General Order 
stipulated that administrative authorities were to be completely independent of the 
military leadership.1126 Meyer related that the Cristero military and civilian sectors 
worked cordially.1127 Still, it was the civil element that held sway; each armed sector 
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took orders from its civilian administrators.1128 General Gorostieta wanted his soldiers to 
understand that the role of the military was to protect the sovereignty of the state.1129 
Cristero military men were expected to respect civil authority.1130 
Another interesting feature of the Cristero Rebellion was its deference for 
women, an unlikely trait in Mexico’s male-dominated society. Meyer remarked that 
there was a surprising lack of machismo among the Cristeros; “Being all volunteers, they 
had little respect for the ‘macho’ classic-type of leader.”1131 Women took an active role 
in La Cristiada, for which they were valued by their male counterparts.1132 “Women,” 
declared Meyer, “were at the heart of the movement.”1133 Women fulfilled vital tasks, 
such as welfare services, espionage, finances, and propaganda.1134 The Cristeros were 
wholly dependent on the Women’s Brigades to provide them with supplies, particularly 
weapons.1135 Some women were adept at explosives and taught the men the art of 
sabotage, while others took a direct part in combat.1136 Hence, it is not surprising that 
many Cristero men believed that women should have a large part in their movement, to 
include roles of leadership.1137 However, the record does not show an instance of women 
leading soldiers to battle. 
 The democratic element of La Cristiada was not embraced by one prominent 
Cristero leader, however. Anacleto González Flores, a pacifist, was ironically an 
authoritarian Catholic leader.1138 While most Catholic activists wanted a democratic 
Mexico, he disagreed.1139 González Flores rejected the view that social Christianity and 
political democracy could easily walk hand-in-hand.1140 Democracy in Mexico had to be 
postponed, he argued, until it could be purged of secularism.1141 Ironically, González 
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Flores feared that a premature democracy would bring demagogues to office and a 
“rebirth of tyranny.”1142 A period of spiritual and moral regeneration was needed before 
the Mexican people could be entrusted with the political system.1143 González Flores’s 
ideology showed a surprising resemblance to the philosophy of the Sinarquistas. In 
certain respects, he could be considered as a forerunner to Sinarquismo. 
 The unruly Cristeros would have had a difficult time adjusting to the strict 
discipline of the Sinarquista Movement. Sinarquismo was given an organizational 
structure that was authoritarian, hierarchical, and semi-militaristic.1144 Sinarquista 
publications emphasized that the UNS was highly stratified, with a definite hierarchy of 
officers, each taking orders from superiors.1145 The Jefe Supremo, the depository of 
Sinarquismo’s supreme authority, was obeyed unquestionably.1146 Beneath the Jefe 
Supremo existed a chain of command composed of chiefs at the regional, district, 
municipal, and rural levels.1147 These chiefs administered their charges using sub-chiefs 
and committees, with the power to remove members from their duties.1148 Hernández 
stated that the executive function of the chiefs, along with the committees, was to direct, 
coordinate, and execute the orders and programs issued from their superiors.1149 Clearly, 
the Sinarquistas shaped their organization after the fascist model. 
 The Sinarquista movement was distinctly antidemocratic. Sinarquista leaders, 
such as Abascal and Torres Bueno, were not elected by the membership. Instead, they 
were appointed by the secretive Supreme Council.1150 The rank and file of the UNS were 
urged to have implicit faith in their chiefs and to render strict obedience to all 
instructions.1151 When Manuel Zermeño passed the leadership of the UNS to Abascal, he 
 149 
stated, “Of us soldiers only one thing is expected: to accept his decision and to follow 
the conduct which he himself, who is our model, has taught us, that is to place our entire 
faith who since today is our chief.”1152  
The controlling nature of the UNS was clearly laid out in the Handbook for 
Chiefs. Only the chief could make the decisions in a Sinarquista cell, who may request 
the advice of his committee.1153 However, there was to be no discussion on any subject 
during Sinarquista meetings.1154 “The general and absolute rule is that no matter must be 
subject to voting by the assembly,” reminded the handbook.1155 The rationale for not 
deliberating was that all Sinarquistas “agreed on everything.”1156 The function of the 
chiefs was to solve conflicts and dictate orders while that of the soldiers was to listen 
and obey.1157 Specific instructions for upcoming activities, such as marches, were given 
out at these meetings, although their reason was rarely explained.1158 These commands 
were announced at the last minute in order to achieve surprise and train members to obey 
orders unfailingly.1159  
Sinarquistas suppressed democracy in other ways. No Sinarquista pamphlet, 
poster, or text could be published without the express approval of the hierarchy.1160 
Everything in these was eliminated “that was contrary to the militant spirit” of 
Sinarquismo.1161 Only accepted individuals were permitted to give Sinarquista 
speeches.1162 The Sinarquista marches were designed to keep complete control of the 
membership, where silence and order were the norm.1163  
Women were considered important to Sinarquismo, but mainly because “they 
were extremely religious and were easy to incorporate and control in a religiously-
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oriented movement.”1164 Women had a submissive role in the Sinarquista Movement, 
unlike the Cristero Rebellion. Women were not allowed to march with the men; instead 
they walked alongside on the pavement.1165 They were “not to run the same dangers as 
men,” stated Hernández.1166 The obvious exception to this rule was María Teresa Bustos, 
the exemplary martyr of the movement.1167 
The colony of María Auxiliadora gave a glimpse of Sinarquista authoritarian 
rule. Abascal drew up a series of rules, known as the “Table of Laws,” for the colonists 
to follow.1168 Historian Hugh Campbell stated that these rules made Abascal the absolute 
despot of María Auxiliadora.1169 Not only was Abascal in complete control of the 
executive, judicial, and legislative powers of the colony, but he also micromanaged the 
activities and habits of the inhabitants.1170 “For any infraction of the stringent rules he 
established for the colony, he himself served as judge, jury and executioner.”1171 
According to Campbell, the colony’s experience foreshadowed what would happen if the 
Sinarquistas came to power in Mexico.1172  
The Christian Social Order envisioned by the Sinarquistas was more autocratic 
than that of the Cristeros. In his thesis, Prager noted that the Sinarquistas focused on the 
repressive features of colonial Mexico. The UNS subscribed to the organic view of 
society with a class structure, the enjoyment of fueros by those who “possessed wealth, 
prestige, and power,” and a governmental system that was highly authoritarian and 
religiously oriented.1173 “Their ideology promoted a restoration of the paternalistic and 
fanatically religious government of Mexico’s Golden Age,” stated Prager.1174  
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Prager wrote that the Sinarquistas wanted a society regulated by the laws of God 
“as revealed by his [sic.] church,” in which a theocracy would inevitably develop.1175 
Abascal was a proponent of such a view; “There is no authority which does not come 
from God…therefore, the social order and the economic order should submit itself to the 
moral and dogmatic instruction of the Church.”1176 Paradoxically, the Sinarquista vision 
of the Christian Social Order conflicted with its ideology of agrarian reform, since the 
rural lower classes were to be kept in check by the elite; “The hacendados would lead 
and the church would inspire, while the illiterate and impoverished peasantry would 
follow.”1177 
The UNS believed in the inequality of humans.1178 Their ideology held that 
authority was given to men by God in order to govern fellow men.1179 Effectively, man 
was unfit for self-rule and had to accept his own place in accordance with his personal 
inequality.1180  Prager argued that Sinarquismo had a general contempt for humanity. 
The majority of human beings were felt to be nothing more than the “scum of the earth,” 
eternally bound to their colossal ignorance.1181 Only a hierarchical society could control 
the unruly masses.1182 
It is little wonder then, that Sinarquismo viewed liberalism with contempt. The 
Sinarquistas felt that with liberty, man would make himself a servant; “a slave of his 
passions…a slave of his necessities…a slave of the democratic bait.”1183 Therefore, 
democracy’s belief in the guaranteed rights of man was thoroughly condemned by the 
Sinarquista Movement. The UNS assumed that through democracy, an absolute lack of 
government would prevail.1184 All the evils that colonial Mexico had undergone were 
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caused by democratic values.1185 In order to combat this abomination of liberty, the Ten 
Norms of Conduct preached self-denial for the Sinarquista soldiers.1186  
Sinarquismo’s ideology strongly supported the notion that the UNS was fascist. 
However, there are indications that the Sinarquista Movement was supportive of a 
limited form of democracy. The term “democracy” appeared several times in Sinarquista 
propaganda. The Sinarquistas believed that a Christian democracy could operate within a 
religious state.1187 Sinarquista society would be ruled by a “legitimate authority, 
emanating from free democratic action of the people, that will guarantee a social 
order.”1188 Even though the UNS condemned the United States’ democratic system, it 
still acknowledged that there were some benefits to it.1189  
The Sinarquista Manifesto of 1937 claimed that the UNS was fighting for the 
restoration of individual rights taken away by the Mexican Revolution.1190 The UNS 
announced that its marches were the “effective exercise of the freedom of association 
and expression.”1191 Federico Gil, in his pamphlet touting the Sinarquista program, wrote 
that UNS meetings were gatherings of Mexicans, who in a democratic manner, united to 
ask for the restoration of social order.1192 Sinarquismo condemned the totalitarian state, 
saying that it repudiated the “natural right” of men and that it was the “the worst of all 
tyrannies, because it is a tyranny which converts the law into the pretext and accomplice 
of its excesses.”1193  
Man could not live in a totalitarian state, argued the UNS, because his only 
purpose for existing would be his usefulness to the government, “for which he should 
sacrifice everything, including his soul.”1194 The UNS also denounced totalitarian states 
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because they threatened private property and family life, which Sinarquistas held 
sacred.1195 “Sinarquismo is the emphatic, calm, definite denial of all totalitarianisms. The 
principles of Sinarquismo oblige it to be irreconcilable with them,” stated Federico 
Gil.1196  
Meyer and Prager concurred that the intentions of Sinarquismo were not 
dictatorial. “The originality of Sinarquismo is that it is one of the avatars of Christian 
democracy and not a ‘fascism in huaraches,’” stated Meyer.1197 Prager’s conclusion was 
not as flattering, yet he believed that the Sinarquista program did not mean the 
elimination of democracy.1198 Prager was convinced that the Sinarquistas wanted to 
restore some form of traditional government, perhaps a monarchy or a government by 
elites.1199 
 
Validity of the Ideologies 
 
 Potential arguments exist which attack this thesis’s view that the ideologies of La 
Cristiada and the Sinarquista Movement, with certain exceptions, were comparable.  
Some historians, such as Azkue, believed that the Cristeros lacked an ideology.1200 Many 
rebels fought the government for reasons such as revenge, adventure, or money.1201 The 
motives behind the League have also been criticized, with historians, such as Meyer, 
arguing that its leadership craved power.1202 Moreover, there was a suspicion that the 
Cristeros rebelled for psychological, rather than ideological reasons. Meyer stated that 
the Cristeros, having a “warrior culture,” were easily provoked.1203 It could also be 
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argued that the Cristero Rebellion was an instinctive defensive reaction, rather than a 
movement with deep-seated ideological values; “These outraged peasants, who loved 
their village, their church, and their priest, quite naturally rose in rebellion.” 1204  
 Sinarquista ideology has also come into question. As has been shown, there were 
several inconsistencies that made the ideology of the UNS complex and confusing, or as 
Prager stated, “Sinarquismo is difficult to exactly define.”1205 Meyer supported this 
assessment by saying that ambiguity was a fundamental characteristic of the 
movement.1206 Moreover, Hernández argued that Sinarquismo, being essentially a 
negation of the Mexican Revolution, had an ideology that could not evolve; “The 
Sinarquistas would only content themselves with denouncing more and more strongly 
the failure of Cárdenas’s reform.”1207 The Sinarquistas never elaborated on the future. 
They did not explain how they would achieve power in Mexico, other than to say that it 
would not be through violence or the ballot box.1208 More importantly, they did not 
clarify how life for the average Mexican would function under their rule.1209 This 
indicates that the Sinarquista Movement wanted to spread an ambiguous message in 
order to attract as many Mexicans as possible to their cause.1210 
 This thesis argues that the ideologies of both movements are valid, despite their 
inherent problems and inconsistencies. As has been shown, the Cristeros had goals and a 
value system. It is true that the rebels were “simple, religious men” not capable of 
publishing and explaining their ideological values, but they had them nonetheless.1211 It 
is more accurate to state that the Cristeros, who saw the religious problem in regional, 
not national terms, had an ideology that was in the developing stages. In writing his 
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seminal work, Meyer wanted to contradict the popular notion that the Cristeros were 
unrefined peasants without a culture; “Their ideology is a system of reasoning that is 
more or less elaborated.”1212 It could very well be that the Cristeros had the “conscience 
of a Christian country.”1213 
 The Sinarquistas had developed an ideology that was fraught with 
inconsistencies. Still, it is clear that the ideology of the UNS was no mere recruiting tool. 
Sinarquismo had a challenging task of crafting an ideology to which all Mexicans could 
relate. Its goal after all, was to create an all-encompassing union that would ostensibly 
benefit all Mexicans.1214 Furthermore, it has been shown that the Sinarquistas developed 
elaborate concepts regarding private property, martyrdom, and the Christian Social 
Order. The UNS borrowed ideas from fascist organizations, but it fused them into 
traditional ultraconservative elements to create a movement that was all its own.1215  
 It was demonstrated that there are several areas in which the Cristeros and 
Sinarquistas shared similar ideologies. A desire to establish a Christian Social Order, 
backed by a feverish desire of martyrdom was the principal driving force behind both 
movements. The contempt for the Mexican Revolution, portrayed as having failed the 
Mexican people, was another core component of their philosophies. Land reform was 
crucial to both organizations, especially to their mass base.  
There also exist significant differences between their ideologies, which explain 
why the Cristeros chose not to join Sinarquismo. The rebels’ sense of nationalism was 
limited to their region. Perhaps they were not interested in or could not relate to a 
movement like Sinarquismo, which viewed Mexico in a larger context. More 
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importantly, the strict discipline and fascist doctrine of the Sinarquista Movement 
discouraged the Cristeros from joining, since they were accustomed to their freedom and 
democratic ways.  Nevertheless, what should be remembered is that both movements 
were a continuation of Mexico’s Catholic response to a liberal threat. This conservative 
tradition, dating back to the colonial period, was the principal legacy inherited by both 
the Cristero Rebellion and the Sinarquista Movement.  
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 CHAPTER VII 
A COMPARISON OF CHURCH RELATIONS 
 
 The Cristero Rebellion and the Sinarquista Movement had a troubled relationship 
with the church. This association was necessary, since a primary reason for the existence 
of the movements was to defend the church against encroaching government powers. 
The extent of the church’s authority in these movements is speculative, but intriguing. 
Both Cristerismo and Sinarquismo were extensively influenced by the church in their 
early stages. Once mobilized, these forces were of great benefit to the hierarchy, since 
they forced the government to scale back on its anticlerical and socialist policies. 
However, there came a pivotal point where the Cristeros and Sinarquistas became 
radicalized, threatening the church’s bargaining position. Once they became a liability, 
the church took decisive action, leading to the movements’ collapse. The question arises 
of whether the church used the Cristeros and Sinarquistas as pawns against the Mexican 
government. 
 
The Church and the Cristeros 
 
 The extent of the church’s role in the Cristero rebellion is highly controversial.  
As stated earlier, the persecution of the church by the Calles government provoked the 
“spontaneous mobilization” of thousands of Cristero rebels. Suddenly, the church found 
itself with a volunteer army with which to fight a sacrilegious state. The church may not 
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have mobilized these forces, but did it manipulate them? Officially, the church never 
approved of the uprising. Yet, it refrained from condemning the rebels until the very end 
of the conflict. The church’s silence, along with its suspension of mass, was seen by the 
rebels as a tacit approval to fight. It is also likely that the church was unsure of how to 
act. There were many conflictive actions at all levels of the clergy, from the local priests 
up to the pope. The evidence supports the contention that at the very least, the church 
tolerated the rebellion as a means to force the Mexican government to the negotiating 
table. Once they were no longer needed, the rebels were cast aside in what Meyer termed 
a “sterile sacrifice.”1216  
 In the months leading up to the Cristero Rebellion, the laity rallied behind the 
church in two different ways. First, there were the organized groups, such as the UP, the 
ACJM, and the League, that advocated a policy of passive resistance. Of all the lay 
groups, the League had the most involvement with the hierarchy. When the League was 
established in 1925, the episcopate declared that it was not involved.1217 Some historians, 
such as Robert Quirk, rejected that claim, arguing that the bishops controlled the whole 
organization.1218 However, it is more likely that the League operated independently, as 
postulated by Meyer and Bailey.1219 Even if the League was independent, it is apparent 
that the church had a strong influence over it. The League sought guidance and was very 
susceptible to any allusion received from the bishops.  
 There existed a noticeable connection between the League and the church. 
Douglas Slawson observed that it was Rome’s apostolic delegate that changed the 
official name of the League in order to reflect that it was defending religious liberty, not 
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just religion itself.1220 Furthermore, it appeared that the League retained Jesuit advisors, 
as noted by Meyer.1221 Meyer also stated that it was the bishops who requested Anacleto 
González Flores and the UP to join ranks with the League.1222 Still, it is difficult to 
conclude how influential the church was, given that it had an obscure relationship with 
the League. 
 Undeniably, the League received strong support from the church up until the 
summer of 1926.1223 During this period, the League embarked on a campaign of passive 
resistance against the government. In fact, Meyer stated that the church was counting on 
the fidelity of Catholics to oppose the state in this manner.1224 In some ways, the 
episcopate viewed the League as a junior partner in its effort to get Calles to stop his 
attacks. League delegates accompanied Mexican bishops to the Vatican to argue that the 
moderate course was not working.1225 When the episcopate decided on the drastic 
measure to suspend mass, the League offered its support.1226 The League’s nationwide 
boycott was fully endorsed by the church.1227 The hierarchy was impressed by the 
League’s ability to rally thousands of people.1228 Therefore, it is plausible that the 
church, facing the possibility of eradication, was tempted by the League’s later offer of 
armed rebellion. 
 The church gave its full backing to the League while it was participating in 
nonviolent resistance. What is unclear is whether the Mexican episcopate endorsed a 
religious war.1229 The League presented a petition before the hierarchy on         
November 26, 1926, asking for its approval to rebel against the government.1230 The 
petition posed a theological question to the bishops: whether their cause was “licit and 
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laudable action, deserving legitimate armed defense.”1231 Meyer related the bishops’ 
response; “Consulted as to the theological legitimacy of a war of this nature, the 
Episcopal Committee, referring to the classics on the subject, answered with a prudent 
expression of assent that the Leaguers interpreted as unconditional support.”1232 Rather 
than being forthright, the hierarchy used surreptitious language in dealing with the 
League.  
The Mexican hierarchy refused to give a direct answer to the League, neither 
encouraging the rebellion nor condemning it. Some historians, such as Slawson, argued 
that by refusing to condemn a resort to arms, the bishops consented to the rebellion.1233 
Instead of chastising the League, the church “wished it well.”1234 The Mexican hierarchy 
was imbued with a combative spirit, which perhaps clouded its judgment.1235 Hernández 
contended that the hierarchy gave its initial “support” to the League because it thought 
that the rebellion would be successful.1236 Regardless of the actual response, the League 
always insisted that the church approved its plans for war.1237  
 The second manner in which the laity supported the church was through 
“spontaneous mobilization.” As discussed previously, the Cristeros cherished their 
individuality and loathed authority. The rebels were very religious and readily provoked 
when they saw their church under attack.1238 A Cristero remarked, “Without their 
permission and without their orders we are throwing ourselves into this blessed struggle 
for our liberty, and without their permission and without their orders we will go on until 
we conquer or die.”1239 This implies that the hierarchy was blameless for the actions of 
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the Cristeros. However, scrutiny of the church’s motives behind its suspension of 
worship suggests otherwise.  
Critics viewed the cessato a divinis as a “piece of medieval obstructionism 
designed to force the regime to restore clerical privileges by depriving Catholics of the 
sacred and stirring up a revolt.”1240 Meyer placed the blame of the rebellion squarely at 
the church’s footstep: “It would be to under-estimate the convictions of the Christian 
people to suppose that they would suffer the suspension of public worship and the 
consequent suspension of the Sacraments.”1241 Essentially, the Cristeros were driven to 
revolt through the closing of the churches. Moreover, the state recognized that the 
resumption of mass held the key to the end of the rebellion. This was the only provision 
it sought from the church as it entered negotiations. However, it does not appear that the 
church had a well-orchestrated plan. Meyer conceded that while the suspension of mass 
instigated the rebellion, the bishops were not formally responsible.1242 
The record suggests that the church was reacting to the situation. The rebellion 
caught the clergy off guard - the response at all levels was ambiguous, conflictive, and 
confusing. A few months after the rebellion began, Pope Pius XI published the 
encyclical Iniqui Affictisque, in which he admired the resistance of the people and the 
young men who offered their lives to Cristo Rey.1243 However, he soon reversed his 
position and never again offered praise for the rebels.1244 The Vatican took a “neutral” 
stance with regards to the rebellion, offering neither encouragement nor condemnation; 
“Rome’s silence was never broken, except to deny that any blessing had been given to 
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the combatants.”1245 According to Bailey, the church was caught in a bind and withdrew 
to narrow spiritual ground.1246 
The Mexican Catholic hierarchy was just as conflictive. Once the uprising began, 
there were several bishops who openly supported the rebels.1247 According to Slawson, 
Mexico’s primate, Archbishop Mora y del Río, wanted the United States to lift the arms 
embargo so that the rebels could receive military supplies.1248 The Mexican exiled 
bishops sent encouraging pastoral letters to the rebels, exhorting the faithful to “imitate 
the constancy of the early Christians…who died like good men, and their blood was the 
seed of new converts.”1249 The bishops from Durango and Huejutla were more direct, 
telling the Cristeros to be “tranquil in your consciences and receive our blessing.”1250 
Confusingly, another group of bishops opposed the rebellion.1251 They made it clear that 
they did not desire any form of resistance that was not passive and peaceful.1252 The 
episcopate made public statements in which it denied having ever supported the 
rebellion.1253 The bishop of Chihuahua even threatened his flock with excommunication 
if they joined the insurrection.1254  
Ambiguity, however, was the predominant response. Meyer stated that the 
church reacted with the “outmost prudence” in regards to the rebellion.1255 He explained 
that the majority of prelates refused to give any guidance to their parishioners, leaving 
them in “complete liberty of action.”1256 The rebels consulted their parish priests as to 
the legitimacy of the insurrection.1257 The priests, in turn, looked to the bishops for 
guidance. Instead of answering, the bishops passed the question to the theologians.1258 
The end result was silence, a ploy adopted by Rome.1259 When they did speak, the 
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bishops’ words lacked clarity. An example was the statement made by the bishop of 
Zacatecas: “The tyranny of the authorities justifies the resolution of the Catholics to 
defend themselves by armed force…however, it is not absolutely clear that all Catholics 
have an obligation to employ this ultimate recourse…nonviolent methods would have 
led to the same result.”1260 Meyer noted that many bishops condemned the uprising 
while implying that under certain circumstances it could be approved.1261 
The confusion of the church’s position reached the lowest echelons of its 
organization. Many priests were faced with the dilemma of choosing between the law 
and their flock.1262 Meyer stated that 25 priests were involved in the rebellion, with 15 
acting as chaplains to the insurgents, and 5 taking arms against the government.1263 As 
stated earlier, two of them became Cristero chiefs. Another hundred or so priests 
followed the example of the bishops of Colima and Jalisco, who chose to remain at their 
posts, thereby giving the rebels priceless moral support.1264 This decision was not taken 
lightly, since anyone caught in the countryside was presumed to be a rebel and 
executed.1265 
The majority of the clergy, however, chose not to join the rebellion. Out of 3,600 
priests, 3,390 abandoned their rural parishes to live in towns.1266 Meyer viewed their 
action as a form of passive resistance against the Cristeros.1267 By fleeing to the relative 
safety of urban areas, the clergy effectively left the rebels to their own devices.1268 Other 
priests were more vocal against the rebellion, actively dissuading their parishioners from 
joining.1269 Meyer cited many instances in which clergy preached openly against the 
rebellion.1270 Some priests denounced the rebels as “cattle thieves,” while others 
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implored them to follow the example of Christ by rejecting violence and “turning the 
other cheek.”1271 
There came a point during the rebellion when the church abandoned its 
ambiguous position and took decisive action against the Cristeros. A gradual distancing 
took place between the League and the bishops. The League, which during its peaceful 
phase enjoyed the full support of Pope Pius XI, had become a warmonger.1272 Once 
viewed with esteem, by 1927, the League had alienated most of the hierarchy.1273 The 
Vatican ceased endorsing the League, but stopped short of condemning it.1274 It was 
likely that the church tolerated the League as a necessary evil in its struggle against the 
Mexican state. However, once the government agreed to negotiate, the League, as well 
as the Cristero cause, had become a liability.  
As discussed earlier, the church’s main concern was the resumption of mass, not 
the welfare of the combatants.1275 By late 1927, the Vatican realized that a victory in the 
battlefield was impossible.1276 Continuance of religious hostilities would only further 
spiritual suffering and encourage the rise of Protestantism.1277 The Vatican recognized 
that the key power player in the scenario was the United States, against whom everyone 
in Mexico was powerless.1278 Once the United States had persuaded the Mexican 
government to talk, the church decided to cut ties to the rebellion, since any continued 
association would hurt its interests.1279 The church’s policy consisted of “simultaneously 
displaying human prudence and Divine wisdom, of satisfying interest and consciences: 
‘It was providential that there were Cristeros, and providential that they ceased to 
exist.’”1280 
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Bishops who were once allied with the Cristeros turned against them. Bishop 
Pascual Díaz, the unofficial leader of the exiled bishops, was initially an advocate of the 
rebels.1281 Once negotiations began, however, he quickly turned against them, 
undermining Capistrán Garza’s attempts at fundraising and urging the NCWC to 
disavow the League.1282 When the League sent delegates to Rome, Bishop Díaz 
discouraged the pope from seeing them.1283 Díaz’s stance won Rome’s approval; in less 
than three years he rose from being the bishop of an unimportant see to primate of 
Mexico.1284 
Once the Vatican decided that the Cristeros had become a burden, it took steps to 
distance itself. The hierarchy’s position could no longer remain ambiguous.1285 The 
pope, through Nuncio Fumasoni-Biondi, instructed all Mexican clergy to stop giving 
moral or material assistance to the rebels.1286 The League was no longer consulted as 
negotiations with the government continued.1287 Yet, the church did not order the 
Cristeros to stop fighting.  
The rebels were convinced that the church was on their side until June 20, 1929, 
the day the Arreglos were announced. For them, the clergy’s call to arms had been the 
closing of the churches. Yet for three years Rome had refused to give a clear answer to 
the question of armed resistance, leaving the rebels to flounder on their own, fighting 
and dying while the parties reached an agreement.1288 As a settlement became imminent, 
the Cristero leadership realized the consequences. The suspension of mass, which had 
fueled the rebellion, was also capable of squelching it. General Gorostieta correctly 
predicted, “As soon as they open the churches, you will all leave me.”1289  
 166 
The resumption of the sacraments was the coup de grâce of La Cristiada. The 
church had achieved its goal and forsaken the rebels, as evidenced by a bishop’s 
statement: “I don’t know, and I’m not interested in knowing, in what conditions you are 
going to be left…The only thing I must tell you is that you must lay down your 
arms…the banner for which you were fighting has ceased to exist now that the 
arrangements have been made.”1290 Since the Cristeros had not been consulted, they 
were caught off guard and took them a whole month to organize a surrendering of 
weapons with the government.1291 The Cristeros were forced to lay down their arms 
without guarantees and were abandoned to the “butcher’s knife.”1292 Meyer summarized 
his harsh view of the hierarchy by stating, “The Church abandoned its own, got rid of its 
servants who were a nuisance, and won victory in the game of loser takes all.”1293 
Confusion exists as to whether the Vatican repudiated the Cristeros or used them 
to force better terms from Calles.1294 The evidence rejects the notion that the church led 
the Cristeros into war, as some critics charged. Once the rebellion erupted, however, the 
church showed a profound lack of leadership; “The overwhelming majority of the 
bishops and priests, displaying a criminal degree of conforming, wallowed in an 
accursed inertia, all expecting sheer miracles from Heaven to give liberty to the 
Church.”1295  The church evaded giving the Cristeros clear answers, conveniently 
absolving itself of any wrongdoing.1296 Another possibility is that the church took 
advantage of the situation by playing Machiavellian politics, such as using the 
suspension of worship as a catalyst for rebellion.1297 New evidence is needed in order to 
concisely ascertain the church’s multi-faceted role in the Cristero rebellion. 
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The Church and the Sinarquistas 
 
 The Achilles’ heel of the Sinarquista Movement was the same as that of the 
Cristero Rebellion: its tumultuous relationship with the church.1298 The rebellion proved 
a harsh lesson for the church, where its ambiguousness contributed to a conflict that 
killed tens of thousands. The hierarchy could no longer risk disastrous consequences by 
allowing the laity to mobilize on its own. After the conflict, it took an active role in 
providing adequate venues for the faithful to vent their anger. The church surmised that 
it would be easier to manage an entity that it created, instead of one that mobilized on its 
own, such as the League. The difficulty lay in controlling the laity, while keeping that 
link a secret. The result of the church’s efforts was the Sinarquista Movement, which 
proved useful against the government’s socialist assault. Yet, the Sinarquistas became 
too radical for the church’s interests and were subjected to the same fate as the Cristeros. 
 The Sinarquista Movement was a creation of the church. This was in contrast to 
the Cristero Rebellion, which was a lay-generated movement with which the hierarchy 
involved itself. Sinarquismo was established to provide Catholics with a nonviolent 
option to combat anticlericalism in Mexico, thereby preventing another religious 
insurgency. The formation of Sinarquismo took various stages: Catholic Action, the 
Legion, and the Base. At each step, the church gauged the laity’s response and its control 
over the organization. Moreover, the hierarchy developed a furtive mechanism in which 
it could impose its will. This secrecy makes the analysis of the church-UNS relationship 
a challenge.  
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 The years of the modus vivendi were a period of transformation for Catholic 
activism. The Cristero Rebellion epitomized the failure of armed revolt against the 
Mexican Revolution.1299 A change in strategy was needed, where the radical energy of 
La Cristiada would be channeled into a new “mystic-social” organization that could be 
used as a nonviolent, but powerful clerical tool.1300 Sinarquismo, noted Hernández, was 
to serve a dual purpose: it provided radicals with an escape for their energies, while 
giving the hierarchy an ability to exert political pressure on the government.1301 The 
change in paradigm was evident with the outbreak of La Segunda in 1934. This 
rebellion, unlike La Cristiada, was quickly, thoroughly, and unanimously condemned by 
the church.1302 
The role of the hierarchy in Sinarquismo was decisive from the beginning.1303 
The archbishop of Michoacán, Monsignor Leopoldo Ruiz y Flores, was instrumental in 
the creation of the Legion, the precursor to Sinarquismo.1304 Ruiz y Flores imagined a 
religious organization with a council “pulling the strings” behind the scenes.1305 
According to Hernández, Ruiz y Flores wanted a Legion in each archdiocese, where it 
would exert pressure on the government at the local level, with the aim of alleviating the 
church’s difficult situation.1306  
Jesuits were involved with Sinarquismo. Ruiz y Flores specifically wanted to 
entrust them with establishing the Legion and becoming its advisors.1307 The Jesuits, 
according to the archbishop, could be trusted because of their strict discipline and loyalty 
to the pope. Therefore, they could prevent the formation of another League.1308 This 
contradicts the view that Romo de Alba created the Legion on his own. Historian Rubén 
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Aguilar mentioned the role of Jesuits in Sinarquismo, claiming that they helped 
transform “the secretive organization such as the Legion into the semi-secret, ambivalent 
organization such as the UNS.”1309  It is an interesting concurrence that both the UNS 
and the League retained Jesuit advisors. However, it is not possible to draw any 
conclusions since the record is vague in this matter.  
  The relationship between the Legion and the church remained strong throughout 
its transformation into the UNS. According to Hernández, the Mexican episcopacy and 
the Vatican’s apostolic delegate gave their blessing to the new movement.1310 The 
Legion remained under the tight grip of the hierarchy via the Supreme Council.1311 
When the Legion morphed into the Base, the power of the council was further 
consolidated.1312 According to Prager, it was the church that organized elements of the 
Base so as to attract peasants to the movement.1313 Priests, who had remained without 
guidance throughout La Cristiada, saw no such ambiguity in the UNS.1314 Many of those 
who distanced themselves from the Cristeros fully supported or at least sympathized 
with Sinarquismo.1315 Nevertheless, the connection remained clandestine; both the 
Sinarquistas and the church officially disavowed the existence of a relationship.1316 
There was an important facet of the Sinarquista Movement which the record does 
not address: how could the church allow the UNS to adopt a fascist image? The link is 
most likely Abascal, whose ascendancy was apparently supported by the hierarchy. The 
primate of Mexico, Archbishop Luis María Martínez, was a longtime friend of the 
Abascal family.1317 In his memoirs, Abascal stated that the archbishop was his godfather 
during his first communion and his teacher and advisor at seminary.1318 This powerful 
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friend probably convinced the Supreme Council to choose Abascal for the top post of the 
UNS. Meyer stated that Antonio Santacruz, the leader of the Base, endorsed Abascal’s 
appointment in 1940.1319 Santacruz believed that Abascal was someone who was 
“obedient and malleable.”1320 Could it be that the church underestimated the radicalism 
of Abascal? 
The militancy of the UNS reached new heights under Abascal. The record does 
not demonstrate whether this was a plan envisioned by the church, the Supreme Council, 
or Abascal himself. It is more likely that Abascal formulated the plan, transforming the 
Sinarquista Movement into something “much more than the church really intended.”1321 
The reason for this assertion is that soon after Abascal’s arrival, tensions developed 
between the UNS and the hierarchy. The atmospheric growth of Sinarquismo was both a 
blessing and a curse to the church. The popularity of the UNS forced the government to 
abandon socialist policies and moderate its course. However, the hierarchy was losing its 
influence over the Sinarquistas, who threatened to destroy the gains already made. Just 
like the Cristero Rebellion, the Sinarquista Movement had outlived its usefulness and 
needed to be disposed of.1322  
Circumstances had changed dramatically between 1937 and 1941. The 
administration of Avila Camacho ushered in an era of better relations with the 
church.1323 In this new spirit of cordiality, it behooved the church to cooperate in order to 
gain concessions from the government.1324 The militancy of the UNS, however, showed 
no signs of restraint, causing concern among the hierarchy that it could derail the modus 
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vivendi.1325 Another fear was that Abascal, enjoying the zenith of his personality cult, 
could take over the UNS and sever ties with the church.1326  
Abascal’s leadership style, while energizing Sinarquismo, had become an 
embarrassment, even a threat, to the church. Abascal was perceived by many Mexicans 
to be an ally of the Nazis and Falangistas.1327 He contravened church policy by 
condemning any attempts at rapprochement with the government.1328 Worse, Abascal 
envisioned himself as the head of a coup, convinced that true liberty would be gained 
once “the revolutionary government was overthrown.”1329 Abascal’s intransigence 
caused fears that a neo-Cristero type crusade was imminent.1330 Consequently, the 
Supreme Council felt it necessary to remove him as national leader and to give the 
movement a more moderate image.1331 
The Supreme Council’s control over the UNS was sufficient enough to force 
Abascal’s departure.1332 His dismissal had to be handled tactfully so as to give the 
appearance that he had voluntarily stepped down.1333 Abascal’s removal risked causing a 
split within the UNS and revealing the church’s secret role in the organization.1334 
Aguilar surmised that Abascal’s old friend, Archbishop Martínez, convinced him to step 
down in order to avert a crisis.1335 A cover story was concocted to explain Abascal’s 
departure, namely his decision to lead the ill-fated colony in Baja California.  
The record suggests that the church and the Mexican government schemed to 
oust Abascal. The Avila Camacho administration made the unprecedented step to help 
Abascal by offering to pay the colonists’ traveling expenses.1336 According to 
Hernández, Antonio Santacruz had close ties with the American ambassador and was a 
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personal friend of Archbishop Martínez.1337 His contacts allowed him to establish a 
“gentleman’s agreement” with the Mexican government, where the UNS would cease its 
anti-American propaganda and fully support the president.1338 Moreover, Santacruz 
assured all involved that Abascal’s departure was imminent.1339 Although a conspiracy 
cannot be proven, the actions of the church and state complemented each other.1340  
Abascal’s banishment to the desert was only the first step. According to Juan 
Ignacio Padilla, the Supreme Council wanted the colony to fail in order to discredit 
Abascal and remove him as a threat.1341 This may explain why the UNS refused to help 
the colonists once they arrived.1342 By February 1944, the Supreme Council had enough 
of the intractable leader and decided to recall him.1343 An envoy was sent to María 
Auxiliadora to ask Abascal to step down and return to Mexico City, which he 
refused.1344 A second delegation arrived, this time with an emissary from Archbishop 
Martínez.1345 This priest was able to impress upon the devout Abascal his obligation to 
obey and surrender the colony.1346 
Abascal’s faith may have also prevented the formation of a breakaway branch of 
Sinarquismo. After leaving the organization, Abascal denounced the UNS leadership for 
the moderate course it had adopted.1347 Many of his followers, the Abascalistas, took this 
as a sign that he was establishing a competing form of Sinarquismo.1348 Upon leaving the 
UNS, however, the Abascalistas were disappointed to find that their former leader had 
no such plans. In the end, Abascal was loyal to the church, refusing to contest the 
hierarchy’s choice of Manuel Torres Bueno as the legitimate leader of the Sinarquista 
Movement.1349 Campbell stated that Abascal’s faith was stronger than his 
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disillusionment with Sinarquismo.1350 It could very well be that the church exploited the 
conviction of its faithful servant. 
The U.S. Catholic Church may have also influenced the Sinarquista Movement. 
Velasco Gil stated that the American clergy exerted a moderating influence over the 
Mexican Church, leading to a transformation of the UNS.1351 Allegedly, a visit by 
American Bishop Fulton Sheen pressured the Sinarquista Movement to modify its policy 
towards the U.S. and Pan-Americanism.1352 Moreover, trips were arranged for El 
Sinarquista writers to visit dioceses in the U.S. so that they could moderate their 
views.1353 
The removal of Abascal did not end the church’s predicament. His successor, 
Manuel Torres Bueno, was acceptable to the Supreme Council because he was deemed 
compliant.1354 While Torres Bueno embraced the policy of temperance, he embarked on 
a political path that was unacceptable to the hierarchy.1355 Unlike Abascal, Torres Bueno 
refused to obey the orders of the Supreme Council.1356 The unilateral decisions made by 
the Sinarquista leader could not be stopped by the church, exposing the fatal flaw that 
existed in the secretive arrangement.1357 Despite the pleas of Santacruz, the hierarchy 
refused to speak out against the obstinate leader.1358 Torres Bueno realized that since the 
hierarchy could not condemn him publicly, the Supreme Council had in effect no control 
over Sinarquismo.1359 This led to the split of the UNS from the Base and the demise of 
the Sinarquista Movement.1360 
 The Sinarquista Movement had the same fundamental weakness as the Cristero 
Rebellion, namely its religious foundation.1361 There was an ecclesiastical learning curve 
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between La Cristiada and Sinarquismo, where the church attempted to better define its 
relationship with the laity. In the Cristero Rebellion, the church acted as an advisor, 
while allowing the faithful to mobilize themselves. With Sinarquismo, the church took a 
different approach by providing the means for the laity to take action in a more 
appropriate manner. However, at some point the UNS tired of the church’s tutelage and 
tried to pursue its own agenda. Once the hierarchy sensed danger, the movement was 
decapitated. The church could not solve the predicament of controlling the laity in a 
clandestine fashion.  
 
 
 
 175 
CHAPTER VIII 
A COMPARISON OF DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
 An analysis of the demographics of the Cristeros and Sinarquistas underscores 
the similarity between the two groups. Both movements were strongest in the western 
part of Central Mexico, a region that was predisposed to religious uprisings. Both 
Sinarquismo and Cristerismo had rural, landless, and uneducated peasants as their rank-
and-file members, which supports the theory that land reform was at the heart of both 
organizations. Another important finding is that the leadership of both movements was 
composed of the urban middle class. Nevertheless, the picture remains incomplete. 
Despite Meyer’s commendable studies, more data is needed to make an exhaustive 
examination between the Cristeros and Sinarquistas. Still, the information is sufficient 
enough to draw some important conclusions. 
 Meyer compiled an impressive amount of research for La Cristiada, which took 
over seven years to complete.1362 In writing his work, he consulted the traditional 
archival sources but realized that the Cristeros, who were illiterate, did not leave a 
written record. Thus, he employed two social science techniques, the interview and the 
questionnaire, in order to glean information from his subjects.1363 Meyers’ direct contact 
with the survivors made him unique in Cristero historiography.  
Meyer’s study took place in five different municipalities that were spread 
throughout the Cristero regions.1364 He collected 348 questionnaires from the former 
insurgents.1365 The topics covered by the survey included age, gender, civil state, 
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education, land ownership, religious beliefs, occupation, and military experience. Meyer 
also conducted a number of personal interviews of former Cristeros, and used 80 hours 
of tape recordings for his study.1366 In his bibliography, Meyer meticulously listed the 
names of all individuals that were interviewed, including their hometown and state of 
origin.  
Meyer’s research is the only direct insight that we have into the Cristeros; 
however it is not without its detractions. Reviewer Ramon Jrade took particular issue 
with the process in which Meyer conducted the surveys. He noted that by having many 
of the interviews inside a church, following Sunday mass, Meyer introduced an element 
of religiosity into his work.1367 Jrade also criticized the manner in which the 
questionnaires were distributed, saying that Meyer’s sampling pool was limited to the 
readership of a veterans’ weekly magazine.1368 Moreover, Meyer’s surveys were 
conducted in the late 1960s, which meant that older participants were no longer alive and 
that the research relied on memories over 30 years old.1369 
Meyer also gathered data on the Sinarquistas; however he did not conduct the 
survey. Instead, the census was taken by the UNS during the early 1940s.1370 The survey 
covered four Sinarquista committees scattered throughout Mexico and one located in the 
United States.1371 The entire state of Aguascalientes was also included, which Meyer 
considered the most reliable part of the census.1372 The census provided information on 
the age, sex, and civil state of the participants, but remained vague on their professions 
and social status.1373 Therefore, the data on the UNS is a limiting factor in allowing a 
comprehensive comparison between the two movements. 
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Location 
 
 The Cristero Rebellion and the Sinarquista Movement had their origins in 
western Central Mexico. The rebellion began in the Los Altos region of Jalisco, while 
Sinarquismo was born in the adjacent state of Guanajuato. The movements were 
strongest in the Bajío region of Mexico and surrounding areas. The Bajío is a fertile area 
of rolling hills located northwest of Mexico City. This region is centered in the state of 
Guanajuato and encompasses parts of Jalisco (including Los Altos), Michoacán, 
Querétaro, Aguascalientes, and San Luis Potosí. It was in the Bajío that the Mexican 
Independence movement under Miguel Hidalgo originated in 1810. However, the Bajío 
was and remains a bastion of Catholic conservatism.1374 It was here that the Religionero 
Revolt of 1875 took place.1375 Although not exactly identical, the regions of the Cristero 
Rebellion and the Sinarquista Movement overlapped, which supports this thesis’ 
contention that there was a strong relationship between the two movements. 
 Table 1 shows a side-by-side comparison of Cristero and Sinarquista 
membership broken down by state. The data, collected by Meyer, reflects the number of 
Cristeros in 1929 and Sinarquistas in 1940.1376 As shown, the largest number of 
followers was concentrated in only a few states. Michoacán, adjacent to both Guanajuato 
and Jalisco, had the highest number for both movements. Jalisco, the birthplace of La 
Cristiada, had a lower number of Sinarquistas, probably because most Cristeros chose 
not to join the UNS.1377  
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Sinarquismo was strong in three states where there were few Cristeros: 
Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, and Puebla. Meyer gave an explanation for the low Cristero 
numbers in each case. The state of Querétaro had a moderate governor who did not 
enforce anticlerical legislation or persecute priests, a fact that was publicly known and 
likely prevented many from taking arms.1378 The Cristeros could not rise up in San Luis 
Potosí because it was under the tight grip of General Saturnino Cedillo, a quintessential 
caudillo.1379 In similar fashion, Puebla did not partake in the rebellion because it was on 
the main route to the port of Veracruz, hence easily controlled by Mexico City.1380 No 
reason, however, is evident for the low number of Cristeros in Guanajuato or of 
Sinarquistas in Zacatecas. 
 
Table 1: States with the largest Cristero/Sinarquista membership1381 
 
STATE CRISTEROS SINARQUISTAS 
Guanajuato 3,000 75,000 
Jalisco 10,000 20,000 
Michoacán 12,000 85,000 
Puebla None listed 16,000 
Querétaro 1,000 25,000 
San Luis Potosí None listed 20,000 
Zacatecas 5,000 None Listed 
  
 
 There were important reasons why the movements flourished in these areas and 
not others. Meyer argued that Los Altos was ideal for the rebellion to occur. Besides its 
historically Catholic conservative tradition, Los Altos was also a “modern” area.1382 
Meyer defined the term as a location where there was a continuum between urbanity and 
the countryside.1383 The peasants that lived in “modern” areas were in constant contact 
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with the cities and towns; hence they were not isolated from the outside world and were 
“enlightened.”1384 Although Indian communities were sympathetic to the cause, it was in 
these “modern” areas where the rebellion “was most strong, unanimous, and 
organized.”1385 However, Meyer did not elaborate why this aspect of modernity induced 
the peasants to rebel. Moreover, this contradicts the concept that the Cristeros viewed 
their world in terms of the patria chica.1386 These regions were also not controlled by 
caciques, which may have made it easier for the Cristeros to rebel.1387 Furthermore, the 
network of small towns provided an effective cover for the rebels, who could go easily 
blend back into the countryside.1388  
 According to Aguilar, Sinarquismo traces its roots back to Guadalajara, Jalisco, 
where the Legion was established.1389 When the Legion transformed into the Base a few 
years later, however, the movement shifted from Los Altos to the lowlands of 
Guanajuato.1390 Although Sinarquismo spread to the old Cristero areas of Michoacán and 
Jalisco, it was strongest in the state of Guanajuato, where the city of León (dubbed 
“Sinarcópolis”) had the largest urban population of Sinarquistas in the country.1391 
 Sinarquismo flourished in the Bajío because the element of hispanismo was 
especially strong there. Manuel Romo de Alba, the founder of the Legion/Base, wanted 
the Bajío to constitute the heart of the movement because of its culture, customs, and 
“Hispanic traditions.”1392 Campbell stated that the success of Sinarquismo was furthered 
by the “atypical” society of Guanajuato, which was traditionally suspicious of 
domination from Mexico City’s elite.1393 Guanajuato’s social makeup was similar to that 
of Los Altos, where there were few Indian communities and no legacy of the 
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encomienda. Prager’s description of Guanajuato’s culture is also reminiscent of Los 
Alto’s strong Spanish element; “Its Catholic faith and its Hispanic culture have always 
been cherished in this region not only because of this tradition, but also because [of] the 
westerner himself – a tall, well-built individual with blue eyes who resembled the 
Northern Spaniards more than their fellow Mexicans.”1394 
The Cristero and Sinarquista movements were not restricted to the Bajío. Pockets 
of Cristero rebels existed in the states of Sinaloa, Veracruz, Nayarit, Durango, Guerrerro, 
Oaxaca, and the Federal District.1395 The Sinarquista Movement was more widespread. 
Sinarquista committees were established in every Mexican state and even the United 
States, where a few migrants embraced it.1396 Nevertheless, the heart of both the Cristero 
Rebellion and the Sinarquista Movement remained in the Bajío, where these movements 
were strongest and best organized.1397 It is also noteworthy that both groups failed to 
achieve a significant following in the northern part of Mexico, which was the traditional 
stronghold of the Mexican Revolution.1398  
 
The Soldiers 
 
 The rank-and-file members of the Cristero Rebellion and the Sinarquista 
Movement were mostly uneducated peasants. One reason these recruits were drawn to 
the movements was because of their lucrative message of land reform. The Cristero 
Rebellion, like Sinarquismo, was primarily a rural phenomenon.1399 Meyer found that 
60% of the Cristeros lived in the countryside.1400 Out of that percentage, most were 
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agricultural laborers versus landowners.1401 Townspeople, except those who had some 
connection to the countryside, such as leatherworkers, drivers, miners, agricultural 
workers, and muleteers, were conspicuously absent from the battlefield.1402 Meyer’s 
study showed that almost 60% of the Cristero rebels did not complete primary school 
and less than 3% finished secondary school.1403  
 The Cristeros elected from among themselves their own battlefield commanders; 
hence these individuals shared the same qualities as the soldiers.1404 Only 16 out of 200 
chiefs attempted secondary education.1405 Illiteracy was so prevalent among the Cristero 
chiefs that most of them had to dictate their orders and proclamations.1406 Meyer 
described these leaders as “true proletarians;” 92% were country dwellers and most 
worked as peons.1407 The leaders of the UP also had a similar humble background.1408 
Most of the Cristeros were landless.1409 Property owners constituted only 10% of 
the rebel force.1410 Another 10% were agraristas; peasants who communally farmed 
state-owned property.1411 The rest did not own land nor had access to an ejido.1412 These 
landless peasants came from various groups: Indian comuneros despoiled by haciendas, 
laborers, and sharecroppers who rented land in order to farm.1413 The field commanders 
were landless for the most part, with only 32% of them being proprietors.1414 
The Sinarquista Movement also found its strength among the “common people.” 
Most of the Sinarquista “soldiers” were poor, uneducated campesinos.1415 The rural 
element of Sinarquismo was emphasized by the fact that the movement did not take hold 
in Mexico’s largest cities.1416 Guanajuato, the core of Sinarquismo, had an “extremely 
high” illiteracy rate compared to the rest of Mexico.1417  At first, the UNS tried to attract 
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Mexicans from all classes of society in order to form the perfect “unión.” Its forerunners, 
the Legion and Base, recruited intellectuals, businessmen, professionals, and 
industrialists.1418 The working class, in particular, was wooed.1419 However, after the 
Legion/Base morphed into the Sinarquista Movement, the bulk of the organization came 
from the peasant class.1420 The census from the state of Aguascalientes shows that 72% 
of Sinarquistas came from the agricultural sector.1421 Although workers were encouraged 
to join the UNS, most decided against it for fear they would be kicked out of the 
CTM.1422  
The Sinarquista Movement emerged in the Bajío, an area left untouched by the 
government’s land reform program.1423 Prager described the chief followers of 
Sinarquismo as rural cultivators of “low economic and political status, who hoped to 
achieve some sort of institutional reform to improve their lot.”1424 In the Sinarquista 
census, only 5% were agraristas, while 18% were small property owners.1425 On the 
other hand, 44% were laborers and 33% were sharecroppers.1426  
The Bajío’s mixed agrarian culture was conducive to the Sinarquista message of 
land reform. It was composed of moderately-sized haciendas which employed a 
substantial non-Indian labor force.1427 These laborers naturally wanted their own private 
parcel. Moreover, the region possessed a large number of small, subsistence-type 
landholdings.1428 Many of these small land owners joined the UNS out of fear that their 
property would be expropriated by the government.1429  
Both the Cristeros and Sinarquistas had a large female component with a similar 
social makeup. The Women’s Brigade of the Cristero movement tried to recruit from all 
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social classes.1430 Members included shop girls, office workers, and seamstresses.1431 
Although the brigades strove for diversity, over 90% of the members were “simple 
women peasants,” a figure which is in league with the demographics of the male 
soldiers.1432 They were mostly unmarried and young, their ages ranging from 15 to 
25.1433 Their leadership was also young and humble.1434 While there is limited data on 
Sinarquista women, the survey shows that there was an equal number of males and 
females within their ranks.1435 Meyer stated that women comprised between one quarter 
to over one half of the membership in every Sinarquista committee.1436 
There exists some uncertainty with regards to ethnicity in the movements. Two 
historians, Meyer and Tuck, have differing viewpoints. Tuck stated that the inhabitants 
of Los Altos were mostly of European stock, descended from both Spanish creoles and 
French troops quartered in the area during their campaign against Juárez.1437 “In this 
region of fair-skinned folk, many with blond hair and blue eyes, the original Indian 
population became a minority,” asserted the historian.1438 The people of Los Altos 
belonged to one of Mexico’s most unusual subcultures. According to Tuck, they and the 
blacks of the Costa Chica are the only sizable ethnic groups found outside the country’s 
prevailing mestizo heritage.1439 Los Altos also underwent a unique phenomenon, where 
the Mexicans of European heritage remained in the rural areas, unlike the rest of the 
country, where they gravitated towards the towns and cities.1440 Tuck’s analysis supports 
the theory that La Cristiada had a strong undercurrent of hispanismo. 
Meyer’s assessment is the opposite of Tuck’s. He argued that ethnicity did not 
seem to be a factor in the Cristero Rebellion.1441 According to Meyer, Indian 
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involvement in the uprising is “irrefutable.”1442 He stated that the Huicholes, Coras, 
Tepehuanos, Acaxees, Xiximes, and Purépechas participated in the rebellion.1443 Since 
these Indians did not distinguish themselves from their mestizo or criollo brethren, 
Meyer rejected the labeling of the rebellion as “a white or mestizo phenomenon that also 
had the aspect of religious fanaticism and ethnic protest.”1444  
Meyer’s and Tuck’s assessments are not completely incompatible, however. 
Tuck conceded that Indians participated in the rebellion, observing that they “were as 
ardently Cristero as their Creole brethren.”1445 However, he stated that in Los Altos, the 
Indian population remained isolated from the Hispanic element, leading to the lack of a 
mestizo culture in the area.1446 Meyer’s survey does not contradict Tuck’s findings since 
it does not specifically address the racial makeup of Los Altos. Moreover, Meyer made 
an interesting assessment which supports Tuck’s view. Meyer stated that Cristero 
Indians were more “cultured” and “Catholic” than those who chose not to join the 
rebellion.1447 One example was the Tepehuanos, the most “advanced” tribe, which was 
75% Cristero.1448 It appears that the more “hispanicized” the Indians were, the more 
likely they would join La Cristiada. 
 Ethnic data for the Sinarquista Movement is lacking. However, it was mentioned 
earlier that the state of Guanajuato, which was the center of Sinarquismo, had a strong 
Hispanic element. Meyer mentioned that the UNS had an interesting success among the 
Mayo Indians of Sonora.1449 This supports the notion that while the Sinarquistas 
emulated Spanish culture and ignored Indian traditions, they were sincere in creating a 
movement that included all Mexicans, regardless of skin color. 
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The Leaders 
 
The leadership of the Cristeros and Sinarquistas was composed of the urban 
middle class. However, there was an important difference in how they connected with 
the troops. The middle-class element of the Cristero leadership (the League) emerged 
separately from the rebels. The League portrayed itself as the leader of the rebellion and 
spokesperson of the Cristeros. However, it was never embraced by the insurgents.1450 In 
their war against the government, these two entities failed to present a united front. 
Sinarquismo, on the other hand, represented a better integration of middle-class 
management. Unlike the rebellion, in which the peasantry mobilized on its own, the 
UNS organized the lower classes within a structure that had already been firmly 
established. 
The Cristero Rebellion emerged as a leaderless insurgency. Out of necessity, the 
Cristeros elected their battlefield commanders from amongst themselves. These leaders 
were recognized and respected by the troops because they were effectively “from the 
ranks.” However, the rebellion as a whole suffered from the lack of a single leader who 
could manage and coordinate the different insurgent bands. The League, a middle-class 
organization based in Mexico City, tried to fill this void.1451 Established one year prior to 
the war, the League had been instrumental in leading Mexican Catholics on a nonviolent 
crusade against the Calles government. When the Cristeros rose up in rebellion, the 
League sensed an opportunity to take command. It represented the rebels at the Vatican, 
promoted their cause to the media, and provided them with General Gorostieta, their 
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most important leader. However, the Leaguers and rebels had a troubled relationship and 
failed to cooperate. A connection could not be established and the League was never 
accepted by the soldiers on the field. Much of the friction had to do with the League’s 
ineptitude, but societal differences were also a factor. The Leaguers and rebels, while 
engaged in the same struggle, lived in different worlds. These two groups languished 
separately throughout the conflict.   
The Catholic militants who joined the League were urban-based, middle-class 
professionals.1452 The League was a young, male organization, with an age group 
between 25 and 35.1453 The ACJM, which provided the League with its “core” radical 
leadership, was comprised of young, middle-class students, the majority of which were 
unmarried.1454 Besides the students of the ACJM, the League had attorneys, politicians, 
engineers, doctors, former military officers, and men associated with the church as 
members.1455 Absent were the upper echelons of society; the hacendados and urban 
entrepreneurs.1456 
The Leaguers and rebels had difficulty relating to each other, which inevitably 
led to suspicion and a lack of teamwork.  The urban members of the ACJM, who were 
sent as emissaries by the League, experienced culture shock when they met the Cristero 
rebels.1457 An encounter between the two groups highlights the problem: “In 
photographs, one can see, in symbolic form, the difference between the Leaguers of the 
ACJM and the Cristero peasants. The first group have [sic] city haircuts and moustaches, 
boots and buttons, and are dressed in khaki; they look like the brothers of the dashing 
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officers on the Government’s General Staff. Those in the second group have no uniform; 
they are long-haired peasants, wearing sandals, with jutting beards.”1458 
The Leaguers, who approached the peasants with the arrogance of a city dweller, 
were received badly.1459 Tuck stated that the Cristero soldiers despised the “egghead, the 
dandy, the poseur, and the puritan.”1460 The rebels looked with contempt at the educated 
young men, who lacked the soldierly qualities that they respected.1461 Not used to 
dealing with the privations of guerilla warfare and faced with the distrust and ridicule of 
the rebels, most of the students returned to the city.1462  
Ironically, the Leaguers had more in common with their enemy than the Cristero 
rebels. According to Meyer, the difference between the membership of the League and 
the supporters of the revolution was not social, but ideological: “Culturally and socially, 
the Leaguers were first cousins, hostile brothers of the revolutionaries, and they lived in 
a world which had no connection with that of the Cristeros or the followers of 
Zapata.”1463 These two groups were the same demographically, except that the 
revolutionaries came from the North, while the Leaguers were from the central 
plateau.1464 
The leadership of the Sinarquista Movement had virtually the same demographic 
qualities as the League; “Sinarquismo was the result of the reflections of the politically 
minded young men of the middle classes.”1465 However, Sinarquismo represented a 
better union of the middle and lower classes, where the former led while the latter 
followed. Prospective members had to adapt to a strict hierarchy and obey the stringent 
rules in order to be considered Sinarquistas. Hence, the UNS leadership lacked the 
 188 
problem of the League, which had to deal with a disorganized and independent-minded 
group of rebels. As discussed earlier, the rigid structure of the UNS dissuaded most of 
the unruly Cristeros from joining, which in turn must have aided its stability.  
The record shows that the leadership of the UNS came from the Legion/Base, 
which recruited from the same social classes and geographical areas as the League.1466 
Sinarquista chiefs were all less than 30, middle class, and from the central part of the 
country.1467 The Sinarquista leaders were jurists, civil servants, businessmen, students, 
and professors; careers that were remarkably similar to those of the Leaguers.1468 
According to Meyer, these Sinarquista chiefs were not rich.1469 However, some of the 
men who headed the Supreme Council, such as Antonio Santacruz, were hacendados or 
wealthy businessmen.1470 Yet, these men did not become an integral part of the UNS, 
choosing to remain disengaged from the day-to-day activities. The difference in social 
stature between the Supreme Council and the Sinarquista chiefs may help explain why 
the UNS eventually broke free. 
The demographic relationship that exists between Cristerismo and Sinarquismo 
remains incomplete. The passage of time prevents a census of Sinarquista members in 
the style of Meyer from taking place. Nevertheless, with the limited data, an intriguing 
picture emerges. Both movements were appealing to the lower and middle classes, 
recruited from the same geographical area of the country, and were rural phenomena. 
The middle class was attracted to the movements’ counterrevolutionary stance, while the 
peasants were drawn to their simple message of religion and land. The key difference 
between the Sinarquista Movement and the Cristero Rebellion lay in the relationship that 
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existed between the two classes. In this regard, Sinarquismo represents a better liaison 
between the middle-class leadership and the soldiers. It could be that this middle-class 
element served as a bridge between the church and its peasant base. 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Some historians, including Meyer, have argued against viewing the Cristero 
Rebellion as a precursor to Sinarquismo, “the Mexican variety of fascism.” 1471 Others 
have also discounted a connection, citing the fact that most Cristeros chose not to join 
the UNS.1472 Yet others, such as Hernández and Aguilar, saw the UNS as being “directly 
descended from the earlier Cristero Movement.”1473 Hernández summarized, “In style, in 
the way of being and living, the Unión Popular, the Cristero Revolution and Sinarquismo 
are one and the same thing.”1474 
This thesis agrees with the latter viewpoint and contends that it was the Cristero 
struggle, not the Cristeros themselves, that continued through Sinarquismo. The UNS 
saw itself as carrying the banner of the Cristero Rebellion.1475 Sinarquismo turned the 
Cristero cause into a national movement, under a central authority that the rebels were 
not willing to follow. It has been shown that both groups shared many ideological views. 
Moreover, they had close, though contentious, ties to the church. Meyer allowed that 
both movements grew in the sphere of Catholicism and that the UNS was a direct 
descendant of the League.1476 Furthermore, Sinarquismo and Cristerismo came from the 
same societal groups and geographical areas.  
This thesis argues against viewing the Cristero and Sinarquista movements as 
separate events in Mexican history. A clear and compelling relationship has been shown 
to exist between the two. It is unlikely that a “missing link” directly connecting the two 
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movements is out there, waiting to be found. The process was rather complicated, where 
the laity and the church experimented with different ways of dealing with the 
intransigent government. An evolutionary process took place between Cristerismo and 
Sinarquismo, where religious warfare gave way to passive resistance in dealing with a 
hostile government. Another progressive step was better control of the masses through 
the integrated leadership of the middle class. The church and laity alike learned their 
lessons, adapted, and persevered.  
The Cristero and Sinarquista movements have had the misfortune of being 
mischaracterized by early historians, the Mexican government, and the population at 
large. The Mexican educational system, never losing its tone of revolutionary rhetoric, 
emulates the achievements of liberal heroes such as Hidalgo, Juárez, and Cárdenas, 
while downplaying the contributions of conservative men like Iturbide and Díaz. In the 
same manner, the Cristeros and Sinarquistas are dismissed as reactionary movements 
that dared fight the “will” of the revolutionary people.  
This perception of history denies that the Mexican Revolution disregarded the 
needs of many Mexicans, who chose to join these movements in order to express their 
popular will. By refuting their popular nature, this view ignores the contribution that the 
movements made to the development of modern Mexico. It was because of this mass 
support that the Cristero Rebellion and the Sinarquista Movement turned into such 
formidable threats that they were able to force the Mexican government to retreat from 
its route of apostasy and socialism that it had embarked upon. These movements kept 
Mexico on a centrist path, an immeasurable contribution that is felt to this day. 
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